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Chapter 1 Introduction 
  
‘Management is a curious phenomenon. It is generously paid, enormously influential and 
often significantly devoid of common sense.’   
 --Henry Mintzberg1  
    
1.1 Research Background  
Companies, or corporations, are ubiquitous business entities worldwide.2 Our lives are 
intertwined with numerous companies, domestic or overseas, giants or start-ups. We buy 
and consume products and services from them; we may work for or invest in them. 
Browsing the headlines on a webpage or in a newspaper, one often comes across some 
reports on the recent events and status of eminent companies. The interactions between 
companies, i.e., transactions, collaboration and competition, constitute the dynamic of the 
overall economy.  
In general, the party which steers a corporate vehicle is the centralized management 
body—the board of directors.3 Directors stand at the top of the corporate hierarchy, make 
discretionary decisions, and control business operations. 4 Associated with such controlling 
power is the concern with their performance. As early as the 18th century, when the joint-
stock company emerged as a royal chartered business entity for overseas trade, Adam 
Smith, in his famous monograph, observed that directors in joint-stock companies ‘manage 
 
1  Henry Mintzberg, ‘Musing on Management: Ten Ideas Designed to Rile Everyone Who Cares about   
Management’, (1996) 74 Harvard Business Review, p. 61.  
2 The term ‘company’ and ‘corporation’ are used interchangeably in this thesis, unless otherwise stated. Here, 
both these terms refer to legal entities with structural characteristics: separate legal personality, limited 
liability of shareholders, transferable shares, centralized management structure, and equity ownership. 
3 The classic model is of a board of directors making major business decisions for the company. Although 
controlling shareholders or senior management personnel may hold corporate control on individual occasions, 
the exercise of corporate control is still greatly dependent on the board of directors in general. See Reinier H. 
Kraakman, John Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki 
Kanda, and Edward Rock, The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach Second 
Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 5. Hereinafter this book is referred to as ‘Kraakman et al., 
The Anatomy’.  
4 For a comprehensive survey of the board’s role, see Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael S. Weisbach, 
‘Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature’, 
(2001) NBER Working Paper No. 8161, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8161 (accessed 
24/09/2019). 
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other people’s money’ and could not be expected to exercise the same degree of caution 
and vigilance as the directors who owned the companies.5    
This concern is not entirely unnecessary. Indeed, corporate frauds, scandals, and 
collapses have never been rare incidences, and sometimes, devastating ramifications may 
ensue. In the event of failures and collapses, shareholders and creditors suffer investment 
losses, while employees lose their jobs. Domino effects at the macro-economic level might 
occur, such as frustration in market confidence, plummeting financial markets, and even 
economic turbulence. For instance, the appalling accounting scandal and bankruptcy of 
Enron in the US at the start of this century resulted in losses to shareholders of up to $74 
billion, tens of thousands of employees jobless, and a huge shortage in the pension funds of 
former employees.6 In 2002, WorldCom was discovered to have committed accounting 
frauds that had inflated the company’s assets by an estimate of $11 billion.7 This wave of 
corporate scandals triggered an immediate regulatory response and heated scholarly debate 
in the US.8  
    More recently, in 2008, Lehman Brothers, the fourth largest investment bank in the 
world, took the bankruptcy record in the US, far surpassing WorldCom and Enron in scale 
of assets.9  The failure of Lehman Brothers was invoked and escalated because of the 
national housing market slump, as this company mainly engaged in the business of 
subprime mortgage loans to sustain a dominant position in the market.10 Commentators 
attributed the failure and subprime mortgage crisis to the weakness of risk management in 
the banking sector.11 
 
5 Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nation 1776 Canna Edition (New York: Modern library, 1937), p. 700. 
6  ‘The Real Scandal’ in The Economist (2002), available at http://www.economist.com/node/940091 
(accessed 24/09/2019).   
7  ‘WorldCom’s Collapse: The Overview’ in The New York Times (2002), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/22/us/worldcom-s-collapse-the-overview-worldcom-files-for-bankruptcy-
largest-us-case.html (accessed 24/09/2019). 
8 The US Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to strengthen the information disclosure of 
publicly listed companies and enhance corporate governance. For an academic evaluation of this Act, see 
Roberta Romano, ‘The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance’, ECGI 
working paper (2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=596101 (accessed 
24/09/2019). For related empirical studies, see Ivy Xiying Zhang, ‘Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002’, (2007) 44 Journal of Accounting and Economics, pp. 74-115.  
9  ‘Unravelling Lehman Brothers’ in Reuters, the Wider Image (2013), available at 
https://widerimage.reuters.com/story/unravelling-lehman-brothers (accessed 24/09/2019).  
10 Ibid.  
11 The OECD reported ‘The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis’ in 2009, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/42229620.pdf (accessed 24/09/2019).  
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    Almost every country has encountered its Enron, WorldCom and similar incidents.12 As 
economic activities become increasingly complicated, well-conceived schemes and 
complex business models are structured and arranged to conceal debts, losses, and even 
illegal gains and payments. The difficulty of combatting management misfeasance and 
malfeasance is increasing.  
A classic debate in the disciplines of management and ethics continues over the reasons 
for corporate scandals. Are certain individuals or organizational defects to blame? 13 
Meanwhile, national regulatory authorities or professional associations formulate 
numerous guidelines and codes to promote the standard model and best practices for 
governance.14 Scholars from various disciplines have analysed the models recommended in 
the guidelines and codes, both theoretically and empirically.   
Corporate law or company law usually offers or confirms a set of methods to mitigate 
management opportunism, which include prescriptive rules and standards of management 
behaviour, entry and exit terms for shareholders, and such governance strategies as power 
to select or remove directors and officers, ratification of management decisions and reward 
mechanisms.15 Among others, the method to directly regulate management behaviour is to 
require or prohibit specific behaviour in legal norms and to leave adjudicators to determine 
the compliance with legal norms after the fact.  
Over the past decades, major EU and Asian countries have introduced and transplanted 
the concept of fiduciary duties of loyalty and care from Anglo-American corporate law to 
 
12  Many news reports on corporate scandals, such as ‘The Corporate Scandal Sheet’, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/2002/07/25/accountingtracker.html; ‘VW and the Never-ending Cycle of Corporate 
Scandals’, available at http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34572562 (accessed 24/09/2019). 
13 Neal M. Ashkanasy, Carolyn A. Windsor, and Linda K. Trevino, ‘Bad Apples in Bad Barrels Revisited: 
Cognitive Moral Development, Just World Beliefs, Rewards, and Ethical Decision-Making’, (2006) 16 
Business Ethics Quarterly, pp. 449-473.  
14 The 1992 UK Cadbury Report (The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance) was the first corporate 
governance code in the world, with an emphasis on financial reporting and accountability among all the 
aspects of corporate governance. The listed companies in the London Stock Exchange are required to comply 
with this code or to explain the reasons for non-compliance, available at 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/cadbury.pdf (accessed 24/09/2019).  
Afterwards, major jurisdictions and international organizations subsequently laid down their codes of 
corporate governance. For index of these codes, visit the ECGI website 
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php (accessed 24/09/2019).  
15 See Kraakman et al., The Anatomy, pp. 21-31. This book provides a generic framework to analyse and 
compare corporate law in different jurisdictions. The authors use the term ‘legal strategies’ to refer to the 
methods commonly deployed in corporate law to address agency problems, and they categorize legal 
strategies into regulatory and governance strategies, and ex ante and ex post strategies.   
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better discipline management.16 Nevertheless, a common observation is that the successful 
transplantation of the fiduciary duty principle to a civil law jurisdiction is quite difficult.17 
China, among others, made a comprehensive amendment to its Company Law in 2005 and 
imported duties of loyalty and care in tandem with shareholders derivative action.18  
Overall, China’s legal system has primarily followed the civil law tradition. The sources 
of law are the provisions formulated in the statutes and codes, and the judges cannot 
interpret legal rules to the extent that they almost establish a new law. Thus, it poses a 
great challenge to Chinese judges to apply the general and inclusive principle of fiduciary 
duty to specific and ever-changing business practices.   
Moreover, the context is unique. As a transitional country, China has undergone a series 
of reforms and changes in its economic system, market institutions, political regime, and 
societal spheres. In particular, many giant companies are state-owned or state-controlled, 
and they have distinct organizational characteristics and management issues in this 
transitional context. In the private sector, a concentrated ownership structure is 
commonplace and close connections with local government remain well maintained to 
obtain favourable policy treatment in the locality.19  
In the stock market, a great majority of investors are individuals rather than investment 
institutions in terms of headcount. These individual investors usually have limited access 
to, and are less capable of analysing market information. Moreover, they usually do not 
have a well-diversified portfolio to spread or hedge risks, and therefore are more 
susceptible to corporate frauds and failures.20  Meanwhile, low efficiency, management 
scandals, and ‘tunnelling’ the funds of listed companies are chronic problems that inhibit 
enterprise development and economic growth.21  The relevance of fiduciary duties and 
 
16 See, e.g., Vassil Breskovski, ‘Directors’ Duty of Care in Eastern Europe’, (1995) 29 International Lawyers, 
pp. 77-97.  
17 Katharina Pistor and Chenggang Xu, ‘Fiduciary Duty in Transitional Civil Law Jurisdictions: Lessons 
from the Incomplete Law Theory’, in Curtis J. Milhaupt (ed.), Global Markets, Domestic Institutions: 
Corporate Law and Governance in a New Era of Cross-Border Deals (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2003), p. 78.  
18 For the official translation of the Company Law, please visit the website of national legislation authority— 
National People’s Congress (NPC), http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-
12/13/content_1384124.htm (accessed 24/09/2019).  
19 Hongbo Duan and Abdul Razak bin Chik, ‘Institutional Environment, Political Connection and Financial 
Constraints—Evidence from Private Enterprise in China’, (2012) 1 Business and Management Research, pp. 
133-140.  
20 Juan Yao, Chuanchan Ma, and William Peng He, ‘Investor Herding Behaviour of Chinese Stock Market’, 
(2014) 29 International Review of Economics and Finance, pp. 12-29.   
21 Guoping Li, ‘The Pervasiveness and Severity of Tunneling by Controlling Shareholders in China’, (2010) 
21 China Economic Review, pp. 310-323.  
10A_BW EdleXun_stand.job




liabilities to China’s governance problems is an interesting, yet barely explored topic. This 
thesis addresses the universal concern with management misconduct and doctrinal 
convergence of directors’ duties and liabilities by focusing on the Chinese case.  
1.2 Research Questions  
Previous studies mostly focused on the design and formulation of the duty and liability 
rules from a rule-based comparison perspective and identified the differences between 
Chinese corporate legislation and the state corporate laws in the US. In recent years, the 
research focus has moved to enforcement practices regarding directors’ duties and 
liabilities.  
However, these studies do not enunciate policy goals and the functional rationale clearly 
or sufficiently. Too often, it was mistakenly assumed that the US model was a one-size-
fits-all approach; the contextual discrepancy between different jurisdictions is not given 
close attention and careful consideration. Consequently, the recommendations proposed to 
improve directors’ duties and liabilities in China might not be grounded in a solid basis.  
For the purposes of exposition, this thesis uses the terms ‘legal strategy’ and ‘duty and 
liability strategy’ interchangeably to refer to the legal duties that directors owe to the 
company or shareholders and legal liabilities for the breach of such duties. In this sense, 
the legal strategy involves the legal norms to dictate requirements or prohibition of 
management behaviour and the enforcement mechanism to hold directors liable, mainly 
through private actions resorting to judicial review.        
This thesis attempts to situate this duty and liability strategy in China’s context and to 
employ a generic analytical framework to specifically identify how this legal strategy can 
and should function in this particular context. As such, the ultimate goal of this thesis is to 
address the following research question:  
How and to what extent does the legal strategy—directors’ duties and liabilities—
ameliorate the agency problems in China?  
    The term ‘agency problem’, deriving from the agency theory, refers to the problems 
arising from the principal-agent relationship, where agents are granted discretionary 
powers by the principal and expected to exercise such power in the best interest of the 
10B_BW EdleXun_stand.job
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principal.22 In fact, agents may commit self-regarding acts in different forms at the expense 
of the principals’ interests, which are conceptualized as agency problems. Chapter 2 
presents further elaboration on the agency theory, which is the underpinning theory of 
corporate law.  
To pursue the functional investigation of directors’ duties and liabilities, this thesis is 
structured to deal with the following sub-questions:  
• What is the rationale of directors’ duties and liabilities? Is there any theoretical 
approach to or a framework for an analysis of this duty and liability strategy? 
First, a clear understanding of the rationale and working mechanism of directors’ duties 
and liabilities is needed. Put differently, it is necessary to examine why legal duties and 
liabilities are imposed on directors and the policy goals to be fulfilled by the duty and 
liability strategy in relation to managerial conduct. Moreover, a theoretical approach or a 
framework is necessary to enable the following analysis to assess the usefulness of the duty 
and liability strategy and recognize the factors conducive to the usefulness of the legal 
liability strategy.  
The economic discipline has provided sufficient explanations for the conflicts of 
interests in a corporate entity, which are likely to give rise to management wrong-doing. In 
addition, the economic analysis of law can serve as a tool to examine the impact of legal 
norms. Thus, the first step is to draw an analytical roadmap with reference to previous 
economic literature.  
• What agency problems are China’s companies likely to encounter?  
Before a thorough examination of the duty and liability strategy, it is necessary to 
identify the context in which this legal strategy is put in place, such as the extent of 
separation of ownership and control and the function of boards of directors in general. 
Following the logic of the agency theory, this contextual survey boils down to the 
following aspects: (1) agency problems confronting companies in China; (2) whether and 
to what degree market mechanisms help to reduce the agency problems; and (3) whether 
and how internal governance may prevent the agency problems ex ante.  
• How are directors’ duties and liabilities designed and formulated in Chinese 
corporate legislation? 
 
22 See infra Section 2.3 Agency Theory for definition of agency problems.  
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    This sub-question concerns fiduciary duties and liabilities of directors in China’s 
corporate legislation. Clearly, it is very difficult to codify the fiduciary duties of loyalty 
and care, originally developed in a body of case law, into statutory provisions. Thus, a 
doctrinal analysis of the relevant provisions per se is meaningful and is also a preliminary 
step for the functional investigation.     
• How are the laws of directors’ duties and liabilities working in practice in China? 
Are directors’ liabilities substantially enforced?  
    Pound has drawn the famous distinction between ‘law in books’ and ‘law in action’,23 
which has inspired many legal scholars to study the functioning aspect of law in practice. 
The effect of legal rules on management practice is largely dependent on how these legal 
rules are actually interpreted and enforced. Therefore, a survey on the pattern and intensity 
of the enforcement of directors’ duties and liabilities is crucial.    
• Considering the current efficacy of this legal strategy, what improvements or 
adjustments can be made in furtherance of management practices in China?  
The central research question consists of two dimensions of inquiries: positive analysis 
and normative analysis.24  Namely, this thesis not only examines the present status of 
directors’ duties and liabilities in books and in action, but also attempts to identify the 
normative status—what this legal strategy should be like in China.  
    In accordance with the agency theory, the strategy of directors’ duties and liabilities is 
interrelated with other devices and factors that may affect directors’ performances, such as 
internal governance, the dynamics of market mechanisms, and even management culture. 
Namely, when the market and contractual instruments can effectively incentivise the best 
performance of directors, the legal strategy would be less desirable. Thus, the normative 
status of the legal strategy is discussed in consideration of the deterrence and incentives 
generated by other instruments in a particular context.  
    Furthermore, this thesis proposes workable adjustments and improvements to bridge the 
gap between the positive and normative status. Law-making techniques, the authority, 
competence, and independence of the judges, relevant procedural rules, and the costs of 
 
23 Roscoe Pound, ‘Law in Books and Law in Action’, (1910) 44 American Law Review, p. 12.  
24 Economists hold the positive-normative dichotomy. Positive studies are mainly about ‘what is the case’, 
while normative statement discusses what ‘ought to be’ like. See Samuel C. Weston, ‘Toward a Better 
Understanding of the Positive/ Normative Distinction in Economics’, (1994) 10 Economics and Philosophy, 
pp. 1-17.  
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enforcement are all relevant factors, and therefore, would be examined in making policy 
and legal recommendations.   
1.3 Academic and Practical Relevance   
This study of one legal strategy in one single country has broader significance and provides 
a consideration to a general theoretical debate. First, this study yields useful insights into 
the transplantation of the fiduciary duty principle. Some challenges and difficulties arising 
from the introduction of fiduciary duties and liabilities are common to civil law countries, 
especially the transitional ones.25 The experience and lessons that China has gained can be 
enlightening for other countries in an effort to refine their equivalent rules.  
Second, the comprehensive view of China’s corporate governance, market infrastructure, 
and judicial institutions may also shed light on the discussion of other issues in areas of 
Chinese corporate and securities law, such as the protection of minority shareholders 
against expropriation by controlling shareholders and securities litigation.  
Third, this study presents distinct evidence for the theoretical debate of convergence-
persistence. Theoretical observations about the development of corporate governance 
worldwide identify two competing lines: convergence and persistence.26 On the one hand, 
corporate convergence theory explains why convergence occurs worldwide, classifies 
different types of convergence, and reveals the driving forces that determine the 
convergence and control the pace of convergence. 27  On the other hand, the path-
dependence theory emphasises the role of initial corporate structure and corporate rules in 
shaping the development trajectory, which is termed as rule driven and structure driven 
path dependence.28  
China’s experience of corporatization reform and corporate governance development 
can well exemplify or help refine some propositions of this convergence-persistence debate. 
One prominent aspect is the transformation of state intervention into state ownership and 
 
25 See supra note 16 in this chapter.   
26  Jeffrey N. Gordon and Mark J. Roe (eds.), Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).   
27 Ronald J. Gilson, ‘Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence in Form or Function’, in ibid., pp. 
125-158. The author describes the convergence at three levels: ‘functional convergence (when existing 
governance institutions are responsive to change without change in the rules), formal convergence (when the 
legislative framework is adapted) and contractual convergence (when companies have to adapt contractually 
as domestic institutions are not flexible enough to accommodate change and political obstacles will not allow 
formal convergence)’.  
28 Lucian Arye Bebchuck and Mark J. Roe, ‘A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and 
Governance’, (1999) 52 Stanford Law Review, pp. 127-170.  
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how state-owned companies struggle with the wrestling forces of traditional legacy from 
the central planning era and modernization momentum within the governance structure. 
Conversely, this theoretical debate also provides an insight into predicting future 
development and dynamics in China.  
Fourth, ‘why law matters’ and ‘how law matters’ to corporate governance remain topics 
of intense discussion.29 Liberal opinion believes that corporate law only provides default 
rules to reduce transaction costs among constituent parties, and enables private parties to 
make their own arrangements through internal charters. 30  The opposing argument 
emphasises that the quality of corporate law is a determinant of the prosperity of 
corporations and the securities market. 31  Closely related to this point, the under-
development of the securities market and a concentrated ownership structure in transitional 
countries are linked to the weak enforcement of corporate law. With particular regard to 
self-regarding actions, it is believed that company law only plays a trivial role in deterring 
shirking.32  
This thesis analyses the function of directors’ duties and liabilities, one important 
component of company law, in a transitional country, which enriches discussions on the 
correlation of corporate law and corporate governance. Moreover, it reveals when, and to 
what extent, legal duties and liabilities are required to control opportunistic behaviour.  
Besides academic relevance, this thesis might also be interesting to investors and 
professional managers. Chapter 3 provides a comprehensive picture of the local context 
and Chinese corporate governance, from which investors, domestic or overseas, which start 
firms or invest in them in China, may obtain information pertaining to market institutions, 
legal framework and policy issues.  
Chapters 4 and 5 together present an estimate of the liability risk that incumbent or 
prospective directors and officers need to be aware of so as to avoid disputes and monetary 
liabilities. In addition, investors can predict the average degree of management 
accountability to take corresponding measures to ensure their investment returns.   
1.4 Methodology and Materials  
 
29 See infra Section 2.4 Why Law Matters in Chapter 2.   
30 See infra note 45 in Chapter 2 (Easterbrook and Fischel 1991).  
31 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny, ‘Investor Protection and 
Corporate Governance’, (2000) 58 Journal of financial Economics, pp. 3-27.  
32 Mark J. Roe, ‘Corporate Law’s Limits’, (2001) 31 Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 233-271.  
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This thesis applies the following research methods to deal appropriately with the central 
research question and the sub-questions: literature review, economic analysis of law, legal 
doctrinal analysis, analysis of judicial and administrative decisions, and comparative 
analysis.  
Literature review  
Literature review is a prerequisite to scientific research, as it provides an overview of 
previous studies. This method helps understand the state-of-art of the research subject and 
identify the starting points of further investigation or the gaps in research.33 The argument 
in this thesis is based on multi-disciplinary literature. To illustrate the context in which a 
law applies, it refers to extensive literature on China’s economic environment and 
corporate governance, and uses corresponding empirical evidence from the disciplines of 
management, accounting and finance. Meanwhile, it also includes original discussions by 
economists, since the discipline of economics contributes substantially to the theories of 
the firm and corporate law.  
    First-hand literature written in Chinese is also integral to this research and mostly 
retrieved from the CNKI database.34 This database is the largest and most comprehensive 
database of academic journals, official Yearbooks, and major conference papers in China. 
For readers who do not read Mandarin Chinese, the abstracts in English that most articles 
have are still accessible. 
Economic analysis of law  
Law and economics, or the economic analysis of law, is the prevailing scholarship in the 
company law realm.35 The reach of this scholarship expands from the US, UK to EU and 
Asian countries in the trend of corporate convergence.36 This thesis views the corporate 
context in China through the lens of the agency theory, which is a branch of economic 
theories of firms; it particularly identifies the inherent conflict of interests of Chinese 
 
33 See Jane Webster and Richard T. Watson, ‘Analyzing the Past to Prepare for the Future: Writing a 
Literature Review’, (2002) 26 MIS Quarterly, pp. xiii-xxiii. 
34  The CNKI (China National Knowledge Infrastructure) database is available at http://www.cnki.net/ 
(accessed 19/10/2019).  
35 Claire A. Hill and Brett H. McDonnell (eds.), Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012), p. 1. 
36 For UK’s interdisciplinary experience in the company law area, see Brian R. Cheffins, ‘Using Theory to 
Study Law: A Company Law Perspective’, (1999) 58 The Cambridge Law Journal, pp. 197-221.  
For acceptance of economic analysis of law in civil law countries, see Robert D. Cooter and James R. 
Gordley, ‘Economic Analysis in Civil Law Countries: Past, Present, Future’, (1991) 11 International Review 
of Law and Economics, pp. 261-263.  
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companies. Meanwhile, this thesis especially mentions the transitional characteristics of 
Chinese companies and management practices, since the agency theory, based on the US 
experience, may not fully capture or explain them.  
Moreover, it uses the rational choice theory and the concept of incentives in micro-
economic discipline to analyse the impact of legal rules on management conduct. The 
thesis raises a series of relevant issues: the consequences of breach of legal duties for 
directors; whether liability rules generate substantial deterrence to wrong-doing; and 
whether prospective plaintiffs decide on filing lawsuits to enforce directors’ liabilities in 
the current circumstances. It adopts a cost-benefit analysis to assess the necessity and 
efficiency of the duty and liability strategy, especially the liabilities for breach of the duty 
of care.   
Legal doctrinal analysis   
This thesis employs doctrinal analysis—the traditional method in legal research—to 
address the sub-question of how directors’ duties and liabilities are specified in the legal 
norms. China’s legal system resembles civil law tradition with legal principles and norms 
codified in statutes. Therefore, the first step is to determine the statutes relevant to the 
research subject. The subsequent steps involve the review and discussion of the literal 
meaning, legislative design, and interpretation of pertinent provisions. Besides, it also 
investigates the relationship of those provisions and the circumstances of their application. 
The thesis also reviews legislative drafts, guidelines, policy document, and mainstream 
opinions in the academic community, to offer interpretative arguments.  
Analysis of judicial decisions and administrative penalty decisions    
This thesis analyses judicial decisions and administrative penalty decisions to reveal the 
enforcement pattern of directors’ liabilities. In other words, which type of management 
wrong-doing is likely to invoke formal enforcement in practice? How are the monetary 
liabilities determined? Moreover, the judicial decisions and administrative penalty 
decisions reflect the interpretation and practice of laws, even though the primary sources of 
Chinese law are the statutes, and judicial decisions do not have precedential effect.  
The cases are collected from Wolters Kluwer China Law Database and the official 
website of China’s securities authority. Detailed explanations for case collection and more 
information about the databases are provided in Chapter 5. An all-round analysis of 
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plaintiffs, defendants, claimed damages, disputed issues, and other aspects are made, both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. Equally important, such analysis exemplifies how 
adjudicators interpret and apply the legal rules.  
It should be noted that the selected cases greatly approximate to, but cannot precisely 
depict, real enforcement practices, because public access to judicial decisions is not fully 
granted in China.  
Comparative analysis 
Mathias Siems describes general comparative methods specifically applicable to the area 
of corporate law, which include (1) rule-based comparison; (2) functional comparison; (3) 
classifications of legal systems; (4) comparative law in context; (5) historical comparative 
perspective; (6) transnational and comparative law; and (7) applied comparative law.37 
Because China’s legal system for corporate entities, securities trading, and other related 
areas replicates the experiences and models of western countries, it is inevitable to make 
implicit comparisons even for the sole purpose of this country study.  
As a starting point, this thesis introduces the original model of the fiduciary duty in the 
US case laws to illustrate how this legal strategy is imported but formulated differently in 
China. In addition, this thesis refers to the German model of the two-tier board because of 
its influence on China’s corporate structure. Therefore, there is an implicit rule-based 
comparison38 for illustrative purposes.    
In addition, previous literature on the economic analysis of directors’ duties and 
liabilities mostly targeted US state laws, and such economic analysis considers the local 
market institutions and judicial system to evaluate the reasonableness of the current 
practice of directors’ liabilities in the US. As stated, such theoretical analysis is used as a 
roadmap for the country study of China. Thus, much work in this thesis takes the 
perspective of a ‘historical and functional comparison’ and ‘comparison in context’.  
1.5 Structure  
After the introductory chapter, the structure of this thesis is designed as follows. Chapter 2 
presents a theoretical view of directors’ fiduciary duties and liabilities by following the line 
 
37 See Mathias M. Siems, ‘The Methods of Comparative Corporate Law’, in Roman Tomasic (ed.), Routledge 
Handbook of Corporate Law (London: Routledge, 2017), pp. 11-31.  
38 For more explanation of rule-based comparison, see Mathias M. Siems, Comparative Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 95.  
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of economic thinking. First, it reviews the nature of the firms from a theoretical perspective 
and the reason for exercise of decision-making power by directors and officers becoming a 
practical concern. Second, it discusses the justification for legal intervention in 
management conduct. This issue is often taken for granted by legal scholars. Yet, the 
economists generally hold that legal intervention comes into play only in the event of 
contractual failure and market failure, and when the benefit of legal intervention outweighs 
its cost. 39  Thus, a thorough examination of market disciplining mechanisms and 
concomitant incentive schemes is conducted to explain ‘why law matters’. Third, this 
thesis reviews and summarises an analysis of the behavioural impact of duty and liability 
rules. For this part, the focus is on the monetary liabilities for breach of duty of care. The 
cost-benefit analysis of the liability regime is examined as well.  
Chapter 3 looks into the market and corporate context where directors’ duties and 
liabilities are implemented, with a focus on the landscape of China’s corporate governance. 
It first presents a brief overview of enterprise development to help understand the present 
status of China’s companies. Second, it examines the structural characteristics, including 
ownership structure, control pattern, and the role of the board. Associated with these 
structural characteristics, it then identifies the generic management problems. Third, it 
undertakes a general evaluation of the development and function of China’s stock market 
to reveal the market pressure for directors. This chapter also discusses the working of 
typical incentive schemes in China, enumerated in Chapter 2.  
Chapter 4 examines the ‘law in book’ specific to directors’ duties and liabilities in China 
through the following steps: (1) identify the source of law; (2) review the development 
trajectory of company, bankruptcy, and securities legislation; (3) identify the regulatory 
approach and general structure of directors’ duties; (4) explain the meaning and 
implication for each prong of directors’ duties; (5) reveal the legal nature of liability; (6) 
clarify the elements that establish the liabilities; (7) introduce the cause of actions, 
typically that of a derivative action; (8) delineate the duty of directors in listed companies 
to disclose information; (9) and investigate directors’ duties to the creditors in case of 
insolvency.  
Chapter 5 mainly analyses the judicial decisions and administrative sanctions to capture 
how directors’ duties and liabilities are enforced and administered. First, it illustrates the 
 
39 N. Gregory Mankiw, Principle of Microeconomics fourth edition (Mason: Thomson South-Western, 2007), 
p. 9.  
14B_BW EdleXun_stand.job
Directors’ Duties and Liabilities in China 
14 
 
interpretation and application of legal text with reference to the judicial opinions and 
administrative penalty decisions. Second, it collects and analyses data to demonstrate the 
utility of private litigation and administrative investigation. Third, it identifies and 
examines the reasons for the current enforcement practices, such as the procedural hurdles 
and judicial incompetence. The ultimate goal of this chapter is to uncover the degree of 
liability risk that directors in China face today.  
Chapter 6 brings together the findings drawn from the previous chapters, applies the 
agency theory, and makes functional observations on whether the degree of deterrence 
arising from legal liabilities to directors is sufficient and appropriate in that context. 
Moreover, this chapter draws conclusions and makes recommendations for necessary and 
feasible improvements and adjustments to enhance the function of directors’ duties and 
liabilities in China.   
1.6 Scope of Study and Limitations  
This thesis is generally concerned with the issue of incentivising directors and officers to 
pursue the best interests of the company and the shareholders. Its primary focus is on how 
legal duties and liabilities address this issue. Indeed, a myriad of duties and liabilities are 
imposed on directors and officers to strengthen the regulations pertaining to the external 
impact of corporate activities such as environmental protection, production safety, and 
market order and competitiveness. However, this thesis primarily examines the internal 
relationship between directors and shareholders. Hence, it will not include the designing 
and enforcement of those duties and liabilities for the ultimate goal of controlling corporate 
activities from a public welfare perspective.   
With regard to fraud, theft, corruption, and other egregious acts, which directly damage 
the interests of companies and shareholders, criminal law is one important type of legal 
control. However, this thesis does not touch upon criminal offences committed by directors, 
since criminal punishment is peripheral to corporate governance and involves multiple 
policy goals, such as market order and economic safety, rather than efficient management. 
Note that the intentional omission of criminal liabilities of directors does not negate the 
utility of deterring undesirable management behaviour. 
This research examines the operation of a newly imported legal strategy and its role in 
China. Although the theoretical framework and the model of the legal strategy are 
primarily based on US case law, this thesis does not employ separate chapters to make 
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equally specific analysis of the US model. Even the implicit comparison only intends to 
shed light on China’s practices rather than assess the efficiency of the original model in the 
US. Moreover, this thesis does not address the justification for transplanting the US model 
into China, but only examines the function and impact of such transplantation in China.     
Another gap in this thesis is examining the influence of the legal provisions of directors’ 
duties and liabilities on management behaviour through informal or extra-legal channels. 
This research only identifies how the violation of legal provisions triggers private litigation 
or administrative investigation through case studies. However, it does not explore the 
factors conducive to voluntary compliance. Besides, it is well worth studying the extent of 
the reputational concern for directors and companies. For prominent companies and 
professional managers, economic losses arising from a damaged reputation might be far 
more than the cost of monetary penalties. Future studies can employ questionnaires and 
interviews to obtain first-hand information from practitioners, which may result in some 


























Chapter 2 Law and Economics of Directors’ Duties and Liabilities 
  
2.1 Introduction   
It is a common practice to prescribe how directors and officers perform their functions in 
firms as legal duties, and hold them liable for any breaches of such legal duties. Despite 
subtle differences among various jurisdictions, this chapter aims to present a theoretical 
view of this legal strategy, namely, to understand the functional rationale, analyse the 
working mechanisms, and assess the efficacy of this legal strategy.  
    This chapter fulfils these tasks by following the scholarship of law and economics, 
which arguably occupies a dominant position in the realm of company law.1 Economic 
theories vitalize the studies of company law in two inter-related ways. First, economic 
theories provide significant insights into corporate activities and lay down the fundamental 
framework for such studies as the regulation of corporate activities. Second, economic 
analysis is a useful tool to discern the impact of legal rules on individual behaviour. Such 
potential impact is often considered in the formulation and implementation of legal rules.       
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 examines corporate 
entities to explain why they are most frequently used and identifies the role of a board of 
directors in corporate activities. This section has two sub-sections: the first revisits the 
economic theories about the nature of the firm; the second portrays the legal characteristics 
of the companies and of their major constituent parties. Section 2.3 reviews the agency 
theory, which identifies and addresses the problems associated with managerial behaviour. 
Section 2.4 deals with why law matters to managerial behaviour and recognizes substantial 
room left by contract failure and market failure in addressing the agency problems. Section 
2.5 analyses how legal duties and liabilities play a role in promoting the desirable 
performance of directors, factors that contribute to the usefulness of legal duties and 
liabilities, and the functional boundary of legal liabilities. Section 2.6 presents the 
concluding remarks.    
2.2. Law and Economics of Corporate Entities  
 
1 See supra note 35 in Chapter 1. 
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Companies, or corporations, are the most common vehicles for business around the world.2 
People are accustomed to their lives filled with the supplies of products and services by 
numerous companies. Giant global companies have built empires of wealth even mightier 
than some states. The complex and dynamic phenomena specific to companies have 
aroused extensive research interests. This section first reviews the economists’ exploration 
into why firms exist and then presents a functional rationale for the structural 
characteristics of companies.   
2.2.1 The Nature of the Firm     
For generations, economists have discussed the nature of the firm and developed 
competing theories, which shed light on the understanding of corporate activities.3 Each 
strand of theory contains voluminous literature. This sub-section focuses on the milestone 
works to sketch the line of theories that subsequent scholars commonly follow. The core 
ideas and concepts of the following economic theories are frequently used to analyse the 
activities of companies and constituent parties. 
Neo-classic economic theory of the firm 
Neo-classic economics viewed firms as market players and assumed that firms are 
managed to maximize profits. 4  How production is organized within a firm was not 
investigated. According to neo-classic economics, the supply and demand of a product in 
the market would reach an equilibrium status, trading at a certain price with a certain 
amount. Via countless transactions in the market, production is efficiently co-ordinated and 
resources allocated to the best use. Firms are merely ‘black boxes’ with input of resources 
and output of products.  
Early works on the nature of the firm  
Why do firms exist at all? Coase first asked this question in his seminal work, Nature of 
the Firm, in 1937.5 This question and related inquiries—the choice of market or firm and 
the boundary between the market and firm are common threads through ensuing 
discussions. In other words, economists have continued asking why some transactions are 
 
2 See supra note 2 in Chapter 1 for the clarification about the use of term ‘company’ and term ‘corporation’.  
3 See Oliver Hart, ‘An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm’, (1989) 89 Columbia Law Review, 
p. 1757.  
4 See Jean Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1998), p. 15. The 
author reviewed the neo-classical economic theory of the firm and approved of its usefulness in explaining 
strategic interactive activities between firms in an imperfectly competitive market.  
5 Ronald H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’, (1937) 4 Economica, pp. 386-405.   
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taking place in a firm while other transactions happen in the marketplace. Coase 
inventively identified that the use of the price system incurs the costs of information 
discovery in the marketplace. Negotiation and conclusion of transactions and policing and 
enforcing the contractual obligation all give rise to substantial costs. This is the conceptual 
origin of transaction cost. A firm has the authority to direct and co-ordinate production in 
place of market price mechanisms, and thus, saves transaction costs. Yet, the firm 
confronts internal management costs. When the market transaction cost outweighs the 
internal management cost, it is more efficient to organize production within a firm. Thus, 
comparative cost 6  determines where the boundary between market and the firm is 
delineated.7  
Coase’s work did not receive follow-up discussions until the 1970s. Alchian and 
Demsetz held an opinion about firms that is not entirely consistent with Coase.8 They saw 
no difference between a firm’s ‘power of fiat, authority, disciplining action’ and the 
counterparts of any contracting parties in the market. In their opinion, a firm is a 
contractual structure with a central party, which enters separable contracts with input 
owners, and these contracts are subject to continuous renegotiation.9  Such a structure 
enables the shared use of inputs and team production, generating higher productivity than 
the sum of the parts.10 Meanwhile, team production gives rise to the ‘metering problem’ 
and ‘incentive problem’.11 To be specific, it is very difficult or even impossible to measure 
individual contributions and their output, and to determine the corresponding rewards in 
the scenario of team production. Accordingly, input owners are likely to shirk their duties 
due to insufficient incentives. They pointed out two possible solutions for the incentive 
problems: external competition may deter shirking; one specialist monitors individual 
productivity and holds the position of the residual claimant.12  
 
6 See infra note 16 in this chapter. In this argument, Oliver E. Williamson used, ‘comparative costs of 
planning, adapting, and monitoring task completion under alternative governance structure’.  
7 See also Oliver E. Williamson and Sidney G. Winter (eds.), The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, 
and Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 4.  
8 Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, ‘Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization’, (1972) 
66 American Economic Review, pp. 777-795. 
9 Ibid., p. 794.   
10 Ibid., p. 780. 
11 Ibid., p. 778.  
12 Ibid., pp. 781-783.  
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   These pioneering works13 conveyed the dissatisfaction with the neo-classic economic 
view of the firm. They perceived the firm as a ‘nexus of contracts’ and an alternative to the 
market to organize production. They provided explanations for the existence of the firm by 
expounding on why firms are more efficient, or in other words, more productive than 
market institutions, from different perspectives. This line of propositions paved the way for 
further investigation. Amongst others, three major branches of theories, complementary to 
each other, emerged, as follows.14  
Transaction cost approach          
Oliver Williamson espoused Coase’s idea and carved out the transaction cost theory to the 
study of business organizations.15 This approach takes transactions as the analytical units 
and compares different governance structures, especially the market versus the firms in 
terms of the capacity to economize on transaction cost.16 Before comparison, Williamson 
looked into the transactions and elicited three critical dimensions: ‘(1) uncertainty; (2) 
frequency with which transactions recur; and (3) degree to which durable, transaction 
specific investments are required to realize least cost supply’.17  
The third dimension—transaction-specific investment, or termed as asset specificity, is 
the core conception in Williamson’s work, which had never been formulated before. Asset 
 
13 See also the controversial work by Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (Boston: Hart, Schaffner 
& Marx; Houghton Mifflin Co, 1921). Knight identified the differences between risk and uncertainty, 
stressed the judgment in addressing uncertainty, and finally explained the existence of organization by the 
judgment of entrepreneurship. Regardless of the controversy, Knight started a strand of theory in parallel to 
Coase—the theories of entrepreneurship.   
14  Other branches include: (1) implicit contract theory of the firm, see George Baker, Robert Gibbons, and 
Kevin J. Murphy, ‘Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm’, (2002) 117 Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, pp. 39-84. They demonstrate that the firm sustains relational contract in a different way from the 
market does and the parties to a firm are more inclined to perform implicit terms because of the concerns of 
relationship maintenance.  
(2) the firm viewed as a communication network, see Jacob Marschak and Roy Radner, Economic Theory of 
Teams (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972). The firm enjoys the benefits of specialized information 
processing and the aggregate communication network. The firm emerges when such benefit outweighs the 
cost of communication.  
15  A series of works by Williamson advance the main body of the transaction cost theory: Oliver E. 
Williamson, ‘Transaction-cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relationship’, (1979) 22 Journal 
of Law and Economics, pp. 233-261; Williamson, ‘The Economic of Organization: The Transaction Cost 
Approach’, (1981) 87 American Journal of Sociology, pp. 548-577; Williamson, Economic Institutions of 
Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1985).  
For noteworthy contributions by other scholars to the transaction cost theory, see Douglas C. North, 
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990) and Ronald H. Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm: Influence’, (1998) 4 Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organizations, pp. 33-47.  
16 Williamson (1981), ibid., p. 574. ‘Governance structures that have better transaction cost economizing 
properties will eventually displace those that have worse, ceteris paribus’. 
17 Ibid., p. 555.   
18A_BW EdleXun_stand.job




specificity refers to a situation in which one party has made investments to facilitate long-
term or recurring transactions; yet, such investment is neither transferrable in the market 
nor valuable in other transactions.18 Quite often, human assets, physical assets, and site-
specific assets can be specifically related to recurring transactions, which reduce the cost of 
input into production.19                           
     One may reasonably assume that ‘human agents are subject to bounded rationality’20 
and ‘some agents are given to opportunism’.21 The corollary is that the opportunistic party 
may appropriate part of the transaction-specific asset which was invested in by the other 
party due to an incomplete contract. 22 In comparison with the market, the firm has the 
advantages in reducing opportunism due to common ownership, access to the information, 
and relative ease of resolving disputes among different input suppliers. 23 The transaction 
cost theory is widely used to explain organizational phenomena and becomes the 
cornerstone of management discipline, notwithstanding a barrage of criticism.24   
Property right approach  
Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) formulated the property right 
approach to the nature of the firm using economic models. 25  The main idea of this 
approach is viewing the firm as a collection of the assets it owns and controls. Grossman 
and Hart argued that ownership conferred residual rights of control over the asset. To be 
specific, the residual right of control implies the power to decide the utilization of assets 
for contingences, which the contract cannot spell out, and comes with bargaining power 
over the allocation of the surplus and quasi rent within the transactions. Then the party 
without ownership over the asset may not obtain the ex post return proportionate to the ex 
 
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., p. 553. Williamson referred to Herbert Simon, whose works had developed the idea of bounded 
rationality. See Herbert Simon, Models of Man (New York: Wiley, 1957), Administrative Behaviour (New 
York, Macmillan, 1961), and ‘Rationality as Process and as Product of Thought’, (1978) 68 American 
Economic Review, pp.1-16.  
21 Ibid.  
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid., p. 559.  
24 See, e.g., Sumantra Ghoshal and Peter Moran, ‘Bad for Practice: A Critique of the Transaction Cost 
Theory’, (1996) 21 The Academy of Management Review, pp. 13-47. This paper warns of dangerous 
prescriptions drawn from the transaction cost theory for management practice, but also presents the surveys 
of extant applications and criticism of this theory. 
25 Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart, ‘The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and 
Lateral Integration’, (1986) 94-4 Journal of Political Economy, pp. 691-719; and Oliver Hart and John 
Moore, ‘Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm’, (1990) 98-6 Journal of Political Economy, pp. 1119-
1158.   
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ante investment and even have to face the holdout problem with the ownership party.26 
Eventually, the lack of sufficient incentives would lower the investment of the non-
ownership party in the transactions. The transfer of ownership from one party to another 
accordingly encourages an acquirer’s investment but discourages investment by the party 
acquired. This argument elucidates the cost and benefit of ownership and explains the 
economic reason for the vertical integration of firms.  
    Hart and Moore further developed this theory and considered the effects of incentives on 
employees. When one firm acquires another, the former may only selectively fire the latter 
firm’s employees or ‘fire’ a combination of the assets and employees within the latter firm. 
They emphasize that ownership of assets should be assigned to the party that is 
indispensable to the transaction and who in turn encourages the investment of the 
indispensable party.27 In sum, the property right approach not only reveals efficient asset 
assignment but also helps predict the optimal size of the firm.     
Agency theory   
As stated in the previous chapter, Adam Smith was the first one who suspected that 
directors may not exercise the same vigilance as the partners in a ‘copartnery’ do.28 Until 
the US depression in the 1930s, Berle and Means investigated 200 of the largest non-
banking corporations and observed that, ‘the property owner who invests in a modern 
corporation so far surrenders his wealth to those in control of the corporation’. They 
alleged that the separation of ownership and control ‘destroys the very foundation on 
which the economic order of the past three centuries has rested’. 29  In 1965, Manne 
innovatively argued that the threat of a takeover scheme could assure efficient management, 
and thereby, provide protection to small, non-controlling shareholders,30 when the agency 
theory did not take shape.  
 
26 Ibid. (Grossman and Hart 1986) 
27 See supra note 25 in this chapter for Hart and Moore.  
28 See Adam Smith, supra note 5 in Chapter 1, p. 700.   
‘The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the manager rather of other people’s money 
of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with 
which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own…Negligence and profusion, 
therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company.’ 
29 Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: 
Macmillan, 1932), p. 8.  
30 Henry G. Manne, ‘Merger and the Market for Corporate Control’, (1965) 73 The Journal of Political 
Economy, pp. 110-120. 
19A_BW EdleXun_stand.job




Inspired by the contractual perspective and transaction cost concept, Jensen and 
Meckling formalized the agency theory of the firm in 1976. 31  This theory generally 
concerns any co-operation between two or more people, not only the narrowly defined 
principal-agent relationship, since the risk preference and interest of different parties often 
diverge. 32  The idea of monitoring and verifying individual performances is largely 
consistent with the observations on team production by Alchian and Demsetz.33  
Meanwhile, Fama explained why the separation of security ownership and control, 
although with agency problems, could still be an efficient form of organization.34  He 
considered risk bearing and management as separate factors for production and noted that 
the separation of security ownership and control would facilitate the specialization of risk 
bearing and management. By diversifying their investment portfolio, diffused shareholders 
in large companies become efficient risk-bearers. 35  Managers are disciplined and 
incentivized by a range of sources inside and outside their firms. Because the central topic 
of this thesis is related to management performance, a subsection is devoted to the 
elaboration of the agency theory.  
The agency theory has developed into the prevailing theory framework for corporate law 
and corporate governance. As aptly summarized, the major goal of company law is to 
improve organizational efficiency, i.e., ameliorate agency problems.36 Besides, the agency 
theory has provided insights into information and risk, and it has been broadly applied in 
other disciplines such as management, finance, and even political science.37  
2.2.2 Structural Characteristics and Constituent Parties  
As commonly recognized, companies around the world have five universal structural 
characteristics: separate legal personality, limited liability, transferable shares, centralized 
 
31 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure’, (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 305-360.  
For more general model of economic agency theory, see Stephen A. Ross, ‘The Economic Theory of Agency: 
The Principal’s Problem’, (1973) 63 American Economic Review, pp. 134-139. For institutional agency 
theory, see Barry M. Mitnick, ‘The Theory of Agency: The Policing Paradox and Regulatory Behavior’, 
(1975) 24 Public Choice, pp. 27-42.  
32 Ibid., Jensen and Meckling, p. 311.  
33 Ibid.  
34 Eugene F. Fama, ‘Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’, (1980) 88 Journal of Political Economy, 
pp. 288-307 
35 Ibid.  
36 Kraakman et al., The Anatomy, p. 28.  
37 Susan P. Shapiro, ‘Agency Theory’, (2005) 31 Annual Review of Sociology, pp. 263-284.  
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management under a board structure, and equity ownership. 38  These inter-related 
characteristics are often provided in the corporate statutes, intended to facilitate the co-
operation of management and finance. Meanwhile these legal characteristics reflect a 
balanced scheme of risk allocation between major players in a company.  
Separate legal personality  
A company has its separate legal personality, although many parties are working or making 
investments therein. This separate personality is legally artificial but similar to the status of 
an individual human being in law. A company owns its property, enters into contracts, and 
files a lawsuit or is sued in its own name. As such, individuals join the undertakings by 
entering into contracts with the firm.    
This legal personality also implies the demarcation of the assets of the company and that 
of constituent parties. For one thing, a company’s creditors have no right to a claim over 
the personal assets of constituent parties, nor do the creditors of shareholders or managers 
have a claim over the company’s assets. Combined with the feature of limited liability, the 
equity investors would not be personally liable for the debt of their company. The 
investment risk for shareholders is no more than their actual amount of capital contribution.  
For another, asset separation encourages creditors’ investment. The size of the 
company’s assets indicates the company’s credit. Creditors enforce their claims of debts 
based on the company’s assets. Without the shield of separate personality, shareholders 
could randomly siphon the company’s assets, which would probably impair the interests of 
the company’s creditors and increase the cost of raising debt.39  
Limited liability  
Limited liability means that shareholders are liable for the company’s debt to the amount 
of their capital contribution. The limited liability of shareholders is a device to avoid high 
risk. One company may divide the lines of production and set up several subsidiaries to 
engage in divided parts of production. The parent company is liable for the subsidiaries 
only to the amount of the divided investment.40  
Shareholders contribute funds into the company with nothing but a promise of a share of 
future profit over the lifespan of the company. If the company makes no profit, 
 
38 Kraakman et al., The Anatomy, p. 5.  
39 Ibid., pp. 5-9.  
40 Ibid., pp. 9-11.   
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shareholders gain nothing, merely being able to cash in their shares. Yet it is not certain 
that the value of their shares is lower or higher than that of their investments at the outset. 
If the company goes bankrupt, creditors have priority to claim a fraction of the extant 
assets, whereas none is left for shareholders.41 Any extra liability risk may greatly frustrate 
investment willingness, and in turn, increases the difficulty and cost of obtaining equity 
finance. Moreover, the company’s creditors are also less interested in the security pledged 
by the shareholders’ personal assets because it is rather costly and difficult to monitor the 
value of such an asset.  
Transferable shares 
Shareholders can neither withdraw their investment at will nor claim their investment with 
a stipulated return following a scheduled agenda, as creditors do.42 However, they may 
transfer their shares to a third party with or without restrictions. In so doing, they are 
entitled to cash in their investment plus the corresponding returns or losses. The liquidity 
of shares increases the interest of shareholders and reduces investment risk. Thus, 
shareholders are able to diversify their investment portfolio to spread investment risk.43 
Meanwhile, companies continue with their undertakings regardless of the change in 
shareholders.44  
Equity ownership  
As mentioned above, shareholders are the residual claimants of the company’s earnings. 
Consumers, employees, suppliers, and other creditors may claim the fixed payment of debt 
prior to shareholders. This means that shareholders lose nothing more than the amount of 
their investment but enjoy the net profit of the firm without upper limit. Shareholders 
expect most of the net profit of the firm, whereas creditors merely care about the firm’s 
solvency. As such, shareholders’ interests are mostly aligned with the company’s interests, 
and hence, they have the strongest incentive to monitor business operations, and 
 
41 For comparison between debt and equity and optimal finance structure, see Mathias Dewatripont and Jean 
Tirole, ‘A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-shareholder Congruence’, (1994) 
109 The Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 1027-1054.  
42 Ibid.  
43 The basic assumption of individual investors, especially consumer-investors in the securities market, is 
being risk averse. See D. Cass and J. E. Stiglitz, ‘Risk Aversion and Wealth Effects on Portfolios with Many 
Assets’, (1972) 39 The Review of Economic Studies, pp. 331-354.  
44 Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, ‘Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in Corporate Law’, 
(2006) 31 Journal of Corporation Law, pp. 729-730.   
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accordingly, retain the residual right of control.45 In particular, shareholders vote to elect 
board members and to approve transactions of crucial importance. They obtain dividends 
proportionate to their respective contributions, unless otherwise stipulated.  
Centralized management under a board structure  
Centralized management is a necessary solution to the lack of expertise, rational apathy, 
and collective action problems associated with dispersed shareholders in large or publicly 
listed companies.46 Quite often, shareholders do not have the specialized knowledge, skills, 
and experience for running a business. They are merely providers of equity finance. 
Shareholders collectively make decisions by following the one-share one-vote principle. 
They become indifferent to the voting results when they only hold small stakes in a large 
company and their preference is barely decisive. In addition, an intelligent decision incurs 
considerable costs of investigation, information processing, and consultancy. It is more 
sensible for shareholders to be free riders rather than to bear costs disproportionate to the 
outcome of a decision, which affects their share of wealth. Consequently, a board of 
directors, or a similar body, is instituted to exercise delegated power and to monitor 
subordinate managers.  
Closely held companies, with only a few shareholders, may have a board of directors 
that is loose and less independent, because each shareholder holds a larger fraction of the 
company’s shares, and accordingly, has a stronger incentive to control. Controlling 
shareholders are prone to pulling the strings; the board of directors, in turn may make 
decisions more favourable to controlling shareholders.  
2.3 Agency Theory   
The agency relationship is between one party and the other party who acts on behalf of the 
former one. The former party is the principal and the latter party is the agent. Such an 
arrangement is universal, since anyone can be subject to the constraints of time, energy, or 
expertise, for certain tasks and matters, whilst others may have comparative advantages. In 
corporate scenarios, professional managers are charged with business operations; 
employees are assigned to front-line jobs.   
 
45 Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 7. For further argument about the features of residual claims, see Eugene 
F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, ‘Agency Problems and Residual Claims’, (1983) 26 Journal of Law and 
Economics, pp. 327-349.  
46 Bernard S. Black, ‘Shareholder Passivity Re-examined’, (1990) 89 Michigan Law Review, pp. 520-608.  
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The agency theory rests upon three reasonable assumptions. First, the principal and the 
agent are both economic rational persons. Namely, they are making choices to maximize 
their own utilities.47 Consequently, their interests and objectives are likely to diverge. Even 
a sharp conflict of interests may occasionally occur. Second, the agent is more risk averse 
than the principal, because the managerial agent cannot freely diversify his or her human 
capital to different undertakings, as the principal does with his or her equity investment. 
Third, it is difficult and costly to assess the agent’s performance.48    
2.3.1 Agency Problems 
Accompanying this relationship is a series of agency problems. On the one hand, because 
of information asymmetry, one party has difficulty in identifying the genuine skills, 
experience, and capacity of the agent candidates, choosing the most qualified candidate, 
and in negotiating and writing appropriate terms and conditions.49 Even in the course of 
service, the principal cannot fully observe the actual efforts and actions of the agent. Worse 
still, merely from the outcome of the service, the principal finds it not easy to verify and 
evaluate the agent’s behaviour, since external factors, some beyond the agent’s control, 
may also affect, or even decide, the outcomes.  
    On the other hand, assuming that both the principal and agent are rational, their goals 
and interests frequently diverge. Quite often, the agent only shares a small fraction of the 
wealth outcome of his or her decisions and efforts. Accordingly, they lack the incentive to 
devote more effort than their share of the outcome. The less the agent shares in the wealth 
outcome, the more the interests of the agent and principal diverge.50 Hence, the agent is 
prone to engaging in self-regarding activities rather than fully maximizing the principal’s 
interest, since the principal may have no idea if the agent is actually performing the service 
and to what extent the agent’s efforts and capacities are relevant to the outcome.51  
To resolve the agency problems, the principal may take measures to monitor the agent’s 
performance and align the agent’s interest with his or her own. It is commonly recognized 
 
47 For the literature on the rational choice theory, see, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, ‘Economic Theory and the 
Hypothesis of Rationality’, in John Eatwell, Murray Milgate and Peter Newman (eds.), The New Palgrave: A 
Dictionary of Economics (1987), pp. 25-39.  
48  Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, ‘Agency theory: An Assessment and Review’, (1989) 14 Academy of 
Management Review, p. 57. 
49 For the literature on adverse selection in the market, see George A. Akerlof, ‘The Market for Lemons: 
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’, (1970) 84 The Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 488-
500.  
50 Easterbrook and Fischel, see supra note 45 in this chapter, p. 91.   
51 Bengt Holmström, ‘Moral Hazard and Observability’, (1979) 10 The Bell Journal of Economics, pp. 74-91.  
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that the more information the principal has to assess the agent’s performance, the more 
likely the agent is to serve the principal’s interest.52 The internal governance, such as board 
of directors, reporting system, and independent directors are instituted to play a 
scrutinizing role.53 Yet, the question ‘who monitors the monitor’,54 and an insufficient flow 
of  information, call for alternative solutions.  
Besides these monitoring mechanisms, incentive schemes are devised to align the 
success of the firm with the agent’s personal remuneration. The agent is incentivised via a 
payment linked to the signal of the firm’s performance, including cash compensation, 
bonuses, stock option, and equity ownership.55  In particular, stock options and equity 
ownership mean that directors and officers have an ownership stake in the companies they 
manage, which encourages managerial performance. 56  According to some empirical 
studies, incentives generated by equity ownership are larger than other types of 
performance-based payment. 57  However, the equity schemes may also encourage 
undesirable behaviour, such as the manipulation of information disclosure and accounting 
records. Besides, managers are discouraged from taking risks.58  
Jensen and Meckling defined agency cost as the sum of monitoring expenditure by the 
principal, the bonding expenditure by the agent, and residual losses. 59  The agent 
undertakes bonding expenditure to guarantee that the agent’s conduct will not harm the 
principal’s interest and compensate harm, if any.60 The residual loss is defined as the 
reduction in the principal’s welfare after all, due to the divergence of interests between the 
principal and the agent.61  
 
52 Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, ‘Agency Problems and Residual Claims’, (1983) 26 The Journal 
of Law and Economics, pp. 327-349.   
53 See supra note 37 in this chapter.  
54 Easterbrook and Fischel, see supra note 45 in this chapter, p. 9.   
55 For empirical studies on incentive schemes, see Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, ‘Performance 
Pay and Top-management Incentives’, (1990) 98 The Journal of Political Economy, pp. 225-264; Michael C. 
Jensen and Jerold L. Zimmerman, ‘Management Compensation and the Managerial Labor Market’, (1985) 7 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, pp. 3-9.  
56 David J. Denis, Diane K. Denis, Atulya Sarin, ‘Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, and Corporate 
Diversification’, (1997) 52 The Journal of Finance, pp. 135-160.  
57 Jensen and Murphy, see supra note 55 in this chapter.  
58 See, e.g., WM. Gerard. Sanders and Donald C. Hambrick, ‘Swinging for the Fences: The Effects of CEO 
Stock Options on Company Risk Taking and Performance’, (2007) 50 Academy of Management Journal, 
pp.1055-1078; and Christopher S. Armstrong, David F. Larcker, Gaizka Ormazabal, and Daniel J. Taylor, 
‘The Relationship between Equity Incentives and Misreporting: The Role of Risk-Taking Incentives’, (2013) 
109 Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 327-350.  
59 Jensen and Meckling, see supra note 31 in this chapter.   
60 Ibid.   
61 Ibid.  
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2.3.2 Contractual Incompleteness  
The principal-agent relationship is of a contractual nature. Yet, bounded rationality,62 
transaction cost, and information asymmetry all combine to make a perfectly specified 
contract almost impossible.63 Bounded rationality derives from an intuitive doubt about the 
classic rational choice theory. People do not always make rational choices to maximize 
their own utility. One obvious reason is that people only have limited cognitive capabilities. 
In the contractual area, people are not able to foresee all possible future contingencies and 
calculate every corresponding reaction in advance.64 For the very unlikely contingency, it 
is also too costly to bargain and write down detailed instructions from the perspective of 
the transaction cost theory. As mentioned, information asymmetry is a major factor that 
creates adverse selection in bargaining and a moral hazard problem in the performance of 
principal-agent contracts.65  
In the corporate scenario, specified instructions are often not desirable. It’s professional 
analysis, calculation, and judgement that create profit and win business advantage. In this 
sense, managers need discretion to employ their skills, experience, and business acumen to 
determine what is best to their firms in certain circumstances, rather than following some 
ex ante clauses, especially instructed by less skilful parties.  
According to the property right theory of the firm, incomplete contracts leave the asset-
specific investment unresolved, and hence, managers may face the hold-up problem from 
shareholders.66 Sometimes, to incentivize entrepreneurship, shareholders need to give up 
detailed provisions and to delegate part of the residual right of control to managers. The 
theory of capital structure is also based on how control right should be allocated if the 
contract is incomplete.67  
2.3.3 Imperfect Market Disciplining Mechanisms  
 
62 Herbert A. Simon, ‘Rationality in Psychology and Economics’, (1986) 59 The Journal of Business, Part 2: 
The Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory, pp. S209-S224. 
63 Kathryn E. Spier, ‘Incomplete Contracts and Signalling’, (1992) 23 RAND Journal of Economics, p. 432.   
64 See Eric Maskin and Jean Tirole, ‘Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts’, (1999) 66 Review 
of Economic Studies, pp. 83-114; and Jean Tirole, ‘Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?’, (1999) 67-
4 Econometrica, pp. 741-781. 
65 See supra note 51 in this chapter.  
66 Patrick W. Schmitz, ‘The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in 
Contract Theory’, (2001) 53-1 Bulletin of Economic Research, pp. 1-17.  
67 Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton, ‘An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting’, (1992) 
59 The Review of Economic Studies, pp. 473-494.  
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In general, the external market continuously generates informative signals of the firms’ 
performance at relatively low cost, which in turn, disciplines the actions of directors and 
senior managers. Scholars argue that the disciplining mechanisms can efficiently reduce 
agency cost, and hence, the separation of ownership and control is characteristic of the 
corporate entity.68 Moreover, incentive schemes use market signals to set the remuneration 
package and obtain maximal managerial efforts. However, external market disciplining 
mechanisms have their respective limitations and pre-conditions, not to say the problems 
arising from market failures and inconsistent behavioural influence by related incentive 
schemes.  
Product market  
The general argument about the impact of the product market is that market competition 
forces managers to reduce inefficiency and increase productivity to survive.69 Increasing 
competition can mitigate agency problems by making more information accessible to the 
principals, and the principals are enabled to more accurately monitor and evaluate 
management conduct.70  Unlike the above general argument, Schmidt’s U-shape model 
demonstrates that increasing competition causes a reduction in profit, which lowers the 
value of managerial efforts, and managers require more monetary incentives to work hard. 
When increasing competition amounts to a threat of liquidation, managers will reduce 
costs to help the firm survive and keep their own jobs and remuneration.71  
For directors and managers in the firms who sustain the monopoly status, the pressure 
from the product market is less intense. Monopolies usually do not have competent 
substitutes, or competitors. Quite often the market barriers keep away potential competitors, 
and the monopolies can maintain a high level of profit in the long term. 72  Sloppy 
management may not be translated into low revenue for the firm; in fact, it may even 
escape observation. Recent empirical evidence draws consistent findings with this general 
argument and implies that ‘firms in non-competitive industries, where lack of competitive 
 
68 Easterbrook and Fischel, see supra note 45 in this chapter.  
69 Armen Alchian, ‘Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory’, (1950) 58 Journal of Political Economics, 
pp. 211-221; and George J. Stigler, ‘The Economies of Scale’ (1958) 1 Journal of Law and Economics, pp. 
54-71.   
70 See Bengt Holmström, ‘Moral Hazard in Teams’, (1982) 13 The Bell Journal of Economics, pp. 324-340; 
Barry J. Nalebuff and Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘Information, Competition, and Markets’, (1983) 73 American 
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, pp. 278-283.    
71 Klaus M. Schmidt, ‘Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition’, (1997) 64 The Review of 
Economic Studies, pp. 191-213. 
72 N. Gregory Mankiw, Principle of Microeconomics fourth edition (Mason: Thomson South-Western, 2007), 
pp. 310-314.  
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pressure fails to enforce discipline on managers, should benefit more from good 
governance’.73  
Capital market and incentive schemes  
The more efficient disciplining force is the capital market.74 First, directors and officers in 
listed companies are exposed to the competition for equity capital. Poor performance 
increases the cost of raising equity capital. Public investors are not willing to buy shares 
unless they are assured that their investment would be well managed. The greater the 
assurance, the higher the share price goes. For this reason, companies adopt a corporate 
governance system to check controlling power which directors and officers might exercise 
in a self-regarding manner.75 Second, the share price is a timely and informative signal of a 
firm’s performance and also an indicator of managerial performance. Incentive schemes 
and managerial labour market refer to this low-cost signal for setting the remuneration or 
opportunity wages.  
However, share price is not a perfect indicator of the quality of a managerial decision.76 
This signal primarily indicates a firm’s performance, even if it is not current or recent 
performance, but largely the perceived prospect of profitability. The firm’s performance is 
determined by many factors other than managerial effort and that are even beyond the 
control of managers. A single decision or event may trigger the fluctuation in share prices, 
but is more usually due to the random synergy of systematic risk and idiosyncratic 
factors.77  Moreover, directors and senior managers, through the choice of information 
disclosure pertaining to accounting profit, financial performance, and some other business 
arrangements, can lawfully manipulate the share price, to some extent.78 The incentive 
scheme linked to the share price may invoke short-termism and other problems. 
Managerial labour market  
 
73 Xavier Giroud and Holger M. Mueller, ‘Corporate Governance, Product Market Competition, and Equity 
Prices’, (2011) 66 The Journal of Finance, pp. 563-600.  
74 Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 45 in this chapter.  
75 Oliver Hart, ‘Corporate Governance: Some Theory and Implications’, (1995) 105 The Economic Journal, 
pp. 678-689.  
76 Merritt B. Fox, Randall Morck, Bernard Yeung and Artyom Durnev, ‘Law, Share Price Accuracy, and 
Economic Performance: The New Evidence’, (2003) 102 Michigan Law Review, pp. 331-353.  
77 Spamann, see infra note 152 in this chapter.  
78 David Aboody and Ron Kasznik, ‘CEO Stock Option Awards and the Timing of Corporate Voluntary 
Disclosures’, (2000) 29 Journal of Accounting and Economics, pp. 73-100.  
Daniel Bergstresser and Thomas Philippon, ‘CEO Incentives and Earnings Management’, (2006) 80 The 
Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 511-529.  
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Similar to the pressure from the product market on companies, senior managers are faced 
with competition from their peers both inside and outside their companies.79 Concerned 
with their career development, managers actively pursue the best sales, profits, and other 
similar goals of the firms they currently serve, so that future employers may price their 
value high, or say, their opportunity wage is high. When firms do not reward the 
performance of managers properly, the latter may leave for better offers. 80  Because 
managers work as a team and have a stake in the success of the team and the firm, the 
internal monitoring between different layers of managers and among top managers 
naturally takes place.81   
    However, the information and signals of the value of human capital on the managerial 
labour market are imprecise and indirect, mostly dependent on the indicators of the firms’ 
performance and share price reactions. Thus, the managerial labour market may partly 
mitigate the managerial incentive problem, but have its limitations due to information 
obscurity.   
Market for corporate control  
In general, the threat of the market for corporate control, to some extent, forces managers 
to work well, and accordingly, ameliorates the agency problems.82 An under-performing or 
under-valued firm in the capital market is likely to become the acquisition target of those 
who believe they can manage the firm more efficiently and make more profit. After the 
take-over, the incumbent directors and officers would be replaced. Considering such an 
external threat, directors and officers increase their efforts and efficiency to avoid personal 
losses arising from a take-over. 83  Some scholars even view the market for corporate 
control as an arena where an alternative managerial team competes for the right to manage 
corporate resources, and hence, a component of the managerial market.84  
    A counter claim argues that the threat of takeover also means a possible over-rule of 
managerial effort and less private benefit, and managers are incentivised to make less 
effort in evaluating projects and make less firm-specific investment, which is of course 
 
79 Fama, see supra note 34 in this chapter.   
80 Ibid., p. 292.  
81 Ibid., p. 293.  
82 See Manne, supra note 30 in this chapter.  
83 David S. Scharfstein, ‘The Disciplinary Role of Takeovers’, (1988) 55 The Review of Economic Studies, pp. 
185-199.  
84 Michael C. Jensen and Richard S. Ruback, ‘The Market for Corporate Control: the Scientific Evidence’, 
(1983) 11 Journal of Financial Economics, p. 7.  
24A_BW EdleXun_stand.job




also harmful to the firm’s value and shareholders’ interests.85 In this sense, the disciplining 
function of the market on corporate control remains contentious.   
The dynamic of the market for corporate control is largely dependent on the market 
development and regulatory environment. A well-functioning securities market, per se, 
generates robust signalling and disciplining functions via share prices, which is also a pre-
requisite to efficient take-over activities. Instead, potential bidders might be less active to 
initiate take-overs in a stock market that lacks sensitive price signals and adequate liquidity.  
Meanwhile, laws and regulations in different jurisdictions may create a pro-, anti-, or 
unbiased attitude towards take-overs.86 Legal rules govern the issues broadly regarding the 
defence tactics for take-overs, bidding procedures, financing channels, and provide the 
apparatus to balance the interests of the major parties in take-over transactions.87 Thus, the 
frequency and gains of take-overs are greatly influenced by relevant laws and regulations 
that may sustain multi-faceted policy goals.88  
2.4 Why Law Matters    
Incomplete contracts give rise to the authority, or managerial discretion, to address future 
contingencies, yet they also leave room for managerial opportunism. The market 
mechanism plays an important role in disciplining internal management. However, the 
behavioural influence of the market mechanism is conditional and imperfect. Then the 
question of whether legal intervention is necessary and socially desirable attracts scholars’ 
attention.  
    The standard view of ‘law matters’ is constructed by the empirical studies of La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (LLSV). 89  LLSV investigated 49 countries, 
classified them into English, French, German, or Scandinavian groups by the standard of 
 
85 Marco A. Haan and Yohanes Riyanto, ‘The Effect of Takeover Threats on Shareholders and Firm Value’, 
(2006) 59 The Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, pp. 45-68.  
86 Luca Enriques, Ronald J. Gilson, and Alessio M. Pacces, ‘The Case for an Unbiased Takeover Law (with 
an Application to the European Union)’, (2013) The European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) 
working paper, no. 212.  
87 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell, ‘Federalism and Takeover Law: The Race to Protect 
Managers from Takeovers’, The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper (1999) 
7232.  
88 Roberta Romano, ‘A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence and Regulation’, (1992) 9 The Yale Journal 
on Regulation, pp. 119-180. The author summarises and classifies theoretical explanations for takeovers and 
provides a guide to policymakers regarding the effects of some regulations in the US.  
89 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny, ‘Legal Determinants of 
External Finance’, (1997) 52 Journal of Finance, p. 1131; Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, ‘A Survey of 
Corporate Governance’, (1997) 52 Journal of Finance, pp. 737-783.  
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legal origin, indexed and measured the legal protection of outside shareholders by the 
‘Anti-director Rights Index’, and compared the depth, size, and market valuation of the 
capital markets. Based on the empirical evidence, they argued that the legal protection of 
investors against expropriation by managers and other insiders is associated with effective 
corporate governance and development of the capital market. Hundreds of subsequent 
papers used their ‘Anti-director Rights Index’ to measure the level of shareholder 
protection.90 ‘Law and finance’ extends to ‘law, finance, and economic growth’, which 
argues that a robust financial market may promote economic growth by allocating sources 
of capital to efficient use. 91   
They found that the legal protection of outside shareholders and creditors, or potential 
financiers, is critical to the development of the capital market, and common law 
jurisdictions offer shareholders more protection than do civil law countries, and 
accordingly, have a deep and liquid stock market and dispersed ownership structure.92 If 
legal protection is insufficient for outside shareholders, then the separation of ownership 
and control could be diminished and access to equity funds is limited to companies, 
because investors are concerned with expropriation by inside controllers and become less 
willing to provide funds.93  
The LLSV studies are very influential and invoke continuous follow-up discussions, 
although the methodology is subject to criticism. Firstly, legal scholars criticized their way 
of explaining, measuring, and comparing legal rules and pointed out their weak evidence 
regarding the enforcement of legal rules.94 Some scholars doubted whether their selection 
of variables was relevant and whether these variables could represent the effective 
protection that legal institutions provide to outside shareholders. 95  In response to the 
criticism, the LLSV scholars improved the ‘Anti-director Rights Index’ with two extra 
indexes under the securities laws and formulated an ‘Anti Self-dealing Index’ with another 
 
90 Ibid.  
91 Ibid. See also Colin Mayer and Oren Sussman, ‘The Assessment: Finance, Law, and Economic Growth’, 
(2001) 17 Oxford Review of Economic Policy, pp. 457-466.  
92 Ibid.  
93 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Vishny Robert, ‘Law and Finance’, 
(1998) 106 Journal of Political Economy, pp. 1113-1155.  
94  John C. Coffee, JR., ‘Law and Market: The Impact of Enforcement’, (2007) 156 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review, p. 244. The author also noted that the major difference between the US and the 
rest of the world is the intensity of enforcement.  
See also Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, ‘Statistics of Legal Infrastructures: A Review of the Law and Finance 
Literature’, (2006) 8 American Law and Economic Review, pp.62-80.  
95 Holger Spamann, ‘The Anti-director Rights Index Revisited’, (2006) 23 The Review of Financial Studies, 
pp. 467-486.  
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author.96 They drew a consistent conclusion that common law jurisdictions provide better 
investor protection and better access to equity funds for firms than do civil law countries.  
   Second, there is no definite causal link between the legal protection of outside 
shareholders and the ownership structure. The legal protection of outside shareholders may 
take other forms in different contexts, which the standardized index may not encompass.97 
Moreover, legal protection for shareholders is not the sole factor responsible for the degree 
of separation of ownership and control. For instance, Sweden has a well-developed 
securities market, while the ownership structure is concentrated. As such, it is hardly 
convincing that the concentrated ownership is due to poor investor protection.98 
Third, the literature on ‘law and finance’ does not address the use of mandatory and 
enabling rules. In contrast, legal scholars do not doubt the necessity of legal norms but are 
concerned with the reasonable scope of private autonomy. Furthermore, there is no serious 
discussion on instances of regulation with mandatory rules and allowing private parties to 
opt out of default rules.  
Roe holds a different opinion, revealing the functional limitation of corporate law, and 
attempts to explain why a well-developed securities market may co-exist with concentrated 
ownership.99 Roe divides managers’ opportunistic behaviour into ‘stealing’ and ‘shirking’ 
and argues that the corporate law may sufficiently deter ‘stealing’ but does much less to 
‘shirking’.100 If agency cost were high when control separates from diffused shareholders, 
but low when control does not, the block-holder would persist even when the company law 
provides good protection to outside shareholders from insiders’ control.  
2.5 Function of Directors’ Duties and Liabilities  
The economic analysis of directors’ duties and liabilities in this section is embedded in the 
fiduciary duty principle in the US, since the state jurisdictions have developed a rich and 
 
96 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, ‘What Works in Securities Law?’, (2006) 
61 Journal of Finance, pp. 1-32.  
Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, ‘The Law and 
Economics of Self-Dealing’, (2008) 88 Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 430-465.  
97 Theodor Baums and Kenneth Scott, ‘Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corporate Governance in 
the U.S. and Germany’, (2005) 53 The American Journal of Comparative Law, pp. 31-75.  
98 Ronald J. Gilson, ‘Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Taxonomy’ 
(2006) 119 Harvard Law Review, pp. 1641-1679.  
99 Mark J. Roe, ‘Corporate Law’s Limits’, (2002) 31 The Journal of Legal Studies, p. 235.   
100 Ibid.  
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sophisticated body of case law, which is in wide use in many countries.101 For expository 
purposes, this thesis does not describe in detail the state variety, legal technicality, and the 
evolution of relevant rules and standards.  
2.5.1 The Fiduciary Duty Principle in General   
Given that a private management contract102 cannot instruct all the proper and desirable 
managerial actions for every future contingency, 103  the fiduciary duty principle 
nevertheless bridges the gap in such an incomplete contract and deters managerial 
misfeasance and malfeasance via an ex post liability regime. That is, judges interpret and 
apply the fiduciary duty principle in consideration of all the facts and circumstances to 
determine whether the directors’ performance complies with the normal and reasonable 
requirement of the shareholders, if they had been able to foresee such facts and 
circumstances.104 The legal liability for the breach of fiduciary duty mainly takes the form 
of out-of-pocket payment. Accordingly, directors and senior managers need to watch their 
actions, irrespective of any stipulated requirement or instructions in the contract.  
Thus, the fiduciary duty principle, at least, partially reduces the transaction cost that 
negotiating and writing a management contract may incur. The parties to the management 
contract do not need to address the unimportant and rare instances that the fiduciary duty 
principle can govern after all.105 Once they are already making capital contributions to the 
firm, outside investors have no feasible way to renegotiate the provisions to curb 
mismanagement. Nevertheless, the fiduciary duty principle serves as a shield against 
mismanagement.106  
The usefulness of the fiduciary duty principle is contingent on judicial discretion and 
competence.107 Judges need to have the business experience and relevant knowledge to 
apply the general principle to a particular scenario with merely after-the-fact evidence, and 
determine the propriety of decision-making. People may doubt whether it is suitable to let 
 
101 For comparative literature, see, e.g., Luca Enriques, ‘The Law on Company Directors’ Self-Dealing: A 
Comparative Analysis’, (2000) 2-3 International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal, pp. 297-333.   
102  Hereinafter, the term ‘management contract’ generally refers to any provisions with regard to managerial 
actions and compensation, which in practice, may be included in a managerial labour contract, company’s 
articles of association, and other internal rules.    
103  See supra Section 2.3.2.  
104 Robert H. Sitkoff, ‘The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law’, (2011) 91 Boston University Review, p. 
1043.  
105  Ibid. 
106 Easterbrook and Fischel, see supra note 45 in this chapter, p. 93.   
107 Sitkoff, see supra note104 in this chapter, p. 1044.  
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judges complete the contract, especially those involving complicated business transactions. 
The sub-section concerning the duty of care will further discuss this issue.           
Closely related to judicial competence is the question of whether judges have the 
discretion to interpret the general terms of the fiduciary duty and to make subsidiary 
standards and rules to enrich the meaning of the principle, as business practice is changing. 
For instance, the corporate opportunity doctrine and business judgement rules have all 
been developed in the case law and later codified into the statutes. This reduces the 
uncertainty within the inclusive but vague term.108 However, judges in civil law countries 
are not empowered to interpret the legal provisions beyond the word of the law, which is 
deemed as one factor that might impair the effectiveness of transplanting the fiduciary duty 
principle.109  
The intensity of deterrence generated by the fiduciary duty principle is determined by 
the magnitude of liability and the likelihood of liability awards. The fiduciary duty has two 
prongs—the duty of loyalty and the duty of care, respectively, dealing with ‘stealing’ and 
‘shirking’.110 In general, shirking mainly affects the production of corporate wealth while 
stealing diverts the corporate wealth to personal pockets after it is produced. ‘Stealing’ 
usually occasions more personal gains to wrong-doers than ‘shirking’; however, ‘shirking’ 
may cause more losses to the firm.111 This differentiation between ‘stealing’ and ‘shirking’ 
results in substantial differences in the judicial review standard, and the magnitude of 
liability from a breach of the duty of loyalty to a breach of the duty of care, in case law.   
2.5.2 Duty of Loyalty   
Directors and senior managers are chiefly in charge of the business operation of their firms. 
They may take the chance to misappropriate the company’s assets or part of its value for 
their own personal ends, which is simply ‘stealing’.  The company’s assets broadly include 
funds, land, patents, and even extends to valuable information, business opportunities and 
other enterprise resources.112 Theft along with fraud are not readily spotted and detected by 
market mechanisms and the ex post market penalty does not suffice to deter a large one-
shot theft. Simply constraining the authority as a contractual safeguard against 
 
108 Ibid.  
109 See supra note 17 in Chapter 1, Pistor and Xu (2003), pp. 77-106.    
110 Roe, see supra note 99.  
111 Easterbrook and Fischel, see supra note 45 in this chapter, p. 98. 
112 Robert Cooter and Bradley J. Freedman, ‘An Economic Model of the Fiduciary’s Duty of Loyalty’, (1990) 
10 Tel Aviv University Studies in Law, p. 300.  
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misappropriation is often not a sensible option. For instance, a flat ban on self-dealing 
transactions also deprives the company of deals that can be profitable. Even though the 
management contract may prohibit various forms of misappropriation, it is still not 
difficult for directors to circumvent the provisions under perfect cover.    
    In US case law, the duty of loyalty signifies that ‘corporate officers and directors are not 
permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to further their private interests’.113 It 
is also held that ‘directors can neither appear on both sides of a transaction, nor expect to 
derive any personal financial benefit from it in the sense of self-dealing, as opposed to a 
benefit, which devolves upon the corporations or all stockholders’. 114  Another classic 
expression in the Weinberger case by the Delaware Supreme Court states that ‘the rule that 
requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that there should be 
no conflict between duty and self-interest’. 115  In short, the duty of loyalty generally 
requires directors to act in the ‘sole’ interest of the companies they serve and refrain from 
engaging in any transactions involving any conflict of interests.116   
The liability for breach of the duty of loyalty, one determinant for the deterrent effect, 
usually involves compensation for the damages caused to the firm and paying back the 
proceeds arising from the breach to the firm, or for example, the wrongful gains 
disgorgement in US law. 117  The idea is to make misappropriation and self-dealing 
financially futile for the wrong-doers ex post. 
    From the directors’ perspective, a breach of the duty of loyalty may incur a sum of costs, 
including: (1) the time and efforts of concealing the self-regarding act; (2) compensation 
for the company’s losses, and in some cases, shareholders’ losses; (3) litigation 
expenditure; (4) losing their firm-specific investment and remuneration, after being 
dismissed; and (5) reputation losses. Notably, the loss of reputation is a very severe penalty 
that could even ruin their future career paths as senior officers. Thus, the magnitude of 
liability for the breach of the duty of loyalty would not be insufficient for deterrent 
purposes, even without a punitive element.     
 
113 Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5A. 2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).  
114 Aroson v. Lewis, 473 A. 2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).  
115 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A. 2d 701 (Del. 1983).  
116 Robert Cooter and Bradley J. Freedman, ‘The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal 
Consequences’, (1991) 66 New York Law Review, p. 1074.  
117 See, e.g., Cameco, Inc. v. Gedicke, 157 N.J. 504 (1999).  
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However, the deterrent effect can easily be compromised by the low probability of 
detection and proving the wrong-doing. Obviously, shareholder plaintiffs have less 
information pertaining to the detailed facts of misappropriation or self-dealing than the 
directors, and therefore, proving a breach of the duty of loyalty is more difficult than 
defending against such an allegation. In the light of this, the subsidiary rules for the breach 
of the duty of loyalty requires that interested directors engaging in self-dealing make full 
disclosure of material facts, including the (potential) conflict of interest and the possible 
influence on the transaction, to obtain the approval by a majority of disinterested 
shareholders (or disinterested directors).118 The approval of disinterested shareholders is 
regarded as ‘the purest case of an arm’s length endorsement of the transaction’.119  
Should a dispute arise, the plaintiff shareholders rebut the presumption of the business 
judgement rule by proving that the challenged decision involved a conflict of interests.120 
Then the burden of proof shifts to the defendant directors. The defendant directors need to 
prove that they have fulfilled the disclosure requirement.121 If the disinterested party did 
not approve the deal with full disclosure, the directors, engaging in self-dealing anyway, 
have to prove ‘the entire fairness’ of the transaction, and the court would conduct a merit 
review to determine whether there is a breach of the duty of loyalty.122  
2.5.3 Duty of Care  
The other element of the fiduciary duty principle is the duty of care. The meaning and 
standard of the duty of care are not as straightforward as the duty of loyalty, and 
substantial variation exists among state jurisdictions. The distinction between the conduct 
standard and liability standard is blurred on some occasions. 123  Many scholars have 
 
118 Since the regulatory approach for usurping corporate opportunities and engaging in the same business as 
the firm emphasizes full disclosure and the approval by disinterested party, the following functional 
explanation takes only self-dealing transaction as example.   
119 Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, ‘The Law and Economics 
of Self-dealing’, (2008) 88 Journal of Financial Economics, p.436.  
120 See infra note 129 in this chapter and the accompanying text.  
121 See Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N.V. 439, 154 N.E. 303 (1926).   
122 See, e.g., Delaware General Corporate Law (DGCL) s. 144 or California Corporations Code s. 310.  
123 John F. Olson and Aaron K. Briggs, (2011) 74 ‘The Model Business Corporation Act and Corporate 
Governance: An Enabling Statute Moves toward Normative Standards’, (2011) 74 Law and Contemporary 
Problems, p. 36. The main controversy is whether the conduct standard of due care is identical to the liability 
standard or standard of judicial review.  
27B_BW EdleXun_stand.job
Directors’ Duties and Liabilities in China 
40 
 
attempted to clarify the ambiguity of the duty of care; however, many nuances remain 
poorly understood.124    
    The duty of care is delineated with a focus on the standard of due care, or reasonable 
care. The Delaware Supreme Court holds an objective standard, ‘the amount of care which 
ordinarily careful and prudent men would use in similar circumstances’.125 However, the 
Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA) changed to a subjective version recently, ‘the 
care that a person in a like position would reasonably believe appropriate under similar 
circumstances’.126  
Business judgment rule  
In addressing the claims pertaining to directors’ liabilities for the breach of the duty of care, 
the courts hold a deferral approach to the directors’ decision and create the business 
judgement rule (BJR), which shields the directors against personal liability under certain 
conditions.127 The BJR ‘is a presumption that in making a business decision, the directors 
of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and with the honest belief that 
any action taken was in the best interests of the company’.128 The plaintiffs bear the burden 
of proof to rebut the presumption, and if they fail to do so, the courts would not 
substantively review the business decisions that were challenged.129   
The BJR has evolved through frequent application in new and complicated transactions, 
and legal scholars, in the meanwhile, have commented on the nature and proper use of the 
BJR.130 One typical formulation of the BJR contends that:    
 ‘Courts do not measure, weigh or quantify directors’ judgement. We do not even decide if 
they are reasonable in this context. Due care in the decision-making context is a process of 
due care only … Thus, directors’ decisions will be respected by the courts unless the 
 
124 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, ‘The Business Judgement Rule as Abstention Doctrine’, (2004) 57 
Vanderbilt Law Review, pp. 83-90.  
125 See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A. 2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).  
126 See the MBCA § 8.30 (b) (2008). The MBCA is formulated and amended by the Committee on Corporate 
Laws of the American Bar Association Section of Business Law. This Act is very influential in state 
corporate laws and has is followed by twenty-four states, either fully or partially.   
127 Lori McMillan, ‘The Business Judgement Rule as an Immunity Doctrine’, (2013) 4 William & Mary 
Business Law Review, p. 524.  
128 See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).   
129 Stuart R. Cohn, ‘Demise of the Directors’ Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions 
through the Business Judgement Rule’, (1983) 62 Texas Law Review, p. 603.  
130 See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, ‘The Business Judgement Rule and the Trans Union Case’, (1985) 40 The 
Business Lawyer, pp. 1437-1455; William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacabs, and Leo E. Strine, Jr., ‘Realigning the 
Standard of Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and its Progeny 
as a Standard of Review Problem’, (2002) 96 Northwestern University Law Review, pp. 449-466.   
28A_BW EdleXun_stand.job




directors are self-interested or lack independence relative to the decision, do not act in good 
faith, act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational business purpose, or reach their 
decision by a grossly negligent process that includes the failure to consider all the material 
facts reasonably available’.131          
Referring to the above statement, some scholars view the BJR essentially as a standard of 
review, i.e., an abstention doctrine.132 Unless certain conditions are met, the courts would 
refrain from second-guessing the merit of the business decisions.133 
    In addition, an alternative and more traditional view considers the BJR as a liability rule, 
asserting that the BJR provides the tests that the court can directly apply to determine the 
liability issue.134 The Delaware Supreme Court holds the BJR ‘as both a procedural guide 
for litigants and a substantive rule of law’.135 Accordingly, the liability standard for breach 
of duty of care is not mere negligence but lowered to gross negligence and even 
recklessness.136 Yet, some courts and commentators are against the adoption of a gross 
negligence standard for the breach of the duty of care.137 
Despite the inconsistency in the case law related to the BJR, legal scholars commonly 
consider that the policy rationale of the BJR is to strike a workable balance between 
discretion and liabilities.138 It is well acknowledged that holding directors liable for the 
failure of their business decisions would stifle their innovation and thwart risk-taking, and 
directorial discretion would be virtually fettered. Directors will only choose a safe plan 
with low profits to avert personal legal liability, even though they are fully aware that a 
risky project may generate more returns to the company they serve.139 Thus, the BJR is 
meant to maintain directorial discretion and even allow for honest mistakes.140   
Limiting liability provision, indemnification, and insurance  
 
131 Brehm V. Eisner, 746 A. 2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000).  
132 Bainbridge, see supra note 124.  
133 See supra note 127 in this chapter, pp. 534-536.   
134 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, ‘The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate 
Law’, (1993) 62 Fordham Law Review, p. 437.  
135  See supra note 131, quoted in Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, 634 A. 2d 346 (Del. 1993).  
136 Bainbridge, see supra note 124 in this chapter, p. 94.  
137  See, e.g., Theroit v. Bourg, 696 So. 2d 1008 (La. 1997) and supra note 127.  
138 See supra note 127 in this chapter, p. 526.  
139 Bainbridge, see supra note 124 in this chapter, p. 85.  
140  See the transcript of a forum on personal liability of directors held at Harvard Law School and moderated 
by Lucian Bebchuk, ‘Directors’ Liabilities’, (2006) 31 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, p. 1015.   
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Furthermore, business practices and state corporation statutes devised and confirmed a 
range of schemes to limit a director’s personal liabilities.141 These private schemes are 
usually subject to the statutory constraint that only negligence or no-fault liabilities can be 
covered. 142  The articles of association, by-laws, or other internal agreements of 
corporations are enabled to set a cap on the amount of, or stipulate the percentage of, 
directors’ personal payment for monetary liabilities or settlement.143 Many corporations 
provide indemnification plans and/or purchase liability insurance for their directors and 
officers as part of their remuneration package.144 The defence cost of negligence claims 
and monetary liability for the losses are largely covered by insurance and perhaps 
marginally assumed by the corporations or directors.  
Debate on the role of monetary liability 
As a result of the above schemes and the BJR, directors’ actual out-of-pocket payments for 
liability are greatly reduced and even eliminated. Some commentators object to the virtual 
exemption of legal liability and emphasize the significance of legal liability to curb 
directors’ irresponsibility.145 However, the mainstream theory maintains that legal liability 
only plays a minimal role in controlling ‘shirking’ for the following reasons.146  
 First, judges are not business experts147 and not sufficiently competent to assess the 
extent to which the challenged decisions are reasonable, or verify directors’ efforts and 
diligence. Besides, a business decision ‘involves intangibles, intuitive insights or surmises 
as to business matters such as competitive outlook, cost structure, and economic and 
industry trends, and is not susceptible to systematic analysis’.148 In addition, judges suffer 
 
141  For a summary of influential pattern of indemnification laws, see Alfred F. Conard, ‘A Behavioral 
Analysis of Directors’ Liability for Negligence’, (1972) Duke Law Journal, p. 900.  
142 As this thesis only examines directors’ accountability to the firms they serve and the shareholders therein, 
it does not discuss how statutory liabilities, such as environmental liabilities and tax penalty, and the liability 
that the third parties, such as employees and consumers, claim are indemnified and insured. 
143 See, e.g., DGCL 102 (b) (7) and American Law Institute (ALI) Principles of Corporate Governance 7.19.  
144  Joseph P. Monteleone and Nicholas J. Conca, ‘Directors and Officers Indemnification and Liability 
Insurance: An Overview of Legal and Practical Issues’, (1996) 51 The Business Lawyer, pp. 574; and 
Roberta Romano, ‘What Went Wrong with Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance?’ (1989) 4 Delaware 
Journal of Corporate Law, pp. 1-33.  
145 Lisa M. Fairfax, ‘Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty through Legal 
Liability’, (2005) 42 Houston Law Review, p. 395.  
146 Easterbrook and Fischel, see supra note 45 in this chapter, pp. 92-96.  
147  See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W.668, 684 (Mich. 1919).  
148 Douglas M. Branson, ‘The Rule that isn’t a Rule: The Business Judgement Rule’, (2002) 36 Valparaiso 
University Law Review, p. 637.   
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from hindsight bias. 149 They tend to conclude that the directors were taking an unduly high 
risk, since the bad outcome ex post materializes the risk at the time of decision-making. 
Thus, directors are likely to ‘be penalized for taking a proper risk but with bad luck’.150 
Second, full liability for losses caused by a decision not carefully made is counter-
productive. Business decisions may turn out to be a failure because of a host of factors 
beyond the control of decision makers. In public companies, such failure may involve 
astronomical losses. Holding risk-averse directors liable for all of the losses may bankrupt 
them. No one risks personal assets to be a director.151 Even if someone remains on the 
board, the deterrence benefit of full liability is far less than what a company pays for taking 
such legal risks.152  
Third, the enforcement of directors’ liability through formal litigation procedure incurs 
high costs. The litigation cost includes out-of-pocket costs, i.e., litigation fee, attorney fee, 
and service expenses, and the opportunity costs of the parties to the suits. The opportunity 
costs of directors’ participation in lawsuits can hardly be ignored, involving the time and 
attention that could be devoted to enhancing the firm’s value.  
Finally, the legal liability for breach of the duty of care is not desirable, because other 
mechanisms can efficiently incentivise the best efforts of directors.153 In capital markets, 
share price closely reflects the performance of public corporations and is also used to 
measure the performance of directors and is linked to their remuneration. 154  Hence, 
directors are also exposed to the risk of losing jobs and income if they fail to maximize the 
firm’s value, since the labour market and the market for corporate control are working with 
share price information.155 Besides, the internal governance mechanism is operating to 
check and balance the power of execution, and thus, control managerial opportunism.  
 
149 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, ‘A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight’, (1998) Cornell Law 
Faculty Publication, paper 801, available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/801 (accessed 
15/12/2019).  
150 See infra note 152 in this chapter, p. 352.  
151 Oliver Hart, ‘An Economist’s View of Fiduciary Duty’, (1993) 43 The University of Toronto Law Journal, 
p. 301.  
152 Holger Spamann, ‘Monetary Liability for Breach of the Duty of Care?’, (2016) 8-2 Journal of Legal 
Analysis, p. 339.  
153 Ronald J. Gilson, ‘A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case against Defensive Tactics in Tender 
Offers’, (1981) 33 Stanford Law Review, pp. 819-824.  
154 Daniel R. Fischel and Michael Bradley, ‘The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate 
Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis’, (1986) 71 Cornell Law Review, pp. 267-268.  
155 See supra Section 2.2.3.  
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A further clarification of the mainstream opinion was made very recently.156 The crucial 
message appears inconsistent with the mainstream opinion, holding that ‘properly 
calibrated partial liability would unambiguously improve the incentives of directors and 
managers’.157 However, the argument against liability is also tenable when the litigation 
cost is high and the benefit of judicial evaluation is low. In sum, the desirability of 
monetary liability is contingent on its relative cost and benefit in certain contexts.    
In particular, judicial evaluations are direct and relatively independent signals of 
directors’ action, although not perfect. By contrast, share prices and accounting profits 
primarily indicate the firm’s profitability, but only indirectly reflect the directors’ 
performance, and are weakly correlated with the directors’ decisions. Moreover, (lawful) 
manipulation by directors and officers, of issues such as discretionary disclosure, the 
choice of accounting standard or some sales actions, may lead share prices and accounting 
figures, to be even more imprecise with regard to the directors’ performance.158 Regardless 
of this, incentive schemes normally use share prices and accounting figures as signals of 
directors’ actions and link the payment to these signals. This is criticized for inducing 
managerial myopia and other similar problems.159  
Besides, judicial decisions are made with internal and specific information that the 
parties to the private actions would bring before the courts, whereas the stock price is a 
compound of external valuation based on disclosed and market information. The combined 
use of complementary information improves the precision of incentives and offsets the 
biases. Specifically, the use of liability may allow the compensation to be less sensitive to 
the firm’s value, and hence, reduce the level of directors’ exposure to the corresponding 
risk when only the stock price is the sole signal. However, in the meanwhile, the incentive 
impact is not discounted. In other words, judges are able to differentiate, if not always, 
whether the drop in the firm’s value is attributable to the directors. Directors, in turn, have 
extra incentives to exercise due care to increase the firm’s value for fear of ex post personal 
liability. Shareholders do not need to afford the increase in directors’ compensation to 
intensify the incentives.160 Thus, it is optimal to input the court signals into incentive 
 
156 Spamann, see supra note 152, pp. 337-373.  
157 Ibid., p. 338.  
158 Ibid., p. 339.  
159 See Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive 
Compensation (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2004).  
160 Spamann, see supra note 152 in this chapter, p. 347.  
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schemes ‘through appropriate weights and adjustments’, when litigation is relatively 
costless.161  
Monetary liability is the financial payoff and acts as a penalty for the failure to fulfil the 
duty of care. Yet, as previously mentioned, personal liability for the entire losses due to the 
sub-optimal decisions imposes too much risk on directors.162 To balance against the extra 
risk imposed on directors, it is argued that tailoring personal liability to the circumstances 
of the corporation, market environment, director’s risk aversion, and so on, is similar to 
designing standard equity- or accounting-based incentives. 163  In this sense, capping 
liability, and indemnifying and insuring partial liability, are sensible attempts to calibrate 
appropriate liability risk.164    
Furthermore, it is clarified that monetary liability does not deter but encourages efficient 
risk-taking. The legal doctrine per se requires directors to maximize the interests of the 
company with due care. Since in the commercial world the best return from investments or 
transactions is usually associated with risk-taking, playing safe is not fulfilling the duty of 
care. 165  It has been assumed that the courts are biased against risk-taking because the bad 
outcome naturally materializes the risk at the time of decision-making. Yet, the empirical 
evidence about judicial hindsight bias is mixed in general and even rare in particular 
relevance to corporate disputes.166  Even if such bias does exist, the instructions of not 
penalizing excessive risk-taking can be incorporated in the design of liability rules.167   
Undoubtedly, litigation incurs high costs. As mentioned, litigation costs include the 
opportunity cost of filing or participating in the lawsuits as well as out-of-pocket payments 
through legal proceedings. Moreover, it is not easy to maintain the optimal level of private 
actions to the point that the increasing benefit of improving deterrence equals the 
 
161 Ibid., p. 338. The author makes this argument based on the ‘informativeness principle’ from contract. The 
central message of this theory is ‘if a second signal of the agent’s action can be drawn at no additional cost, 
the optimal incentive scheme uses both signals’  
For more about the ‘informativeness principle’, see Bengt Holmström, ‘Moral Hazard and Observability’, 
(1979) 10 Bell Journal of Economics, pp.74-91; Steven Shavell, ‘Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal 
and Agent Relationship’, (1979) 10 Bell Journal of Economics, pp. 55-73; Patrick Bolton and Mathias 
Dewatripont, Contract Theory (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005); and Jean-Jacques Laffont and David 
Martimort, The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2002).  
162 See Spamann, supra note 152 and the accompanying text.  
163 Spamann, see supra note 152, pp. 344-345.   
164 Ibid.  
165 Ibid., p. 351.  
166 Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and Andrew J. Wistrich, ‘Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide 
Cases’, (2007) 93 Cornell Law Review, pp. 1-43.  
167  Spamann, see supra note 152, p. 352.   
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increasing litigation costs in a jurisdiction, since legal proceedings are instigated by private 
parties whose major goal is to seek a personal remedy.168 Therefore, it is necessary to 
adjust the procedural rules for allocating the burden of proof and litigation expenses. 
In sum, the utility and design of monetary liability for a breach of duty of care can be 
well explained from the cost-benefit perspective. The benefit of liability incentives cannot 
be ignored and would complement other schemes and mechanisms to better incentivise 
directors. However, the relative value could be low, if more precise, efficient signals are 
already in place, and the litigation cost is high. Conversely, when the internal governance 
structure is weak and even vulnerable, when conflicts of interests are severe, and when 
judges are expert at finding complex facts and rendering appropriate judgements; it would 
be sensible to employ a liability regime to address agency problems.  
2.6 Conclusion  
The widespread popularity of corporate entities is primarily attributable to the structural 
characteristics that facilitate fund raising and management specialization. The agency 
theory has revealed that the widening gulf between managers’ personal interests and those 
of the firms, and the information asymmetry between shareholders and managers may give 
rise to managerial opportunism. This makes the issue of incentivising managers to pursue 
the best interests of the firm and shareholders a topic of heated debate and extensive 
investigation.  
Internal agreement may institute monitoring forces and adopt incentive schemes to align 
the managers’ personal interests with those of their firms’. Yet, incentive schemes can only 
reduce the divergence of interests but not eliminate it. External market mechanisms help 
discipline management without incurring extra costs. The capital market, product market, 
and the managerial labour market combine to generate informative signals to indicate 
managerial performances. However, these signals contain random noises; furthermore, the 
disciplining function is dependent on many conditions that ensure the efficient functioning 
of the market. Therefore, there seems to be a niche for alternative strategies that can ensure 
managerial commitment to the company and investors.  
The literature on law and finance contends that the legal protection of outside investors 
is critical to the development of the stock market, which is accepted as a tenable belief. 
 
168 Steven Shavell, ‘The Social versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System’, (1982) 
11 The Journal of Legal Studies, p. 334.   
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Amongst others, the right to challenge the decisions of directors through litigation is 
considered as a major element of anti-director rights. In line with the logic in the literature, 
the duties and liabilities of directors are not dispensable. Yet, legal scholars raise doubts 
about their understanding of law and the accuracy of their valuation of law in different 
jurisdictions.  
A more specific point of view holds that the judicial review and opinions present an 
independent and direct signal of the management decision(s) at issue, and the award of 
liabilities is essentially construed as the deterrence for particular wrong-doing. The 
desirability of a liability strategy is just a cost-benefit issue. When the relative benefit of 
deterring impact outweighs the cost of obtaining judicial opinions, it is sensible to calibrate 
the monetary liability for directors in a similar way to the arrangement of incentive 
schemes. The relative benefit of judicial review is contingent on the efficient and 
informative nature of other signals, especially the share prices. When the share prices are 
sensitive to management decisions and corporate status, the benefits of a judicial review 
reduce.  
    The fiduciary duty principle, inclusive and flexible, can bridge the gap in an incomplete 
management contract to govern the manner in which directors make business decisions in 
varying circumstances. Civil liabilities serve as deterrence to self-regarding behaviour, and 
simultaneously, as a remedy for the losses sustained by the company and shareholders. 
This means that directors are not free from accountability only because there is no specific 
requirement stipulated in the contract ex ante, since any improper management behaviour 
may trigger a judicial review under the fiduciary duty principle.   
The fiduciary duty of loyalty and monetary liabilities have unique merit in deterring 
one-shot thefts and various forms of self-dealing amounting to theft. This type of wrong-
doing is usually associated with concealment, and market mechanisms cannot immediately 
take in the information until discovered. Moreover, personal gains arising from these one-
shot deals probably exceed the market penalties. Accordingly, the design of liability for 
breach of the duty of loyalty needs to take the information advantages that wrong-doers 
possess, and the under-deterrence of other mechanisms into account.  
    The monetary liability for the breach of the duty of loyalty usually encompasses 
damages to the companies, plus the disgorgement of unlawful gains. To overcome the 
difficulty of detecting self-dealing transactions, interested directors are usually required to 
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disclose the material facts to disinterested directors or shareholders so that self-dealing can 
be negotiated at arm’s length. Accordingly, the rules related to the allocation of the burden 
of proof tilt the balance towards the company and shareholder plaintiffs. Defendants need 
to prove that they have made full disclosure of a potential conflict of interest and its likely 
impact on the dealing. If they failed to do so, the courts would look into the substance of 
the dealing to determine whether it is entirely fair to the company.  
The fiduciary duty of care is more elusive and sophisticated. In case law, the liability 
standard is like a pendant swinging forewards and backwards. A series of private 
arrangements in practice almost waive the personal liability for the breach of the duty of 
care. Some scholars believe that the use of liability as deterrence is ineffective and 
inefficient, but market mechanisms are efficiently disciplining and incentivising directors 
to maximize the firm’s value. This opinion has recently been altered: market signals are 
imperfect and properly calibrated partial liability improves the incentives of directors and 
managers to maximize the interests of the company. The only reason for the complete 
exclusion of liability is high litigation cost, rather than the chilling impact on efficient risk-










Chapter 3 Corporate Governance and Board of Directors in China 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The primary objective of this chapter is to explore the context where the duty and liability 
rules are to be applied. The contextual picture encompasses corporate governance and the 
market environment in China. In general, corporate governance essentially concerns how a 
company is governed and a board of directors is usually the central governance body in a 
company. Therefore, the role and function of the board of directors can be better examined 
within the realm of corporate governance.  
The concept and system of corporate governance have been adopted in China for no 
more than two decades.1 The dynamic of directorial and governance practice still bears the 
imprint of the models in the central planning era. Thus, Section 3.2 classifies the 
enterprises in two standards to give readers some familiarity with China’s enterprise sector. 
Section 3.3 conducts a historical review of enterprise development to understand how the 
traditional legacy remains influential. Section 3.4 shifts the focus onto the current generic 
patterns of ownership and control and associated conflicts of interests in Chinese 
companies, which condition the boards’ functions and status. In addition, this section also 
examines how the boards of directors may function in the internal governance system and 
whether the internal monitoring forces can effectively control managerial opportunism.  
Market mechanisms, as Chapter 2 illustrates, generate signals to incentivise management 
conduct. Moreover, the market disciplining function and precision of market signals are 
relevant to the desirability of the legal liability as well. Section 3.5 undertakes a functional 
assessment of the capital market and the disciplining signals. Following the contextual 
investigation within companies and across markets, Section 3.6 concludes.  
3.2 Categorization of Enterprises 
Chinese enterprises have evolved in a transitional age characterized by spectacularly rapid 
economic growth, 2  transformation of the economic system, 3  and increasingly deeper 
 
1 See infra section 3.3.1.3.   
2 The average annual growth rate of GDP from 1979 to 2012 is 9.8%, according to data issued by the 
National Bureau of Statistics of the PRC. See more information on its official website 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2013/html/Z0102e.htm (accessed 14/11/2019), and see also the GDP growth 
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integration into the world market. 4  The enterprises, the major players in economic 
activities, are becoming vibrant, diverse, and complex in many ways. For instance, the 
number of Chinese enterprises on the list of Fortune Global 500 has increased from three 
in 1995 to 120 in 2018, a massive surge in only two decades.5 Parallel to these giant 
company groups, many small and medium-sized firms are rising to prominence in 
technology innovation in new industries. 6  Notably, the Alibaba Group, an online 
commerce company, raised $25 billion on the New York Stock Exchange in 2014, setting 
the record for the largest IPO ever.7 
Without sorting and classifying the enterprises, any further exploration from any 
perspective, and for any purpose, would be inaccurate and confusing. However, the 
classification can hardly be clear-cut and tenable all the time, since the transitional 
economy has bred hybrid forms and regional variations, and the enterprise sector has 
undergone continuous evolution.8 To facilitate the discussions later in this chapter, this 
section uses the following criteria to classify Chinese enterprises: ownership standard and 
legal form standard.  
3.2.1 Ownership Standard  
A common method used to categorize China’s enterprises is by ownership standard. The 
use of this standard has its theoretical rationale: ownership of a firm represents the right to 
control the firm and the right to gain the firm’s net profit. This determinant considerably 
conditions the distribution of decision-making power, the share of interest, and risk 
 
rate of the PRC from 2010 to 2017 on the website https://www.statista.com/statistics/263616/gross-domestic-
product-gdp-growth-rate-in-china/ (accessed 14/11/2019).  
3 The economic reforms involve nearly every dimension of economic activities and have direct or indirect 
impact on the enterprise operation. Owing to the scope limitation of this study, it will only discuss the reform 
measures regarding enterprise organization.  
4 From 2002 to 2011, the total volume of imports and exports increased from 620.77 to 3 641.86 trillion US 
dollars, at an average annual growth rate of 21.7%. From 2009, China has ranked the second largest economy 
in foreign trade volume globally. See more information on the official website of General Administration of 
Customs of the PRC http://www.customs.gov.cn/publish/portal0/tab48022/info393418.htm (accessed 
14/11/2019).    
5  Fortune Global 500 ranks companies by total revenue in the fiscal year. See the 2018 list on 
http://fortune.com/fortune500/list/ (accessed 14/11/2019).  
6 This argument has its evidence at the policy level. A special government fund was set up to support 
technological innovations of STFs (small technology-based firms) 科技型中小企业技术创新基金 The 
typical cases are available at http://www.innofund.gov.cn/2/dxal/list.shtml (accessed 14/11/2019). 
7  See, one news report about Alibaba’s IPO in the US stock market on 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/22/us-alibaba-ipo-value-idUSKCN0HH0A620140922 (accessed 
14/11/2019).  
8 See infra Section 3.3 for elaboration of these dynamic features of China’s enterprise sector.  
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assumption among corporate participants.9 In a practical sense, the enterprise legislation 
and policies are not entirely unified in China even though efforts have been made to level 
the playing field for all market players.10 Many official reports and statistics adopt the 
ownership standard to evaluate economic performance and economic contribution of each 
type of enterprise.11  
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
In the central planning era (1956-1978), only public ownership (gongyou) was recognized 
as conforming to socialist ideology, and therefore legally confirmed. Based on public 
ownership, only two types of enterprises existed at that time: the SOEs and the collectively 
owned enterprises.12 In contrast, any economic entity privately owned was incongruous in 
that era.  
The SOEs are nominally owned by the entire population of China.13 The state claims to 
exercise ownership on behalf of all people, and the SOEs are actually controlled by 
government agencies. Individual citizens are not entitled to any interest or dividends 
arising from the nominal ownership of the SOEs.  
As the focal point of the policy agenda, the SOEs have undergone a series of reforms 
after the launch of the Opening-up and Reform policy (from 1978 to the present). One 
major change is that after gradual and marginal privatization, the SOEs nowadays are 
defined by whether the government, either local or central, has actual control. The other 
change is the emergence of giant SOE groups or the SOE conglomerates that have 
 
9 See supra note 25 in Chapter 2.  
10 Donald C. Clarke, ‘Legislating for a Market Economy in China’, (2007) 191 The China Quarterly, pp. 
579-581.   
11 See infra Section 3.3.  
12 The Constitution of the PRC has defined the economic system and emphasized the status of the state-
owned economy.  
Article 6. The basis of the socialist economic system of the People’s Republic of China is socialist public 
ownership of the means of production, namely, ownership by the whole people and collective ownership by 
the working people… 
Article 7. The State-owned economy, the sector of the socialist economy under the ownership of the whole 
people, is the leading force in the national economy. The State ensures the consolidation and growth of the 
state-owned economy.  
See the currently effective version and previous versions of the Constitution of the PRC at 
http://law.wkinfo.com.cn/document/show?collection=legislation&aid=MTAxMDAwMDAwNjU%3D&show
Type=0 (accessed 27/11/2019).  
13 Ibid., Art.7.  
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occupied such crucial industries as energy, banking, telecommunication, infrastructure 
construction, and national securities.14   
Collectively owned enterprises (or Collective enterprises)     
Collectively owned enterprises refer to enterprises jointly owned by a particular group of 
people, usually the residents in the community or the workers in the enterprises. Collective 
ownership means that one particular group of people share the profit as well as the means 
and raw materials of production.15 However, it is not possible to proportion collective 
ownership to individuals, who in turn, cannot transfer their shares freely.  
Unlike SOEs, mostly located in urban areas, collective enterprises are pervasive in rural 
areas such as towns and villages. For this reason, township and village enterprises (TVEs) 
are often used to represent collective enterprises.16 The villagers elect their committees to 
govern public affairs within the community,17 and therefore, villagers’ committees play an 
active role in managing the TVEs. The workers in the urban collective enterprises jointly 
own their enterprises and have internal bodies, i.e., employees’ congress, to exercise 
control.  
In the 1980s, collective enterprises outperformed the SOEs and became the engine of 
economic growth in China. Such economic success attracted scholars accustomed to 
 
14 For the organization structure within the SOE groups and the party-state control, see Li-Wen Lin and 
Curtis J. Milhaupt, ‘We Are the (National) Champions—Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism 
in China’, (2013) 65-4 Stanford Law Review, pp. 697-732. 
15 See supra note12, The Constitution Law of the PRC,   
Art. 8 ‘Rural collective economic organizations implement a two-tier system that combines unified and 
separate operation on the basis of household contracts. The various forms of the rural co-operative economy, 
such as production, supply and marketing credit and consumers’ co-operatives, belong to socialist economy 
sector under the working people’s collective ownership. Working people who are members of rural economic 
collectives have the right, within the limits prescribed by law, to farm private plots of cropland and hilly land, 
engaged in household side-line production and raise privately owned livestock.  
The various forms of co-operative economy in cities and towns, such as those in the handicraft, industrial, 
building, transport, commercial and service trades all belong to the socialist economy under collective 
ownership by the working people.  
The state protects the lawful rights and interests of the urban and rural economic collectives and encourages, 
guides, and helps the growth of the collective economy.  
16 TVEs Law of PRC (1996), available at http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-06/01/content_3432.htm (accessed 
21/11/2019).  
17 The villagers’ committee is a grass-root autonomous organization in China, in charge of affairs concerning 
the land use and the distribution of other assets collectively owned by all villagers. Accordingly, the villagers’ 
committee plays an active role in TVEs collectively owned by their villagers. See the Organic Law of 
Villagers’ Committees of the People’s Republic of China 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/government/207279.htm (accessed 21/11/2019). 
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traditional property rights, to explore how the obscure property right and hybrid form of 
organization achieve success.18  
Foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs)  
To attract foreign investment, the Chinese central authority launched the Opening-up 
policy in 1978,19 and gradually established a separate system of laws and regulations for 
enterprises with foreign investment.20 At the outset, foreign investors tended to co-operate 
with local partners via joint ventures either by contract or by equity to enter this new 
market. When foreign investors became more familiar with the market environment and 
cultural differences, they began to opt for wholly foreign-owned enterprises.21 In other 
words, the enterprises wholly or partially owned by individuals or entities outside the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) are FIEs.  
On the one hand, the FIEs have enjoyed ultra-national treatment in the areas of income 
tax, land use, and project approval procedure for almost three decades. On the other hand, 
the government authority controlled the inflow of foreign direct investment through a 
series of examination and approval procedures. In recent years, the government has 
adjusted the regulatory framework to ensure the equal treatment of domestic and foreign 
investment and has selectively liberalized market entry to foreign investment.22 
Private enterprises  
Private enterprises, in this thesis, only refer to those owned and run by domestic private 
parties, excluding the FIEs. This delimitation is also consistent with the use of the terms 
‘private sector’ and ‘private economy’ in the policy circulars and official documents in 
China. Private business in any form was not permitted in the central planning era (1956-
 
18 See, for instance, Martin L. Weitzman and Xu Chenggang, ‘Chinese Township-Village Enterprises as 
Vaguely Defined Cooperatives’, (1994) 19 Journal of Comparative Economics, pp. 121-145;  
David Li, ‘A Theory of Ambiguous Property Rights in Transition Economies: The Case of the Chinese Non-
State Sector’, (1996) 23-1 Journal of Comparative Economics, pp. 1-19.   
19 See infra note 37.  
20 See Peter Howard Corne, Foreign Investment in China: The Administrative Legal System (Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong University Press, 1997).      
21  Ken Davies, ‘China Investment Policy: An Update’, (2013) OECD Working Papers on International 
Investment, OECD Publishing http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/china-investment-
policy_5k469l1hmvbt-en (accessed 21/11/2019).  
22 The negative list of the accessible markets for foreign investment, first tested in Shanghai pilot free trade 
zone, and is currently applicable nationwide. The FIEs do not need to go through pre-approval procedure any 
more to engage in the sectors out of the negative list. In December 2016, the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) issued Revised Draft Foreign 
Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue (seeking public comment), available at 
http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/yjzx/yjzx_add.jsp?SiteId=122 (accessed 21/11/2019).  
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1978). When the economic reform was adopted, the private economy gradually gained 
legitimacy but still endured long-term policy suppression. Nevertheless, the growth has 
been explosive due to the strong market adaptability.   
Table 3.1 illustrates the number and distribution of the enterprises of different types by 
the end of 2017. The number of private enterprises has increased to a total of 16,204,143, 
accounting for 89.53 % of the enterprise sector. In sharp contrast, SOEs, collectives, and 
foreign-funded enterprises occupy small fractions of 1.80%, 1.38%, and 1.24%, 
respectively. Notably, 6.05% of all enterprises do not have controlling shareholders, falling 
in the group of other enterprises.  
Table 3.1 Number of China’s Enterprises by Ownership Standard (2017)  
Number of 
Enterprises 
State-holding Collective-holding Private-holding Foreign-holding Others 
18 097 682 325 800 249 946 16 204 143 224 731  1 093 062 
100% 1.80% 1.38% 89.53 % 1.24% 6.05% 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2018, Table 1-7, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2018/indexeh.htm.   
 
The other recent set of data, issued by the regulatory authority in charge of registration 
of enterprise establishment, shows that private business has been growing fastest by 
measurement of numbers and registered capital in aggregate. In particular, the number of 
private companies has increased 146.0% and the registered capital of the private 
companies has increased 454.7%, from 2012 September to 2017 September. Consequently, 
the proportion of private enterprises in the whole enterprise sector has been continuously 
rising (See Figure 3.2).  
Figure 3.2 Proportion of Private Companies to all Companies (2012-2017)                 
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Source: ‘Analysis into the Development of Market Players from 2012 to 2017’ by State Administration for 
Market Regulation of the PRC.   
3.2.2 Legal Forms  
There is a dichotomy of legal forms for enterprises in Chinese civil law.23 One group is 
enterprise legal persons; the other group is comprised of firms that do not enjoy the legal 
status independent from their investors. Enterprise legal persons have their own assets and 
funds, independently enter into contracts, and assume civil liabilities to the extent of their 
assets and funds. In 1994, the first Company Law came into force, introducing modern 
corporate form. Obviously, companies enjoy independent legal personalities, and hence, 
are called company legal persons. In practice, companies register with the local 
government authority and obtain the ‘business licence for an enterprise legal person’. The 
latter group of business enterprises includes individual industrial and commercial entities, 
individual proprietorship enterprises, and partnership enterprises. Usually, investors are 
jointly and severally liable for these firms’ debts. Only limited partners in partnership 
enterprises assume limited liability as do shareholders in companies; however, they do not 
have the statutory control power, as do the general partners.24  
Nowadays, a vast majority of enterprises has been established as companies. According 
to the official statistics, 2,368,950 enterprises were registered as limited liability companies 
 
23 Chapter III Section 2 Enterprise as Legal Person in 民法通则(General Principle of the Civil Law of the 
PRC) The ‘General Principle of the Civil Law’ is equivalent to the general principle in Civil Code.      
24  Partnership Enterprise Law of the PRC (2006 revision), Chapter III Limited Liability Partnership 
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(LLC) in 2017, 151,259 registered as companies limited by shares (CLS).25 The LLCs and 
the CLSs have common legal features: (1) independent legal personality; (2) investors’ 
limited liabilities; (3) transferability of shares; (4) mandatory two-tier board structure. The 
major differences between the LLCs and the CLSs, in legal texts, used to be the 
registration requirement, i.e., the capital threshold and the number of shareholders. The 
statutory minimum amount of capital and the quorum of shareholders of the LLCs were 
both smaller than those of the CLSs. In 2014, the minimum capital contribution was 
annulled. 26  Capital contribution is not the yardstick to distinguish LLCs from CLSs. 
Besides, a CLS can raise funds by issuing shares to a certain group of people and the 
shareholders of a CLS can freely transfer their shares to a third party. The listed companies 
are sub-type of the CLSs who offer and issue shares to the public in stock markets and 
whose shares are traded in stock markets. 
Nevertheless, the LLCs are suitable for relatively small businesses. The organizational 
structure can be more flexible. Several investors with mutual trust start their business. If 
one shareholder of an LLC wants to transfer his or her shares, he or she ought to inform 
other shareholders of the share transfer first. Subject to the same terms and conditions of 
the transfer, other shareholders have priority over any third party outside the LLC to 
purchase shares.27  
The CLSs are devised to raise capital from a wider scope of investors, including getting 
listed in the securities market. The capital of a CLS is divided into shares and each share 
has equal value and an equal vote. How much capital one shareholder contributes is 
calculated in the number of shares he or she holds. In this way, it is feasible to have 
enormous investors joining the firm with clear statutory rules of voting rights and interests. 
Concomitant with the shareholding system, the CLSs are required to have a more 
standardized internal governance structure. Moreover, the listed CLSs are also subject to 
transparency requirements and many other regulations in order to maintain a well-
functioning securities market. According to the recent annual official report by the 
 
25 The data is from Table 1-8 in 2018 Annual Statistics compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics of 
China http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2018/indexeh.htm (accessed 12/11/2019).  
26 See infra no. 27 in Chapter 4.  
27 See Art.71 the Company Law of PRC (2014).   
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securities authority, by the end of 2017, 3,485 companies have been listed on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange (SSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE).28 
3.3 Historical Review of Enterprise Development   
Against the backdrop of economic transition, the evolution of the enterprise sector 
demonstrates the following characteristics. First, the enterprise evolution is closely inter-
related with the fiscal reforms, industrial policies and market development. Second, the 
enterprise sector exemplifies China’s overall transitioning pattern, government-oriented, 
gradual, and experimental. 29  Consequently, different regions and areas have been 
undergoing varying stages of transformation, and regional variation is expanding.30 Third, 
with market forces such as price, property right, and competition becoming stronger, the 
spontaneous transformation at enterprise level has begun to echo with the top-down 
approach, calling for further policy initiatives.31 This section traces the development of 
each type of enterprise and aims to reveal the legacy that persists among today’s 
companies. This section will also briefly examine the institutional changes and reform 
policies that have direct and important impact on changes in enterprises. 
3.3.1 SOE Reforms 
The evolution of the SOEs is mainly shaped by the reform policies. These policies, on the 
one hand, touch upon the dimension of internal governance to improve the efficiency and 
competitiveness of the SOEs. On the other hand, efforts were made, for example, to adjust 
the industry distribution, relieve the burden of overhead, and propel moderate privatization. 
To identify organizational features of the SOEs, this section focuses more on the former 
aspect and divides the reform process into two stages: primitive attempt and 
corporatization.  
3.3.1.1 Prior to the reforms  
 
28 See 2017 Annual Report of the CSRC, available at 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/zjhjs/zjhnb/201809/P020180907609864959832.pdf (accessed 
22/11/2019).  
29 Linda Yueh, Enterprising China—Business, Economic & Legal Development since 1979, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 4.  
30 Victor Nee, ‘Organizational Dynamics of Market Transition: Hybrid Forms, Property Rights, and Mixed 
Economy in China’, (1992) 37-1 Administrative Science Quarterly, pp. 1-27.  
31 Xu Chenggang, ‘The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development’, (2011) 49 Journal 
of Economic Literature, pp. 1076-1151. 
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From 1949 to 1978, the newly established People’s Republic of China (PRC) followed a 
central planning system, in which the central government allocated and coordinated supply 
and demand. Administrative fiat was the sole means to organize economic activities. The 
SOEs were merely units affiliated to the government agencies, manufactured the 
designated quotas of products or services, and provided welfare to their employees with 
assigned inputs and capital. In general, the regulatory function, enterprise management, 
and sustaining social welfare were mixed and distorted in this period.32 
For each major industry, one bureau of authority was instituted at the central level. The 
bureau authority and its local branches coordinated upstream and downstream enterprises 
within the industry, and were in charge of the nomination and evaluation of the SOEs’ 
leaders. The state, as a whole, seemed like a large firm in which each enterprise was only a 
production unit under the direction of the central authority.33  
At the same time, the SOEs assumed heavy policy burdens. One was to maintain urban 
employment; the other was to provide a wide range of social welfare to labourers. Large 
and medium-sized SOEs provided housing, medical care, and education to their staff, 
amounting to ‘cradle-to-grave benefits’.34  Employees in the SOEs earned equal wages 
regardless of the quality and quantity of their work. Moreover, they had no fear of losing 
their jobs because of idleness or lack of skills, and therefore, a job in an SOE was akin to 
having an ‘iron rice bowl’. In this regard, economic incentives are not key factors to 
motivate the devotion and diligence of ordinary employees.   
Similarly, the leaders in the SOEs were not concerned with maximizing profit but 
mainly fulfilling the output targets, as enterprise revenue was not a criterion in evaluating 
their performances. Other major tasks included coordinating the relationship between 
cadres and employees and earning appreciation from senior authorities, mostly the 
government agency. The leaders of the SOEs were virtually government officials and Party 
cadres. These aspects were more decisive for their promotion to a more politically 
powerful position. The enterprise culture at that time was bureaucratic and ideological,35 
 
32 Barry Naughton, ‘Hierarchy and the Bargaining Economy: Government and Enterprise in the Reform 
Process’ in David M. Lampton (ed.), Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 245-279.  
33 Donald Clarke, ‘Corporate Governance in China: An Overview’, (2003) 14 China Economic Review, pp. 
494-507.  
34  Hua Jinyang, Paul Miesing, and Li Mingfang, ‘An Empirical Taxonomy of SOE Governance in 
Transitional China’, (2006) 10 Journal of Management Governance, p. 403.  
35 Theodore Groves, Hong Yongmiao, John Mcmillan, and Barry Naughton, ‘Autonomy and Incentives in 
Chinese State Enterprises’, (1994) 109-1 The Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 183-209.  
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and the ideologist indoctrination played a far more important role in motivating the staff to 
reach production goals than economic rewards.36 
3.3.1.2 Reforms in managerial autonomy (1978-1992)  
The central planning system established major industries from scratch. However, the low 
efficiency of the SOEs and the state deficit were quite severe. Moreover, a ten-year 
political campaign—the Cultural Revolution—exacerbated the political control and 
ideology block, leading to a stagnation of the overall economic system and societal chaos. 
Confronted with intense economic and social pressure, the Communist Party of China 
(CPC) announced the commencement of economic reforms at its Third Plenum of the 
Eleventh Central Committee in 1978,37 and from then on, the nation entered a new era.  
With regard to the SOEs, extensive efforts were made to devolve managerial power 
from government agencies to enterprises from 1978 to 1992. At inception, the SOEs began 
to gain decision-making power over business matters that were explicitly listed in the 
administrative regulations.38 Moreover, the SOEs were permitted to produce more than the 
designated quota and to retain the profit from such extra output; meanwhile, the designated 
quotas were maintained at low levels. On the margin, SOEs began reacting to the market 
forces. This strategy was aptly termed the ‘growing out of plan’.39 From 1983, the SOEs 
did not need to submit profits to the government but pay income tax, and could accumulate 
the net profit as an enterprise fund.40  
 
36 Oiva Laaksonen, ‘The Management and Power Structure of Chinese Enterprises during and after the 
Cultural Revolution; with Empirical Data Comparing Chinese and European Enterprises’, (1984) 5-1 
Organization Studies, p. 5.  
37 The Third plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC declared that the goal of the central 
authority should be shifted from political struggle to economic development. To this end, a series of policies 
were subsequently issued and summarized under the umbrella term ‘Economic Reform and Opening-up’ 
policies, which have turned a new page in China’s development and paved the way for continuous economic 
growth.  
More information about the original version of resolution at this meeting is available at 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/134580/134581/ (accessed 10/11/ 2019).   
38 In 1979, the State Council issued 关于扩大国营工业企业经营管理自主权的若干规定(Regulations on 
Expansion of Autonomous Managerial and Operational Power of the State-owned Industrial Enterprises) 
wherein production and sales, internal governance structure, employees recruitment, fund use, and refusal of 
political apportionment were all recognized as the realm of enterprises’ autonomous power.  
39 Barry Naughton, Growing out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform 1978-1993 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995).  
40  In 1983, the State Council approved 关于国有企业利改税的试行办法  (Promoting Measures of 
Replacement of Profit Submission with Tax Payment) drafted by the Ministry of Finance. All the large and 
medium-sized SOEs would pay the enterprise income tax at the rate of 55% of profit. After-tax profit, if still 
large, could be distributed between the enterprise and its superior authority, or could be paid as adjustment 
tax to the government.  
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To boost enterprise vitality, in 1984, the CPC asserted that the SOEs should be 
independent of the government and responsible for their own profits and losses.41 A series 
of attempts were made through the 1980s to delineate the relationship between the 
government and SOEs, including ‘contract-based responsibility system’ and ‘shareholding 
system’.  
The contract-based responsibility system drew up an operational contract between the 
government agency and one SOE. In the legal sense, the SOEs started to have an 
independent legal personality, termed as ‘enterprise legal persons’. 42  The government 
authority was the owner of the state-owned assets and the SOE was in charge of running 
the assets. The operational contract between the state and the SOEs was the embryonic 
form of separation of ownership and control in China’s enterprises. This contract set forth 
the scope of managerial power, profit distribution between the government and the 
enterprise, and other matters. The SOEs were obliged to perform their duties according to 
the contract. 
To ensure the execution of the operational contract, the general manager of an SOE was 
held responsible for the enterprise’s performance. The general manager took on sole 
leadership and had the final decision-making power, while internal committees and 
production departments would simply provide information and consultancy to the general 
manager. This is also recognized as one-man management.43  
The major responsibility of the SOEs was to ensure profit making and submit the 
stipulated portion of profit to the government agency. Failing to do so in one year, the 
SOEs had to pay the difference from the next years’ profit. However, a prominent problem 
emerged. What would be the base line of profit submission? This issue provoked 
continuing disputes between the SOEs and government agencies. When an SOE made 
greater profits in consecutive years, the government authority tended to increase the ratio 
 
41 The Third Plenum of the Twelfth Central Committee of CPC promulgated ‘CPC’s Resolution on the 
Economic System Reform’, which laid down the guiding principles for reform measures in major areas, and 
in particular, emphasized the focus of the SOEs reforms.  
 ‘The significant part of economic reform is to advance SOEs’ vitality, especially the large and medium-sized 
SOEs. Administrative authorities should be segmented from the management of SOEs. The SOEs will be 
independent in operation and responsible for their own profits and losses. Enthusiasm, initiatives, and 
creativity of production should be sufficiently encouraged on parts of the SOEs.’ The full text of the 
Resolution is available on the CPC’s official website, 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/134902/8092122.html (accessed 21/11/2019).   
42 See supra note 23 in this chapter.    
43 Wang Baoshu and Cui Qinzhi,论国营企业厂长的法律地位 (Argument on the Legal Status of General 
Manager of SOEs ), (1984) 5 法学研究(Chinese Journal of Law), pp. 49-56.  
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of profit to be turned over. This means that the more outstanding the performance of an 
SOE, the heavier their burden would be. Taking Capital Steel as an example, its profit was 
continuously increasing. The government authority adjusted the ratio of turned-over profit 
several times, from 5% to 6.2%, and finally to 7%. Capital Steel did not accept the ratio 
adjustment. Regardless, the Beijing Finance Bureau directly subtracted around 100 million 
CNY from the bank account of Capital Steel as profit submission.44 Conversely, it could 
also be possible that an enterprise, suffering continuous losses, was unable to make up for 
the gaps in previous years.45  
The other problem was the rampant management wrong-doing. The role and function of 
general managers were closely regulated; however, the liability or extra-legal 
consequences they would assume for the losses to the enterprise caused by their improper 
performance of the function was unclear. Besides, the operational contract was for a fixed 
term of several years. The general managers were encouraged not to pursue long-term 
goals for the enterprises in case of major changes after the expiration of the operational 
contract. 46  Making small gains at large or future cost, speculative investment, asset 
stripping, and diversion of enterprise funds to the managers’ personal pockets was frequent. 
Meanwhile, the remaining government intervention hindered efficient business decision-
making. This range of problems has been depicted as ‘insider control under administrative 
intervention’.47 In 1993, the central authority accordingly called a halt to the contract 
responsibility system.   
In parallel, some SOEs started to issue shares to raise funds as early as 1983, despite 
political reticence and ideological constraint.48 For one thing, the idea that private parties 
would hold shares of the SOEs was simply not ideologically compatible with socialism and 
 




45  Anthony Y. C. Koo, ‘The Contract Responsibility System: Transition from a Planned to a Market 
Economy’, (1990) 38-4 Economic Development and Cultural Change, pp. 797-820. 
46  Wang Yanlin and Tian Yinzhi, 关于厂长负责制的若干问题 (Several Issues on Management 
Responsibilities System), (1986) 2 法学评论 (Law Review), pp. 44-47.   
See also Harry G. Broadman and Geng Xiao, ‘The Coincidence of Material Incentives and Moral Hazard in 
Chinese Enterprises’, Development discussion Paper No. 606, Harvard Institute for International 
Development, Harvard University.  
47  Zhang Weiying, ‘China’s SOE Reform: A Corporate Governance Perspective’, Institute of Business 
Research Working Paper, No. 1998 E04, Peking University.  
Qian Yingui, ‘The Institutional Foundation of China’s Market Transition’, World Bank Annual Conference 
on Development Economics in April.  
48 In 1983, Shenzhen Bao’An United Investment Enterprise with shareholding system was established. 
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the state-owned economy. For another, the SOEs did have a pressing need of capital, since 
their source of funding was shifted from direct government grants to banking loans.49 
Scholars actively participated in the debate on the nature of the state-owned economy and 
the control of the SOEs.50 Meanwhile, experiments in the shareholding system were carried 
out in pilot enterprises and areas.51 Until 1992, official documents concerning accounting, 
management personnel and other internal mechanisms of shareholding enterprises were 
issued to guide the reform experiments.52   
In 1990, the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges were established so that the SOEs 
could issue their shares to the public and have their shares traded in a stock market. In 
1992, the securities regulatory authority at the central level—China Securities Regulatory 
Committees (CSRC) was established. Equivalent to the Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in the US, the CSRC is in charge of regulating and supervising the issuance and 
transactions of securities and other related activities in the securities market.53 Also in this 
year, nine SOEs were selected and approved for reform into CLSs to be listed onto the 
Hong Kong stock exchange.54  
To sum up, the period from 1978 to 1992 saw the breakthrough of a planned economic 
system and primary transformation of SOEs. Management autonomy was gradually 
granted to the SOEs; the central authority recognized the necessity of separation between 
 
49 See Yi Gang, ‘The Intrinsic Logic of China’s Banking Industry Reform’ in Fang Cai (ed.) Transforming 
the Chinese Economy (Leiden: Brill, 2010).  
50 Li Yining is the first Chinese economist to advocate ‘restructuring SOEs into shareholding enterprises’. Li 
and his colleagues Cao Fengqi and Zhang Guoyou published 怎样组建股份制企业 (How to Establish a 
Shareholding Enterprise) (Beijing: Peking University Press, 1993). He opined, ‘the state shareholding system 
is a new form of state economy’. Wang Jue and Yu Jinfu supported his idea. Hu Jun held an opposing idea 
that the profit distribution among shareholders and employees was not equal, and accordingly, the socialist 
system was shaking. The debate was reviewed in a paper: Wang Kejing and Yin Chanjuan, 试论国有企业公
司制股份制改革 (The Discussion on Corporate Form and Shareholding Reform of the SOEs), (2008) 6 中央
财经大学学报 (Journal of Central University of Finance and Economics), p. 3.  
51 ‘Three provinces Guangdong, Fujian, Hainan conducted an experiment of issuing shares to the public (not 
quoted in the stock exchanges) based on the authorities of comprehensive pilot areas. The measures and scale 
of issuing shares should be approved by the People’s Bank of China (China’s central bank) and National 
Committee for Economic System Reform (dissolution of NCESR was in 1997).’ in国务院批转国家体委关
于一九九二年经济体制改革要点的通知  (Announcement of State Council Approving and Circulating 
Notice of Main Points in 1992 Reforming Economic System by NCESR) State Council [1992] No.12, 
available at http://www.reformdata.org/special/709/about.html (accessed 19/10/2019).  
By the end of 1992, 3700 SOEs had become pilot enterprises of the shareholding system.  
52 股份制企业试点办法 (Experimental Measures on Shareholding Enterprise); 股份有限公司规范意见 
(Regulatory Opinions on Companies Limited by Shares); 有限责任公司规范意见 (Regulatory Opinions on 
Limited Liability Companies).  
53 See infra section 5.3.1 for more information pertaining to the CSRC functions.  
54  Ma Qiangquan (ed.), 中国证券史 1979-1998 (China’s Securities History 1979-1998) 中信出版社 
(Beijing: Citic Publishing House, 2003), p. 162. 
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government and SOEs. The enterprises began to act like commercial entities, pursuing 
profit and getting adapted to the market environment. Despite the positive impacts of the 
primitive reforms, many SOEs were still suffering from low efficiency and overhead 
burdens.  
3.3.1.3 Corporatization and advancing corporate governance (1993-present)  
In 1992, Deng Xiaoping, the former leader of the CPC, took a southern tour to the pilot 
provinces and gave a speech to confirm the reform attempts, which heralded a new phase 
of economic reforms towards a ‘socialist market economy’. 55  This idiosyncratic term 
‘socialist market economy’ literarily means a market economy with socialist characteristics, 
indicating the retained component of public ownership in a market environment. A 
perceptive comment is that ‘establishing market institutions was less of an end itself, but a 
means to achieve economic growth and realize social stability’.56 Others observed that this 
term reflected the pragmatic but cautious attitude of the central authority towards market 
economy.57  
At the enterprise level, a major concern that remains is whether SOEs can survive and 
perform better in a market. In 1993, the ‘modern enterprise system’ (xiandai qiye zhidu) 
was proposed as the new trend of the SOEs reforms.58 In the same year, the first Company 
Law was enacted and its primary goal was to facilitate the corporatization of the SOEs.  
The modern corporate form endorsed by the central authority is to reach two ends. First, 
corporatized SOEs would realize the separation of the government and the enterprises. It is 
conceived that the government agency plays the role of a shareholder while the company’s 
internal governance organs undertake the business operations. To separate regulatory 
functions and the shareholding role, the distinct agency—the State-owned Asset 
 
55 In 1992, Chairman Jiang Zemin delivered a message at the 14th National Congress of the CPC. This 
congress essentially summarized the 14 years of practical experiences after the commencement of economic 
reforms in 1978. More information is available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-
01/20/content_697129.htm (accessed 19/10/2019).  
56 OECD (2000): Reforming China’s Enterprises, p. 10.  
57 Barry Naughton, ‘A Political Economy of China’s Economic Transition’, Loren Brandt and Thomas G. 
Rawski (eds.), China’s Great Economic Transformation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 
94-97.   
58 In 1993, the Third Plenum of the 14th Central Committee of the CPC was held. This meeting announced a 
series of decisions regarding the establishment of a socialist market economy. The full version of the CPC 
document ‘Decisions on Several Issues Concerning the Establishment of a Socialist Market Economy’ is 
available at http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/134902/8092314.html (accessed 21/10/2019). Among others, 
建立现代企业制度 ‘establishing modern enterprises’ was strongly highlighted and conceptualized with four 
components: ‘explicitly stipulated property right, clearly defined rights and duties, separation of government 
and enterprise, and scientific management’.  
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Supervisory and Administrative Committee of the State Council (SASAC) was established 
in 2003. The branches of the SASAC have been set up at local levels in the provinces and 
large municipalities. In case of large company groups, the holding company plays the role 
of equity owner and becomes the parent company of the subsidiaries. This means that state 
shares are currently held by government agencies or the state-owned asset holding 
companies.  
The second objective is to promote best management practices and eventually advance 
enterprise efficiency. In accordance with the Company Law, the corporatized SOEs must 
establish the mandatory governance structure—two-tier board under shareholders (general) 
meeting in place of the general managers’ responsibility model in the previous reform 
stage. Moreover, in 2004, the SASAC launched an innovative pilot program among the 
central SOEs to standardize the executive boards and enhance board effectiveness. The 
pilot program extensively covers the diversity of board composition, the selection and 
nomination of professional managers, and the board function. 59  For some large SOE 
groups, the executive boards are required to have outside directors to provide independent 
and professional opinions as to business operation. In addition, specialized committees are 
instituted for performing key functions professionally, including the audit committees, 
strategy committees, ethics committees, and remuneration committees.60 
To promote management expertise in the boards, the SASAC often holds management 
skills training for the SOEs’ directors.61 Regular communication between the government 
agents and the directors in the central SOEs is facilitated. Under the frequent informal 
inspection of the SASAC, the SOEs, especially the listed ones, and those at the central 
level, have moved rapidly to standardize their governance mechanism, at least in terms of 
formality and resolution procedure.   
 
59 In 2004, the SASAC issued 关于中央企业建立和完善国有独资公司董事会试点工作的通知(The 
Notice on Pilot Works of Establishing and Improving Board of Directors in Wholly State-owned Companies 
in Central Enterprise Group) , and the pilot program commenced pursuant to this regulation. By the end of 
2015, 85 central SOEs have joined this pilot program. See a news report by official media: 85 家中央企业纳
入建设规范董事会试点(85 Central SOEs Join Pilot Program of Establishing Standard Board of Directors),  
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2015-12/15/c_1117470345.htm (accessed 15/10/2019).  
60 Ibid.  
61  Relevant information and the reports of professional training are available at 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n6881559/n10281480/index.html (accessed 15/10/2019). 
40A_BW EdleXun_stand.job




Apart from the efforts to enhance management efficiency, in 2013, a new round of 
mixed ownership reforms began strengthening the monitoring by non-state investors.62 It is 
contemplated that the diversification of ownership would effectively lift insider control, 
since private and foreign investors may have stronger incentives to monitor insiders. Yet, 
non-state parties are concerned with the protection of their interests against the 
expropriation of state controlling shareholders. Some commentators argue that the success 
of mixed ownership reforms is essentially counting on whether the state virtually cedes 
control of the SOEs.63  
Indeed, the concept of equity stakes jointly held by the state party and non-state party is 
not new. Since the late 1990s, private and foreign investors have already joined in some 
SOEs due to the implementation of other enterprise policies.64 The line between the private 
sector and state sector is now blurred. The indirect influence of the government also 
extends as far as the large non-state enterprises. Thus, despite the privatization of central 
SOEs, government control may not diminish.65 The progress of the new reform moves and 
their anticipated results remain to be observed in the years to come.  
3.3.2 Rise and Fall of the Collective Enterprises  
In China, collective ownership is rooted in rural areas. The villagers in a community jointly 
own the land and the villagers’ committee is responsible for land use and the organization 
of agricultural production. In the central planning age, villagers were organized into 
communes or brigades, and they collectively owned product materials as well as the land, 
 
62 Chairman Xi Jinping endorsed the notion of mixed ownership reform at the Third Plenum of the 18th 
Chinese Communist Party in 2013. The State Council issued 国务院关于国有企业发展混合所有制经济的
意见  (Opinions on the Development of Mixed Ownership among SOEs) in 2015 and this regulatory 
document enlightens local governments, ministries and commissions on advancing diversification of 
ownership structure in SOEs, available at http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2015-
09/24/content_10177.htm (accessed 15/10/2019).  
63 Marshall W. Meyer and Changqi Wu, ‘Making Ownership Matter: Prospects for China’s Mixed Ownership 
Economy’, Paulson Policy Memorandum, September 2014, p. 2. http://www.paulsoninstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/PPM_Making-Ownership-Matter_Meyer-and-Wu_English.pdf (accessed 
16/11/2019);  
Curtis J. Milhaupt and Wentong Zheng, ‘Why Mixed Ownership Reforms Cannot Fix China’s State Sector’, 
Paulson Policy Memorandum, January 2016, p. 2. http://www.paulsoninstitute.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/PPM_SOE-Ownership_Milhaupt-and-Zheng_English.pdf (accessed 16/11/2019).   
64  For instance, the policy ‘grasping the large; letting go of the small’ (zhuada fangxiao) was implemented to 
adjust the overall structure of the state-owned assets. Those small, local, and financially distressed SOEs 
were sold to private businessmen. With regard to foreign investment, the primitive stage at the inception of 
the Opening-up Policy was to establish joint ventures with SOEs. Since 2002, foreign institutional investors 
obtain approval by China’s regulatory authority to invest in the listed companies.  
65 Fayuan Liang, ‘新一轮国企改革中如何发展混合所有制经济 ’ (How to Develop Mixed-ownership 
Economy in the New Wave of SOEs Reform), (2014) 2 企业研究 (Business Research), pp. 77-79.   
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undertook agricultural production altogether, and shared the output equally. To implement 
the policy of rural industrialization, some communes started to run small-sized enterprises, 
engaged in processing agricultural by-products and other related business. Because their 
products and services were able to fill in the supply gap left by the industrial SOEs, the 
annual growth rate of the commune and brigade enterprises was 25.7% in the period of 
1970 to 1976.66  
The economic reform has brought about a fundamental change in the rural areas since 
1979. The commune production system was replaced by the household responsibility 
system, which retained collective ownership but allocated production to individual 
households. Consequently, this boosted the efficiency of agricultural production 
significantly, by increasing incentives of individual families generously. More labourers 
were released from farming and family savings became possible.67 Under these hospitable 
conditions, the TVEs gained momentum to grow rapidly, and their proportion in the annual 
national industrial output increased from 9% in 1978 to 27% in 1993, and reached 
approximately 60% in 1999.68 
Some scholars compared the SOEs and the TVEs and unravelled the reasons for the 
TVEs outperforming the SOEs during the late 1980s to 1990s.69 Firstly, the TVEs enjoyed 
political endorsement but without too much government intervention. In such a favourable 
position, the TVEs were able to organize their production and formulate their development 
roadmap in a flexible manner. Some TVEs have become the suppliers of auxiliary products 
and services to what SOEs produced, or filled in market niches left by large SOEs.70 
Second, the TVEs had a better incentive structure. The entrepreneurs, usually the leaders of 
the villagers’ committees, had one single goal, to maximize the welfare of all the residents 
in their villages.71 When many of the villagers were participating in the production of the 
 
66 William A. Byrd and Qingsong Lin, ‘China’s Rural Industry: Structure, Development, and Reform’ 1990 
A World Bank Research Publication, The Oxford University Press, p. 10.   
67 Fan Gang and Chen Yu, ‘ “过渡性杂种”：中国乡镇企业的发展及制度转型’ (‘Transitional Hybrid’: 
Development and Institutional Transformation of China’s Township and Village Enterprise), 2005 4 (3) 经济
学(季刊) (China Economics Quarterly), p. 948. 
68  Jinhua Che and Yingyi Qian, ‘Institutional Environment, Community Government and Corporate 
Governance: Understanding China’s Township-Village Enterprise’ working paper no. 59 in April 1997, p. 25. 
The data is originally from the Statistical Yearbook of China, 1993, p. 15 and p. 395.  
69 Gary H. Jefferson and Thomas G. Rawski, ‘Enterprise Reform in Chinese Industry’, (1994) 8 Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, pp. 47-70.  
70 The success of TVEs in the southern part of Jiangsu Province was aptly termed as the ‘Southern Su Model’ 
(Su nan Model).  
71  Hongyi Chen and Scot Rozelle, ‘Leaders, Managers, and the Organization of Township and Village 
Enterprises in China’, (1999) 60 Journal of Development Economics, pp. 529-557. 
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TVE, the enterprise’s profit became directly and positively related to the villagers’ 
interests, and the goal of maximizing the TVE’s profit was consistent with the aim of the 
villagers’ committees. On the contrary, the leaders in the SOEs had stronger political 
incentives than economic ones. Third, privileges in terms of land use, bank loans, and 
market access, which the SOEs enjoyed, were somehow available to the TVEs. The 
villagers’ committee played an important role during an era of underdeveloped market 
institutions.72 The leaders of villagers’ committees served as a bridge between the local 
government and the TVEs, and hence, the TVEs could gain specific support at the local 
policy level.73 Moreover, the connection with local government also made obtaining loans 
from rural credit co-operatives or the local bank branches feasible.74  
However, the number of TVEs and their share of annual national output were declining 
in the approach to the 21th century. The TVEs have gradually lost their comparative 
advantages.75 First, when the market institutions took shape and private enterprises gained 
more development room, the semi-government background of the TVEs turned out to be 
not as meaningful as before. Second, the tax preferential policy adopted by the local 
government was revoked due to the fiscal reforms.76 Bank loans began to flow into private 
enterprises that were more promising because they could provide solid collateral. In 
contrast, the community assets were not readily transferrable.77 Third, the vaguely defined 
property right and obscure boundary between the TVEs and villagers’ committee in the 
competitive market appeared less efficient and even obsolete.78  
 
72  Qiucheng Tan, 转型时期乡村组织行为与乡镇企业发展  (Organizational Conduct of the Villagers’ 
Committees and the Development of Township and Village Enterprises in Transitional Age), (2003) 3 中国
社会科学 (Social Science in China), pp. 72-73.  
73 Anthony Ody, ‘Rural Enterprise Development in China, 1986-1990’, World Bank Discussion Paper, No. 
162, World Bank, Washington, DC. 
74 Albert Part and Minggao Shen, ‘Joint Liability Lending and the Rise and Fall of China’s Township and 
Village Enterprise’, (2003) 71 Journal of Development Economics, p. 500. This paper also uses data to show 
that bank loans financed a great majority of TVEs on p. 502. 
75 Ho, Samuel, Paul Bowles, and Xiaoyuan Dong, 2000, ‘Letting Go of the Small: the Political Economy of 
Privatizing Rural Enterprise in Shandong and Jiangsu,’ Hongbin Li, ‘Property Right Transformation with a 
Tail: A Case Study of Successful Reform by a Screening Mechanism in China’, Working paper, Stanford, 
2000; Eduard Vermeer, ‘Shareholding Cooperatives: A Property Rights Analysis’ in Andrew Walder and 
Jean Oi (eds.), Property Rights and Economic Reform in China (Redwood city: Stanford University Press, 
1999), pp. 123-144 
76 In 1994, China adopted fiscal reforms. The government revenues are classified into three parts: central, 
local, and shared. Before the reform, the distribution of revenues between the central and local government is 
at a negotiated percentage or amount, and accordingly, the local government used to have more discretion in 
implementing taxation policies than after the reforms. See Shouguang Wang, ‘China’s 1994 Fiscal Reform: 
An Initial Assessment’, (1997) 37 Asian Survey, p. 801-817.  
77 See supra note 74 in this chapter. P. 501.   
78 See supra note 72 in this chapter.  
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To survive in the increasingly fierce market competition, many TVEs underwent 
restructuring into the corporate form, to eliminate the inefficient decision-making model. 
All the villagers, also the owners and employees of the TVEs, had voting rights to decide 
on business transactions and development strategies. However, villagers were inclined to 
approve distribution plans that generated more wages. This hindered the accumulation of 
enterprise funds and the enterprise’s long-term development.79 From 1998 to 2003, in the 
southern coastal areas, local governments advocated management buyout to privatize the 
TVEs.80 The ‘vaguely defined’ property right, which used to achieve economic success in 
the transitional period, has been gradually replaced by private property right. The relative 
weight of the collective enterprises in China’s economy is rather light.81  
3.3.3 Boom of Private Enterprises  
Similarly, a sea change has occurred in China’s private sector in the last four decades. The 
central planning age eliminated the private economy. As above discussed, the state 
government tightly controlled any economic activities, which state-owned and collectively 
owned enterprises performed. Until the commencement of the economic reforms in 1978, 
individual self-employed business, in the legal form of individual proprietorship, was 
permitted. This policy breakthrough was intended to ease the unemployment pressure in 
the urban areas. Yet, the scale was limited to no more than eight persons in one firm. 
However, the number of individual proprietorships, from 1978 to 1986, was increasing at a 
rate of 74.6%. In 1986, there were 1.211 million individual proprietorships with 3.439 
trillion CNY registered capital across the country.82 
In 1987, the 13th Central Committee of the CPC officially recognized the ‘private 
economic sector’ as ‘a necessary supplement’ to the state sector. In the next year, the 
Constitution of the PRC, for the first time, declared in the amendment that the rights and 
interests of private economy are under legal protection. However, the lingering suspicion 
about the legitimacy of private economy in a socialist system was not immediately cast 
away. Private entrepreneurs took the ‘red hats’ on their enterprises to avoid the risk of 
unpredictable political risks.83 The ‘red hat’ is a metaphor for the tag of state-owned and 
collective enterprise. Private business got ‘affiliated’ to the collective enterprises or SOEs 
 
79 Fan Gang and Chen Yu, see supra note 67 in this chapter, p. 948.   
80 Ibid., p. 949.  
81 See supra note 74 in this chapter.   
82 The statistic is provided by the State Administration for Industry & Commerce of the PRC and used in the 
report http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2012/0828/c64387-18850046.html (accessed 23/11/2019).  
83 Victor Nee, see supra note 30 in this chapter.  
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by providing outsourced services. With this ‘red hat’, private enterprises could survive, 
expand, and develop in a stable policy environment.  
In tandem with the general promotion of further transition to a ‘socialist market 
economy’ in 1992, the official document of the CPC and the national Constitution Law 
continued to upgrade the role of the private sector in the overall economic system in the 
following decade.84 The legal framework and regulatory policies accordingly relaxed more 
room and provided more support for the development of private enterprises. Consequently, 
the private enterprises eventually embraced a burgeoning era and the private sector has 
become the most vibrant component of economic development, representing a majority of 
the GDP, employment, and government revenue.85 Notably, private enterprises contribute 
around 70% of economic growth. In the areas of technology innovation and international 
trade, private enterprises also prevail over SOEs.86  
In the meantime, private enterprises still face serious impediments to their development: 
policy bias, limited access to certain industries, heavy burden of tax and fees, inadequate 
access to finance, and low-level management. According to the official statistics, 
individual private enterprises, around 60% in all, go bankrupt within five years, and about 
85% will do so in 10 years. The average business life span of the private enterprises is only 
2.9 years.87  
3.4 Corporate Governance and Board of Directors 
3.4.1 Ownership and Control  
3.4.1.1 Ownership structure  
It is natural that closely held firms have a limited number of shareholders and are under the 
control of one or a few shareholders. In China, listed companies have concentrated 
ownership structure as well. In the early 1990s, when the stock market was new, almost all 
 
84 Tianli Feng and Guofeng Wang, ‘How Private Enterprises Establish Organizational Legitimacy in China’s 
Transitional Economy’, (2010) 29 Journal of Management Development, pp. 377-393.  
85 For the relevant statistic, see 中国民营经济发展报告(China’s Private Economy Development Report), 社
会科学文献出版社(Beijing: Social Science Literature Publisher, 2013). For each year since 2006, an annual 
report is published as a single volume.  
86 The number of the private technology enterprises has increased to about 150,000. In 53 national high-tech 
development zones, private enterprises account for more 65% of patent applications, and 80% of new 
products are created by small and medium-sized enterprises, many of which are privately owned. The 
growing rate of international trade by private enterprises is 19.2 % higher than the average rate of all sectors.  
87  Shenzhen Stock Exchange, (2008) ‘Empirical Studies into Development of China’s Private Listed 
Companies’.  
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listed companies were converted from SOEs. The major goal of setting up a stock market 
back then was to provide a financing channel, specifically to the SOEs, as an alternative to 
banking loans.88 In contrast, the non-state companies, especially private ones, did not gain 
sufficient opportunities for development, and accordingly, were almost unable to fulfill the 
listing requirements, such as profits in consecutive years. Even if the listing requirement 
was reached, non-state companies could barely be allocated with the quota to list shares on 
the stock market.89 
To avoid the dilution of government control over the listed SOEs, only one-third of all 
shares of the listed SOEs were circulated on the stock exchanges, while two-thirds were 
held by the government entity as state shares, and by the wholly state-owned enterprises 
(WSOE) as legal person shares.90 The division of tradable shares (TS) and non-tradable 
shares (NTS) is called the split share structure, a manifestation of partial privatization in 
China.91  
The split share structure resulted in a conflict of interests between the TS holders and 
NTS holders. Namely, the shares of one listed company are priced differently; the 
assumption of risks varies among different groups of shareholders; and the dividend 
policies are completely at the disposal of NTS holders. These problems severely distorted 
the function of, and inhibited the development of, the stock market.92 In addition, TS 
holders were mostly individual investors without sufficient power to curb insider control, 
and thus, their interests were positioned precariously.  
In 2005, the central government launched the split-share structure reform to achieve the 
full circulation of all shares of listed companies. 93  The major strategy is to offer 
compensation for the TS holders by the NTS holders. Share trading is suspended during 
the period of formulating, announcing and approving the compensation plan. To offset the 
 
88  Weiye Li and Louis Putterman, ‘Reforming China’s SOEs: An Overview’, (2008) 60 Comparative 
Economic Studies, p. 372.  
89  For more information about the quota system in 1990s, see Katharina Pistor and Chenggang Xu, 
‘Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies: Lessons from China’, (2005) 7-1 American Law and 
Economic Review, pp. 184-210.  
90 For more information about the split-share structure, see Qian Sun and Wilson H.S. Tong, ‘China Share 
Issue Privatization: The Extent of its Success’, (2003) 70 Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 183-222.  
91 Kai Li, Tan Wang, Yan-Leung Cheung, and Ping Jiang, ‘Privatization and Risk Sharing: Evidence from 
the Split Share Structure Reform in China’, (2011) 24-7 The Review of Financial Studies, pp. 2499-2525.  
92 Franklin Allen, Jun Qian, and Meijun Qian, ‘Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China’, (2005) 77 
Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 79-83.  
93 In 2005，关于上市公司股权分置改革试点有关问题的通知 (Announcement Regarding the Issues of the 
Split-share Structure Reforms in Pilot Listed Companies) was delivered by the CSRC, marking the beginning 
of the new wave of split-share structure reform.  
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impact on share prices due to the massive release of shares in the market, some other 
measures are adopted, like the 12-month lock-up period for NTS holders.94  
The empirical evidence concerning market reaction to reforms of split share structure 
has also demonstrated many characteristics of the listed companies and the ownership 
structure of these companies.95 In particular, 1301 companies, accounting for the 98% of 
all listed companies, had undergone the split-share restructure reform by the beginning of 
2007.96 This suggests that the overwhelming dominance of the listed SOEs on the stock 
exchanges continued until at least one decade ago.  
Moreover, the extent of share concentration of these listed SOEs is strikingly high. On 
average, the largest shareholders hold 42.73% of all shares, while the second to tenth 
shareholders together hold 19.49%.97 Furthermore, the split-share structure reforms did not 
bring immediate changes to the ownership structure but the removal of trade restrictions 
that would generate far-reaching impact on the liquidity and share price in the long term.98  
More recently, a large increase in private companies listed on the stock exchanges 
occurred. Notably, by the end of 2013, there were already 1308 private companies in the 
stock market, accounting for 52.01% of all listed companies.99 The initial public offerings 
(IPOs) have been suspended on two occasions to cope with market volatility, from October 
2012 to January 2014, and from July to November in 2015. The expanding trend of private 
companies in the stock market is unchanged, not only in terms of total number but also of 
aggregate market value.100 However, central SOEs still occupy 50.14% of the total share 




94  Mikael Mattlin, ‘The Chinese Government’s New Approach to Ownership and Financial Control of 
Strategic State-owned Enterprises’, BOFIT Discussion Paper No. 10/2007. The author opined that the 12-
month lock-up period for non-tradable shares indicates that the central authority wants to remove trading 
restrictions but not lose state control.   
95 See, e.g., Andrea Beltratti, Bernardo Bortolotti, Marianna Caccavaio, ‘The Stock Market Reaction to the 
2005 Split Share Structure Reform in China’, (2012) 20 Pacific-Basin Financial Journal, pp. 543-560.  
96 Ibid., p. 546.  
97 Ibid.  
98 Ibid., p. 559.  
99 Yongjun Li, 我国上市公司股权结构分析 (An Analysis of Share Structure of the Listed Companies in 
China), (2014) 6 冶金管理 (China Steel Focus), p. 39.  
100 China Centre for Market Value Management, 2015 年 A 股市值年度报告 (The Annual Report of Market 
Value of A Shares of the PRC). According to this report, the market value for all private companies for the 
first time surpassed that of the central SOEs in the security market.  
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Table 3.3 Listed Companies and Fractions of Shares 
 
 
   
 
   
 
According to the SSE report, the average number of shares per private company is much 
smaller than the number of shares per state-owned company in the stock market. 101 
Moreover, the percentage of shares that the largest shareholders hold in private companies, 
on average, is 31.93%, much lower than the percentage in state-owned companies.102 
Furthermore, the second to the fifth largest shareholders together hold 10.25% less than the 
largest shareholders have on average in private companies. Such average differences in the 
state-owned companies are much larger.103 In sum, concentrated ownership structure is 
prevalent among private companies, but the concentration degree is much less than that of 
state-owned companies in the stock market.  
3.4.1.2 Government control  
The legacies from the central planning era—government control and intervention took on a 
new form after continuing reforms, i.e., the government agents become controlling 
shareholders or actual controllers. The chronic problems associated with government 
control, to some extent, still inhibit the enhancement of corporate governance in the SOEs. 
First, there is no fixed or constrained source of funds for the SOEs, termed ‘soft budget 
constraint’ by economists. 104  The SOEs are given priority in obtaining government 
subsidiaries and bank loans. The budget and state subsidiaries are negotiable and can be 
 
101 Xiaonan Lu and Weidong Zhang, 中国民营上市公司发展研究  (The Research on Development of 
Private Companies Listed onto the Stock Market), 2012.  
102 Ibid.  
103 Ibid.  
104 Janos Kornai, ‘The Soft Budget Constraint’, (1986) 39 KYKLOS International Review for Social Science, 
pp. 3-30.   
Company Category Number of 
Shares 
Percentage to all of 






7380.62  18.21 
Private companies 5741.03  14.17 
Joint ventures  6360.07  15.69 




Others  173.95  0.43 
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adjusted from time to time. In the event of financial distress, the government can bail out 
the SOEs. As a consequence, directors and senior managers in the SOEs may have moral 
hazard problems. That is, they have less pressure to maintain the business operation, since 
the SOEs would survive anyway, riding the government bailout.105  However, the low 
efficiency of the SOEs, non-performing loans, and financial deficit may stifle the 
development of the overall economic system.106  
Second, unlike private firms, the SOEs’ goal is not purely to maximize the wealth of the 
firms but also to assume policy burdens including maintaining the employment rate, 
implementing industrial policies, and so on. These multiple goals cannot be fulfilled at the 
same time. Even worse, to pursue the policy goals not only distracts from efforts to 
maximize the firm’s value but also encourages moral hazard problems among directors and 
senior managers, because it is difficult to measure the portion of losses due to 
mismanagement and the portion attributable to extra policy burdens.107 
Third, the SOEs do not have real owners, or moreover, the principals who normally have 
the ultimate claim over the residual interest and to whom the agents are accountable. The 
central and local governments, on behalf of all the people, exercise the ownership of the 
SOEs, but the whole people of the PRC do not have substantive power to monitor the 
government agencies.108 The central government has instituted the SASAC to play the role 
of shareholders of the SOEs; the SASAC sets up the WSOEs as holding companies; and 
the holding companies invest in the SOEs listed on the stock market. In this way, higher 
agency costs due to multiple agency relationships are inevitable, especially when no 
ultimate owners virtually exist. Therefore, concentrated ownership in China’s SOEs does 
not necessarily mean a strong monitoring force. Even if the monitoring force works, the 
by-product of government interference, such as perverse incentives for directors, is not 
conducive to corporate efficiency.  
 
105 Yifu Lin and Guofu Tan, ‘Policy Burden, Accountability, and the Soft Budget Constraint’, (1999) 89 The 
American Economic Review, pp. 426-431.  
106 Ruiming Liu and Lei Shi, 国有企业的双重效率损失与经济增长 (Dual Efficiency Loss of the SOEs and 
Economic Growth), (2010) 1 经济研究 (The Economic Review), pp. 127-137.  
107 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’, (1997) 52 The Journal of 
Finance, p. 755.   
108 Yingyi Qian, ‘Enterprise Reform in China: Agency Problems and Political Control’, (1996) 4 Economics 
of Transition, pp. 427-477.  
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In addition to these common problems among the SOEs, listed SOEs may face pervasive 
‘tunnelling’ by the controlling shareholders, i.e., the state holding companies.109 Many 
listed companies have been ‘carved out’ or ‘spun off’ from the company groups. The 
company groups assign the profitable assets to the firms to be listed, and allocate inferior 
assets and debts to other unlisted firms. Once the profitable firms are approved for IPOs, 
they become ‘cash cows’ for their company groups. The profits and raised funds of the 
listed firms are ‘tunnelled’ to sustain those unlisted and unprofitable firms at the expense 
of the interests of minority shareholders in the listed companies. The major forms of 
‘tunnelling’ encompass related party transactions, corporate loans, and earnings 
management.110 
3.4.1.3 Family control 
Private firms are usually started by one or several entrepreneurs and supported by family 
members in forms of fund contribution and other investment. It is a common practice that 
family members either take major positions in the firms or hold substantial company shares. 
Such a model remains unchanged when some of these private companies are listed on the 
stock markets.111 The family relationship is likely to impair the corporate governance of 
listed companies in the following aspects.  
Family control results in the involvement of business decision-making with family 
issues and personal relationships. Quite often, the patriarchal approach may prevail over 
the standard procedures and mechanisms of consultancy, discussion, and decision-making. 
Then, the quality of governance and decision-making is more contingent on one 
determinant—the competence of the actual controller. Whether the actual controller has 
great investment insights and operational techniques becomes decisive to the firm’s 
performance. When the business is expanding in terms of scale and variety, it becomes 
more risky for listed companies with unstable corporate governance to count on personal 
capabilities.112   
The dominance of family kinship in the firms not only keeps funds away but also makes 
it difficult to attract managerial talent. For one thing, to retain the family control of the firm, 
 
109 For a further explanation of tunnelling, see Simon Johnson, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes 
Andrei Shleifer, ‘Tunneling’, (2000) 90 American Economic Review, pp. 22-27.  
110 Qiao Liu and Zhou (Joe) Lu, ‘Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in the Chinese Listed 
Companies: A Tunneling Perspective’, (2007) 13 Journal of Corporate Finance, pp. 881-906.  
111 Lei Wang and Leonel Prieto, ‘Institutional and Individual Factors Impacting Domestic Private Companies 
in China’, (2009) 17 International Journal of Organizational Analysis, p. 312.  
112 See supra note 100 in this chapter, p. 46.  
45A_BW EdleXun_stand.job




issuing shares to the public has to be within a certain limit, or else the family control would 
be diluted when other strong investors come in. Therefore, fund-raising may be arbitrarily 
constrained and business expansion inhibited.113 For another, even these private firms do 
need professional managers to have an edge in fierce competition. Controlling families are 
inclined to shut the door on strangers to maintain family control.114  
There is a conflict of family interest and the firm’s interest. When family firms are listed 
in the stock market, family members may cash out and transfer monies to their personal 
accounts. It is extremely difficulty to spot such tunneling actions under the cover of family 
relationships and through informal arrangements.115 Thus, family kinship can provide the 
most supportive and consistent resources when the firms just start. As for long-term goals 
and continuous and stable development of listed companies, family control may present 
risky variables and impede efficient governance and rational decision-making.            
3.4.2 Internal Governance  
The internal governance of Chinese companies is basically set up in accordance with the 
Company Law. 116 The Company Law formulates comprehensive rules regarding 
organizational structure, internal bodies, and the dynamic mechanisms of internal 
governance. Individual companies may opt into or out of default rules and customize the 
specific rules in their articles of association (AOA) to their needs. Such alterations vary 
with the scale of the firm, stage of lifecycle, type of industry, and many other attributes 
that a firm possesses. Nevertheless, the generic pattern of governance strategies to control 
mismanagement and internal monitoring can be illustrated as follows.  
3.4.2.1 Prototype of internal governance structure  
The Company Law of PRC devises the mandatory internal governance structure: a two-tier 
board under shareholders (general) meeting (SGM). 117  The SGM is a forum, either 
regularly or provisionally held, where the shareholders of a company can attend, cast votes 
 
113 Ibid.  
114 Ibid.  
115 Ibid.  
116 The full text of the Company Law is available http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_4814_0_7.html 
(accessed 28/11/2019).  
117 In this thesis, ‘shareholders meeting’ and ‘shareholders general meeting’ are used interchangeably. The 
Company Law of the PRC uses ‘shareholders meeting’ (gudonghui) in the context of LLCs and ‘shareholders 
general meeting’ (gudong dahui) in the CLSs. However, an SGM is a meeting where all the shareholders of a 
company can participate to exercise their voting right on business proposals. The only difference, in the legal 
sense, is that on average, the number of shareholders in the CLS is large and the meeting procedure is more 
regulated to ensure shareholders’ participation.   
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on crucial business matters and transactions, and elect or dismiss the members of two 
boards. In addition, the company’s AOA, internal rules applicable to the company’s 
constituent parties, is subject to the SGM’s approval.   
The two distinct boards are the executive board and supervisory board. The boards of 
directors (BODs) exercise the executive power and delegate a part of such power to senior 
managers. The supervisory boards are in charge of monitoring management and expected 
to check internal controls.118 At the first glance, the two-tier board structure mirrors the 
German model. Yet, Chinese supervisory boards do not have the statutory power to 
nominate, elect, or dismiss directors or senior managers like their German counterparts 
do.119  
3.4.2.2 Governance strategies constraining mismanagement  
The first governance strategy directly affects the scope of executive power that a board of 
directors can exercise. The Company Law empowers the SGM to be the ultimate decision-
maker rather than the board of directors, which differs from the ‘director’s primacy model’ 
in the US.120 This means that not only does the SGM grant the authority of the board of 
directors, but also particular matters are subject to the SGM’s approval. In particular, the 
board of directors must propose to the SGM any actions and transactions that may cause 
fundamental and crucial changes to the company or to the relationship between the 
company’s constituent parties. Notably, it is mandatory in the Company Law that 
amendment of the company’s AOA, increase or decrease in registered capital, merger, 
division, dissolution, or conversion of the company should be approved by a two-thirds 
majority of all the shareholders in the LLCs or all the shareholders present at the meeting 
in the CLSs (Art. 44 and 104 respectively). In addition, the Company Law allows 
substantial room for specific stipulations regarding the purview of the SGM in the 
company’s AOA. As such, the board of directors do not have sole decision-making power 
 
118 Jay Dahya, Yusuf Karbhari, Jason Zezong Xiao, and Mei Yang, ‘The Usefulness of the Supervisory Board 
Report in China’, (2003) 11 Corporate Governance: An International Review, pp. 308-321.  
119 For more information about the two-tier model in Germany, see Klaus J. Hopt and Patrick C. Leyens, 
‘Board Models in Europe—Recent Developments of Internal Corporate Governance Structures in Germany, 
the United Kingdom, France, and Italy’, (2004) 1 European Company and Financial Law Review, pp. 139-
142.   
120 For the legislation of this ‘director primacy model’, see, the Delaware General Corporation Law that sets 
forth: ‘the business and affairs of every corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of 
directors.’ http://delcode.delaware.gov/title8/c001/sc04/index.shtml (accessed 18/11/2019).  
For a scholarly discussion, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance’, (2003) 97 New York University of Law Review, p. 547; and Stephen M. Bainbridge, ‘Director 
Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment’, (2006) 119-6 Harvard Law Review, pp. 1735-1758. 
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over business matters of crucial importance. The SGM’s approval may ex ante screen out 
those proposals and plans that may be potentially harmful to the shareholders’ interests.  
The other governance strategy is to retain power to determine who can be board 
members. The Company Law conferred the right to elect and remove directors (who are 
not employees’ representatives) to the SGM (Art. 38) as well. Who has the right to 
nominate the candidates, the procedure of the election and removal, and the majority 
quorum are all in the realm of the company’s AOA. 
The term of office of a director is a maximum of three years; however, the term can be 
renewed upon successful re-election (Art. 46). Therefore, at least every three years, 
directors have to cope with the pressure of a potential turnover. Indeed, the frequency of 
exercising the removal right is not limited to the statutory term of office. Since there is no 
legal requirement for the cause of removal, the SGM may remove a director at any time for 
any reason, unless the company’s AOA or the employment contract state otherwise. 
In practice, majority shareholders control the SGM because the one-share-one-vote rule 
renders it so. Then the substantial decision-making power retained for the SGM in law is 
virtually more favourable to the interests of controlling shareholders, rather than that of the 
company. Through the SGM, controlling shareholders elect their ideal candidates to be 
board members. The directors would propose the plans that benefit the controlling 
shareholders for the sake of their careers. In this circle, the alliance of controlling 
shareholders and directors strengthens continually. But the independence of board of 
directors is severely undermined.  
3.4.2.3 Specialized monitoring forces  
In parallel to the executive board is the supervisory board, monitoring whether directors 
and senior managers properly exercise their decision-making powers. To ensure the 
independence of the supervisory board, the Company Law explicitly proscribes the dual 
role of a supervisory board member and a director or a senior manager at the same time 
(Art. 52). Supervisory board members may attend the meeting of the executive board. They 
are enabled to raise questions and put forth suggestions about the issues under the directors’ 
consideration; however, they cannot vote. When discovering any irregularity in the 
operational conditions, the supervisory boards may conduct investigations and engage an 
accounting firm and other intermediaries to provide assistance and consultancy when 
necessary. The firm bears the expenses of such professional consultancy (Art. 55). 
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Furthermore, they may also call the attention of shareholders, present proposals to the 
SGM, and convene interim shareholders meetings to resolve crucial issues, such as the 
removal of directors (Art. 54). Finally, supervisory board members may require the 
directors to modify improper or unlawful conduct or even file civil actions against 
directors in egregious circumstances (Art 152).  
However, in practice, there is significant variance in the exercising of these statutory 
powers and most empirical evidence shows that China’s supervisory boards are not 
effective in monitoring the executive branch.121 The supervisory boards usually lack the 
independent status, competence, incentives, and the relevant information to challenge and 
censor the executive branch. First, the supervisory boards in the SOEs are under 
government and party control. Their counterparts in the private firms have somehow 
obtained connections with the entrepreneurs or directors. Such affiliation to insiders can 
hardly deliver an effective monitoring service for the firm’s interests.122 Second, reviewing 
accounting books and noticing the irregularity of financial status requires professional 
skills that few supervisory board members possess. In many listed companies, the secretary 
of the BOD writes the supervisory board reports and other required documents for 
information disclosure. 123  Third, there is tension between access to information and 
relative independence. To understand the overall scenario and the ‘behind-the-scenes’ 
stories of business strategies and transactions, the supervisory board members need to get 
close to the decision makers even to the extent that the decision makers are willing to share 
inside information. However, at the same time, they become less independent and can 
hardly deliver any critical observations. Finally, it makes no difference to the supervisory 
board members if they do a good job, since neither legal liabilities nor incentive schemes 
are in place to motivate the supervisory function.124 
3.4.3 Board of Directors  
The BODs in China are mainly in charge of business decision-making, organization of 
production, and firm management. Even for crucial issues in the SGM, the BOD draft and 
 
121  Jay Dahya, Yusuf Karbhari, and Jason Zezong Xiao, ‘The Supervisory Board in Chinese Listed 
Companies: Problems, Causes, Consequences and Remedies’, (2002) 9 Asia Pacific Business Review, pp. 
118-137.  
122 Weiqiu Long and Qingchi Li, 公司内部治理机制的改进:“董事会-监事会”二元结构模式的调整 (The 
Internal Governance Improvement: The Adjustment of the Two-tier Board Model), (2005) 5 比较法研究 
(Journal of Comparative Law), pp. 58-71.    
123 See supra note 99 in this chapter.  
124 Ibid.  
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propose the plans, and execute the final resolution of the SGM. Thus, how the BODs 
perform their functions is pivotal to the quality of corporate governance, and in turn, to the 
firms’ performances and values. 
Unlike their counterparts in private firms, directors in the SOEs also find themselves in a 
hierarchy of government officials. This fundamental difference is that the incentives, 
career track, and remuneration packages of directors in the SOEs are all idiosyncratic. 
Their primary goal is not to purely maximize the firm’s value, since they are actually 
accountable to government superiors. The government superiors, as shareholders, tend to 
select those who can perfectly represent their interests and pursue policy agendas. To gain 
the trust of the government superior, the candidates must have a track record of experience 
in similar SOEs or government agencies, or have already developed connections with these 
government superiors. This ecology in the SOEs hinders lateral movement of professional 
managers. Besides, the independence of directors from government control and the Party’s 
influence is not ensured.125 As a result, it is likely that the SOEs do not have a competent 
and independent BOD, which per se is unfavourable to the SOEs’ efficiency. 
In addition, the remuneration packages for the directors in the SOEs are politically 
sensitive, and thus, under unified regulation. 126  For instance, the whole remuneration 
package for a director in a central SOE cannot be more than seven or eight times the 
average salary of the ordinary employees therein. Such inflexible regulation cannot 
efficiently incentivize the directors’ best efforts. Moreover, the empirical evidence shows 
that seldom is equity ownership used to align the directors’ personal interests with that of 
the firm.127   
3.5 Market Mechanisms and Incentives  
The Stock Market  
China’s stock market has been established since the opening of Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges in 1991. With no more than three decades of development, this stock 
market became the second largest in the world by trading volume and market capitalization 
 
125 Mi Zhou and Xiaoming Wang, ‘Agency Cost and the Crisis of China’s SOE’, (2000) 11 China Economic 
Review, pp. 299-300.  
126 中央管理企业负责人薪酬制度改革方案 (Reform Measures Concerning the Remuneration for the 
Leaders in Central Enterprise) was delivered by the CPC Central Political Bureau in 2014.  
127 Hongxia Liu and Michelle W.L. Fong, ‘Board Characteristics of Medium and Large Chinese Companies’, 
(2010) 10 Corporate Governance, pp. 168-169.  
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by the end of 2014.128 Chart 3.4 illustrates the general trend of expansion by total market 
capitalization and the number of listed companies on the two stock exchanges from 2003 to 
2012. However, relative to the robust figure of GDP, the performance of the stock market 
is rather disappointing, as indicated by the returns on investment.129 
Figure 3.4 Total Market Capitalization and Number of Listed Companies on the SSE 
and SZSE, 2003-2012.  
Source: China Capital Market Overview at the official website of Shanghai Stock Exchange130 
Many practitioners and theorists, domestic and overseas, have studied this emerging 
stock market and made the following observations.131 First, the stock market is merely a 
secondary source of funds while the financial system is dominated by the state-owned 
banking sector. 132  The great majority of China’s companies rely on self-financing, 
including debts, foreign direct investment, and trade credits to sustain their business 
operations.133  
 
128 The 2014 CSRC Annual Report  
129 See Figure 1 in Franklin Allen, Jun Qian, Susan Chengyu Shan, and Julie Lei Zhu, ‘The Best Performing 
Economy with the Worst Performing Market: Explaining the Poor Performance of the Chinese Stock Market’, 
2014 Working paper, Imperial College London.  
130  The official website of the Shanghai Stock Exchange is 
http://english.sse.com.cn/investors/introduction/chinacapital/ (accessed 29/10/2019).  
131 Since this part mainly focuses on the function of the stock market, it does not discuss the explanation for 
why China presents a counter-example to the theory of law, finance, and economic growth.   
132 See supra note 92 in this chapter, p. 61.  
133 Ibid.  
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Second, the stock market has been long lamented as being worse than a casino, due to 
the lack of game rules.134 There are hundreds of millions of individual retail investors in 
China’s stock market, who conduct more than 80% trading.135 Individual retail investors do 
not have the expertise to analyse the disclosed information, nor do they have the resources 
to diversify their investment portfolios like institutional investors do. The share price is 
extremely volatile, and in turn, these individual investors undertake speculative trading 
rather than long-term investment. Moreover, the regulation and enforcement actions 
against insider trading, misrepresentation, and market manipulation are weak; thus, there is 
poor protection of the interests of these individual retail investors.  
Third, it is doubtful that share price reflects the firm’s value and future profitability and 
whether corporate governance matters in the market value of firms in China. Extensive 
empirical literature has revealed mixed findings. With regard to the function of the stock 
market, it is commonly believed that the stock market has not achieved fully-fledged 
development and cannot adequately fulfil efficient capital allocation, and discipline 
corporate managers.136 However, recent studies do show that the informativeness of share 
prices has increased.137   
Market for corporate control  
The nascent market for corporate control in China has just come into existence. As 
previously examined, before 2006, almost all listed companies were state-owned and two-
thirds of their shares were not tradable on the stock market. At that time, it was the 
government authority that initiated and led mergers and acquisitions (M&A), and 
restructuring to implement industrial strategies, or to bail out insolvent firms. The transfer 
of corporate control was mainly by means of agreement. Private parties could not buy state 
shares and legal person shares in the stock market. 
As of 2006, with the launch of the split-share structure reform, the obstacle for NTS 
trading were removed. Furthermore, in 2006, the Administration Measures on the 
Takeover of Listed Companies was issued by the CSRC, which for the first time, 
 
134 Forbes Report 10/01/2001, ‘China’s $ 600 Billion Casino: Can It Become a Stock Market?’, quoting 
Jianglian Wu, a Chinese economist, who once commented that ‘The stock markets in China are worse than 
casinos, because even casinos have rules’.  
135 Jennifer N. Carpenter, Fangzhou Lu, Robert F. Whitelaw, ‘The Real Value of China’s Stock Market’ 
(2015) NEBER Working Paper No. 20957, p. 5.  
136  William T. Allen and Han Shen, ‘Assessing China’s Top-down Securities Markets’, (2011) NBER 
Working Paper Series, p. 38.  
137 See supra note 135 in this chapter, p. 7.    
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established a regulatory framework for takeovers of listed companies in China.138 However, 
the 2006 Administration Measures still imposed substantial control on takeover 
transactions, which was abolished in 2014.139  
The concentrated ownership structure poses another challenge to the prospective 
acquirers, since an acquiring firm needs to buy out the majority of shares of the target firm 
in order to obtain control over the target firm. Nonetheless, an increasing number of private 
companies are getting listed on the stock exchanges and many have a relatively more 
dispersed ownership structure than the SOEs. Financing channels and tools for the 
takeovers of the listed companies become more diversified.140 Thus, it becomes financially 
feasible to buy out a moderate fraction of the shares of a private company to obtain 
corporate control. However, for listed companies with a single or few large shareholder (s), 
the lack of funds alone suffices to keep bidders away.   
At present, the disciplining function of the market for corporate control is constrained by 
the undeveloped stock market. As the share price may not be able to indicate the value of a 
firm accurately, both acquiring and target firms are reluctant to enter share transfer deals or 
have difficulty in consenting to the terms, due to the lack of an efficient pricing mechanism.  
Besides, a takeover proposal may trigger volatility in the share price of the target firm. 
Without strong information disclosure systems and effective protection of individual 
investors, insiders may misuse the information advantage to seek unlawful earnings. Even 
worse, some decision-makers initiate a restructuring plan only to create the opportunity for 
insider trading, which also greatly disturbs the market for corporate control.141 In sum, the 
directors and officers in the listed companies with a relatively dispersed ownership 
structure begin to pay attention to the threat of a takeover, while for the remaining majority 




138  The full text of Administration Measures on the Takeover of Listed Companies is available at 
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/1800000121_39_4237_0_7.html (accessed 31/11/2019).  
139 Linklaters: China Reforms Rules on Takeovers and Material Asset Restructuring of Listed Companies, 
December 2014.   
140  For instance, the China Banking Regulatory Commission issued 商业银行并购贷款风险指引 (The 
Guidelines Regarding the Risks of Commercial Banks’ Loans for Merger and Acquisition) in 2008. These 
Guidelines mark a policy breakthrough of using bank loans for equity investment.  
141 Shanghai Stock Exchange: （2009）中国公司治理报告-- 控制权市场与公司治理(The Report on 
China’s Corporate Governance—Market for Corporate Control and Corporate Governance), p. 35.   
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The enterprise sector has undergone tremendous changes, as the overall economic system 
has transitioned from central planning to market-oriented. Previously, the SOEs and 
collectively owned enterprises were the only legitimate forms of productive organizations. 
After decades of reforms, the major forces in the economy are private enterprises. The 
SOEs continue to dominate in key industries. In the meantime, modern corporate form and 
internal governance structure, as the SOE reforms initially promoted and national 
legislation formulated, have become widely adopted in business practices.   
A common feature of Chinese companies is the concentrated ownership structure, no 
matter whether a company is privately owned or under state control or if it is listed on the 
stock exchange. Controlling shareholders or actual controllers have substantial influence 
within companies, but minority shareholders are positioned in disadvantageous situations 
or even exposed to the expropriation of controlling shareholders or directors and officers. 
In the lens of the agency theory, horizontal agency problems between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders can be prevalent among Chinese companies.  
The SOEs suffered from low efficiency due to the soft budget constraints and excessive 
policy burdens. Meanwhile, the directors and officers in the SOEs have serious moral 
hazard problems, because the internal monitoring function remains weak, if not absent, and 
market mechanisms are unable to generate substantial pressures. To be specific, they are 
not monitored by the real owners of the SOEs but by some government agents whose aim 
is not to maximize the return on investment like normal investors. Managerial 
performances are not measured purely by profitability indicators. Directors and officers, in 
turn, are not incentivized to pursue commercial goals like their counterparts in private 
companies. Although the two-tier board structure is mandatory, the supervisory boards do 
not actually play a significant monitoring role due to the lack of information and incentives. 
In addition, directors and officers in the SOEs are not in a liquid managerial labour market, 
since the promotion of management personnel is determined by government authorities. As 
the SOEs are usually monopolies in their respective industries, their directors and officers 
do not face intense market competition. Last but not least, the stock market is still at a 
early stage, and the market for corporate control has barely taken shape. Directors in the 
SOEs that go publicly listed are virtually free from the threat of replacement after 
takeovers in the stock market.  
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Private companies, especially those begun by entrepreneurs, and of small and medium 
size, may operate under family control. The interest of a big family may prevail or personal 
relationships can disturb business operations. There is improper maintenance of internal 
governance mechanisms, as a close-knit group tends to make business decisions in a 
flexible manner. This might entail ‘stealing’ of the company’s fund, opportunities or other 
resources or violations of laws and regulations. Nevertheless, the product and services 
market incentivize directors and officers to work efficiently and diligently to some extent, 






















Chapter 4 Directors’ Duties and Liabilities in China’s Law 
  
4.1 Introduction     
This chapter mainly examines the status quo of the applicable laws that set forth directors’ 
duties and liabilities in China. Before delving into the specific rules, it briefly introduces 
the sources and hierarchy of law in China, to impart a basic understanding of the Chinese 
legal system to readers.  
The hierarchy of China’s laws and regulations, in top-down order, consists of the 
Constitution, national laws, administrative regulations, ministry rules and local rules, and 
local regulations.1 The state legislative organ—the National People’s Congress (NPC) and 
its Standing Committee, enact and amend national laws.2 The NPC Standing Committee 
also has the authority to interpret the Constitution and national laws. The State Council, the 
central government, issues administrative regulations in accordance with national laws.3 
The ministries, directly under the State Council, promulgate specific rules regarding the 
issues within their regulatory purview and designated authority, which are categorized as 
the ministry rules, or department rules. Besides, the commissions and other agencies, 
directly affiliated to the State Council, formulate regulatory documents. The regulatory 
documents usually provide for the methods and operational standards to fulfil the 
regulatory requirements. However, there is no official definition of the authority of the 
regulatory documents, which creates significant controversy over the application of these 
regulatory documents in legal practice.  
The local people’s congresses and local governments have the power to formulate only 
the rules and regulations applicable in their areas pursuant to national laws and 
administrative regulations.4 The local rules promulgated by the local congresses have legal 
force equivalent to that of the ministry rules issued by the ministries.  
 
1 See 立法法 (Legislation law) ; the full text in English is available at https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-
provisions/legislation-law-chinese-and-english-text (accessed 11/11/2019).  
2 Ibid., Art. 7.  
3 Ibid., Art. 56.  
4 Ibid., Art. 63.  
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The Supreme People’s Court (SPC), the highest judicial organ, plays a significant role in 
shaping and refining national laws.5 The SPC issues judicial interpretations to guide the 
application of laws in the overall judicial system, which frequently goes beyond the literal 
meaning of legal provisions.6 Some commentators highlighted a lack of justification for the 
expansive manner in which the SPC interprets laws.7 Nevertheless, the judges at all levels 
refer to the judicial interpretations by the SPC in a similar way that they apply the national 
laws. Since 2010, the SPC has adopted the Guiding Case System to enhance national 
uniformity in the interpretation and application of the legal rules.8 The judges are expected 
to invoke guiding cases that are similar to the disputes on hand.9 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 briefly sketches the 
landscape and development trajectory of corporate and securities legislation in China. 
Given that the Company Law, the Securities Law, and the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law knit 
a web of legal duties and liabilities of directors, Sections 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5, respectively, 
analyse the relevant provisions in these national laws and examine the associated judicial 
interpretations.   
4.2 Brief Overview of Corporate and Securities Legislation  
4.2.1 Enterprise Legislation by Ownership Standard  
The first legislation in the PRC that provided the LLC as a legal form for business entities 
was the Sino-foreign Equity Joint Venture Law (EJV Law). The EJV Law was enacted in 
1979 to accommodate the inflow of foreign investment, immediately after the Opening-up 
and Economic Reform policy was launched in 1978. The EJV Law only contains 16 
articles that broadly cover the issues related to capital contribution, registration approval, 
governance structure, labour protection, and the mechanism of foreign currency exchanges. 
 
5  The official introduction of the SPC and the court system is available at the NPC’s website 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/stateStructure/2007-12/06/content_1382076.htm (accessed 11/11/2019). 
6 关于加强法律解释工作的决议 (The Resolutions on Strengthening the Interpretations of Laws) by the 
SCNPC in 1981 and 关于司法解释工作的规定 (The Provisions Regarding Judicial Interpretations) by the 
SPC in 2007 have clarified the binding force of the judicial interpretations by the SPC.     
7 For the debate over the scope and constitutionality of the judicial interpretations by the SPC, see, Chunlong 
Chen, 中国司法解释的地位与功能 (Function and Significance of the Judicial Interpretation in the PRC), 
(2003) 1 中国法学 (China Legal Science), pp. 24-32.  
8 Before the establishment of the guiding case system, the SPC has selected and published the representative 
cases to guide the interpretative work in the SPC’s Gazette since 1985. Some other case reference books by 
the SPC compiled the selected cases, not formally binding but representative of judicial practice, including 中
国案例指导 (Chinese Case Guidance Series) and 人民法院案例选 (People’s Court Case Selection).  
9 See Xingliang Chen (ed.), 中国案例指导制度研究 (Chinese System of Directive Cases) (Beijing: Peking 
University Press, 2014).  
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The rules were written in a clumsy and over-simplified manner. However, before this law, 
no business enterprises in the modern sense existed, nor did any enterprise legislation in 
the PRC.10  
To facilitate diverse forms of foreign investment and business operation, China passed 
the Wholly Foreign-owned Enterprise Law (WFOE Law) and the Sino-foreign Contractual 
Joint Venture Law (CJV Law) in 1986 and 1988, respectively.11 Similar to the EJV law, 
the policy goal focused on the regulation of foreign investment. However, the internal 
governance structure and the relationship between the constituent parties did not receive 
much attention. These laws, in tandem with the revisions, implementing rules and relevant 
administrative regulations constitute a separate legal system for foreign-invested 
enterprises. However, such a piece-meal law-making approach brought about severe 
overlaps, conflicts, redundancy, and even vacuum in these legal rules.12    
In 2015, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) conducted a complete overhaul and 
began restructuring the foreign investment legislation. Amongst others, the Draft of 
Foreign Investment Law was circulated to solicit public opinion. The forthcoming law will 
replace ‘the trio’ of the EJV, CJV, and WFOE Laws. The fundamental idea of this law is to 
unify the regulatory framework of foreign investment, mainly including the rules for 
market entry, national treatment, national security review, information reporting system, 
and investment protection.13 With regard to the legal forms for business, foreign-invested 
enterprises are subject to Company Law and the Partnership Enterprise Law.  
Similarly, the SOEs, collective enterprises, and private enterprises have been regulated 
along distinct tracks, and the laws were separately enacted. A number of interim 
regulations were firstly issued by the State Council to implement the reform measures for 
managerial autonomy and independent enterprise status.14 Based on these regulations, the 
 
10  Jianwei Li, 中国企业立法体系的改革与重构  (The Reform and Restructure of China’s Enterprise 
Legislation), (2013) 6 暨南学报 (Ji’nan Journal, Philosophy and Social Science), p. 87.   
11  For the full text of the WFOE Law, see the official website of the Ministry of Commerce 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/lawsdata/chineselaw/200301/20030100062858.html; and the CJV Law 
available at http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/lawsdata/chineselaw/200301/20030100065891.shtml 
(accessed 18/07/2018).  
12 See Peter Howard Corne, Foreign Investment in China: The Administrative Legal System (Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong University Press, 1997), pp. 147-186. 
13 English translation of the Draft of Foreign Investment Law by Jones Day, https://www.uschina.org/china-
hub/english-translation-draft-foreign-investment-law (accessed 18/07/2018).  
14  (1979) 关于扩大国营工业企业经营管理自主权的若干规定  (Regulations on the Expansion of 
Autonomous Managerial and Operational Power of the State-Owned Industrial Enterprises); (1981) 国营工
业企业职工代表大会暂行条例 (Interim Regulations on the Congress of Employees’ Representatives in the 
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NPC Standing Committee enacted the Law on Industrial Enterprise Owned by the Whole 
People in 1988.15  
As for the collective enterprises, the rural and urban ones had their respective 
regulations. The State Council passed the Provisions of Rural Collective Enterprises in 
1990 and issued the Provisions of Urban Collective Enterprises in 1991. To promote the 
economic contribution of rural collectives, the NPC Standing Committee promulgated the 
Law of Township and Village Enterprises in 1996.16  
As mentioned in Chapter 3, private enterprises used to be under tight constraints; 
however, the private economy has been gradually accepted, permitted, and confirmed 
through several revisions to the Constitution. In 1998, the State Council delivered the 
Interim Rules for Private Enterprises, which mainly set the limit to the business scope, 
scale, finance channel, and even the managers’ salaries.17 
In sum, before the 1990s, the enterprise legislation intended to implement the reform 
measures and regulatory policies that treated the enterprises differently, according to their 
ownership. Owing to gradual reforms, the body of enterprise legislation was formed by 
various pieces of laws, regulations, and even interim rules. However, its contents were 
fragmented and inconsistent. The extensive state intervention and discrimination against 
the private economy became obsolete and counter-productive when continuing economic 
transition.18   
4.2.2 The Company Law  
The Company Law is the national legislation that provides for corporate forms, structures 
internal governance, and co-ordinates the relationship between major constituent parties. 
As early as 1987, when the shareholding system was introduced in some pilot SOEs, the 
State Council began to review the ‘Provisions of the Limited Liability Companies’ and 
‘Provisions of the Companies Limited by Shares’, proposed by the National Economic and 
 
State-Owned Industrial Enterprises); (1982) 国营工厂厂长工作暂行条例 (Interim Regulations on the Work 
of Leaders in the State-Owned Enterprises); (1983) Interim Regulations on State-Owned Industrial Enterprise; 
(1984) 关于进一步扩大国营工业企业经营管理自主权的暂行规定  (Interim Regulations on Further 
Expansion of Autonomous Managerial and Operational Power of the State-Owned Industrial Enterprises).  
15  The full text of the Law on Industrial Enterprise Owned by the Whole People is available at 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/lawsdata/chineselaw/200303/20030300072563.shtml (accessed 
22/03/2019).  
16 The full text is available at http://www.gov.cn/banshi/2005-06/01/content_3432.htm (accessed 22/03/2019).  
17  The full text is available at http://fgk.chinalaw.gov.cn/article/xzfg/198806/19880600410064.shtml 
(accessed 22/03/2019). 
18 Jianwei Li, see supra note 10 in this chapter.  
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Trade Commission.19 However, further law-making procedure was suspended due to the 
intense debate over whether a ‘capitalist’ shareholding system would impair a socialist 
economy and whether economic reforms should continue.20 Until 1992, Deng Xiaoping’s 
Southern Tour re-asserted the reform agenda.21 Accordingly, the first Company Law of the 
PRC was promulgated in 1993 and came into effect in 1994.22  
The 1994 Company Law established a comprehensive legal framework for corporate 
form, based on the German law model. This Company Law provided two types of 
corporate forms: limited liability company (LLC) and company limited by shares (CLS). 
All companies must adopt the two-tier board structure under the authority organ—
shareholders (general) meeting.23 Namely, a board of directors is chiefly in charge of 
executive function; a supervisory board mainly monitors the exercise of executive power; 
and both boards are accountable to the shareholders. This dichotomy of corporate forms 
and the internal governance structure is still effective. 
Meanwhile, the 1994 Company Law adopted the registered capital system. The 
registered amount of capital was paid-in contribution, i.e., the actual contribution of 
shareholders by the date of registration. Moreover, the threshold of registered capital was 
set very high and the minimum amount varied according to the companies’ main 
business.24 It was very difficult for a private start-up to achieve the capital threshold. To 
maintain the company’s assets and ensure transaction safety, the Criminal Laws and some 
administrative regulations imposed criminal penalties and administrative fines on the 
illegal withdrawal of capital, in addition to the civil liabilities.25  
 
19 The National Economic and Trade Commission was the department of the State Council yet removed in 
the structural reform in 2003. The Ministry of Commerce took charge of governing domestic and overseas 
trade and economic cooperation that the National Economic and Trade Commission used to govern.    
20 A series of domestic and international events at that time invoked concerns of political risk and state safety 
arising from the economic reforms, such as the radical change in Eastern Europe and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.   
21 Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour was another landmark event in China’s contemporary history. In 1992, 
Deng Xiaoping, in the capacity of the former leader of the CPC, visited the coastal areas, made a series of 
speeches, and obtained local support. After several months, the incumbent leader confirmed and endorsed his 
suggestion of further economic reforms. Since then, China has stepped onto the track of continuous reforms 
and economic growth.  
22 In 1993, the State Council initiated the proceedings for a unified Company Law based on the Regulatory 
Opinions of the LLCs and Regulatory Opinions of the CLSs by the State Council.  
23 The exception allowed that the LLCs with very few people and very small size might have one executive 
director to play the dual role of a director and a general manager.  
24 Art. 23 in the 1994 Company Law, the registered capital of limited liability company cannot be less than (1) 
RMB 500, 000 for production; (2) RMB 500, 000 for wholesale business; (3) RMB 300, 000 for sales; (4) 
RMB 100, 000 for technology development, consultancy and service.  
25 See Art.199 and 200 in the 1994 Company Law.  
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In 2005, a comprehensive revision of the Company Law was undertaken, almost 
amounting to a new law. The basic notion shifted to deference to private autonomy and this 
revision was greatly influenced by the US model. The extensive use of default rules 
encourages private parties to arrange for their own needs in the company’s articles of 
association (AOA) and other internal rules. 26  Moreover, the capital contribution 
requirement was largely relaxed. An update is worth noting. In 2014, the minimum capital 
requirement was completely abolished, and simultaneously, an online credit system was 
established. 27  The public has access to the information and creditworthiness of any 
company in China. 28  Therefore, the legal environment for setting up and running a 
company became more hospitable than before.  
The 2006 Company Law considerably strengthened shareholders’ rights and investment 
protection.29  In particular, the access to information, cumulative voting system, direct 
participation in the decision-making process, and an exit mechanism have provided all-
round safeguard for investors’ interests.30 Furthermore, shareholders have a more powerful 
weapon—the right to sue when their rights cannot be properly exercised or when their 
economic interests are jeopardized. This also indicates that the regulatory approach is more 
 
Art. 159 in the Criminal Law provided for the crime of capital withdrawal and sanctioned the corresponding 
penalty.   
26 The phrases, ‘…according to the company’s AOA’, ‘unless all the shareholders consent…’ and ‘…if the 
company’s AOA stipulates otherwise’ have been interchangeably used in 119 places. 
27 The notion of registration system reform is ‘relaxed entry requirement, strict supervision’ (宽进严管). The 
minimum capital threshold is removed in the revision to the Company Law, effective since 1 March 2014.   
28 On 7 August 2014 the State Council published 企业信息公示暂行条例 (Interim Regulations on the Public 
Disclosure of Enterprise Information). The Regulations established a national enterprise information 
publicity system, and the centralized website is http://www.gsxt.gov.cn/index.html (accessed 23/03/2019).  
29 The comprehensive revision in 2005 came into effect in 2006, and thus, the Company Law in effect is also 
called the 2006 Company Law. The full text of the Company Law is available at 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384124.htm (accessed 14/09/2019).  
30 The following articles are quoted from the official translated version of the Company Law by the NPC.  
‘Shareholders of a CLS are entitled to inspect important corporate files and reports such as the company’s 
AOA, memoranda of shareholders (general) meeting, resolutions passed through a board meeting, and 
accounting or financial reports. In addition to the information right, they can put forward proposals or raise 
questions as regards the business operation of the company’ (Article 98). 
‘Shareholders of LLCs can make a request to inspect the accounting books of the company as well’ (Article 
34). 
‘Shareholders, holding shares above a certain threshold (10% of all shares), are entitled to convene or preside 
over the shareholders general meeting when the board of directors and board of supervisors do not do so’ 
(Articles 41 and 102). ‘One shareholder who holds, or several shareholders who jointly hold, three per cent or 
more of the shares of the company may submit an interim proposal in writing to the board of directors ten 
days before the general meeting is held. The board of directors shall, within two days upon receipt of the 
proposal, notify the other shareholders, and submit the interim proposal to the general meeting for 
deliberation’ (Article 103). 
Article 75 confers on dissident shareholders the right to request the company to acquire their shares at a 
reasonable price in any of the enumerated circumstances. 
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dependent on the judicial review ex post than previously on government intervention ex 
ante.31  
4.2.3 The Securities Law  
The Securities Law, also a ground-breaking statute in China, came into force in 1999 when 
the securities market was just beginning. The 1999 Securities Law laid down the 
fundamental regimes underpinning the securities market: (1) the scope and types of the 
securities; (2) the approval and issuing system for the securities; (3) transaction rules for 
shares; (4) takeover of listed companies; (5) information disclosure system; (6) the roles, 
function, authority and responsibilities of securities companies and other intermediary 
agencies; and (7) the function of the stock exchanges, and the CSRC.32  
Similar to the 2005 amendment to the Company Law, the Securities Law was drastically 
revised in the same year, when the securities markets entered a new phase.33 The scope of 
securities was expanded from merely corporate shares and bonds to government bonds and 
units of securities investment funds. It even included the derivative varieties of securities, 
and hence, was subject to the principles of the Securities Law. 
For the issuing system, what is a public offer was re-defined; and a sponsor system and 
pre-disclosure for initial public offerings (IPO) was established to promote the quality of 
information and ensure investors’ confidence.34 A sponsor, usually a qualified institution, 
undertakes a comprehensive investigation into the operating status of an issuer and 
recommends the issuer for share issuance if there is no violation of laws and administrative 
regulations. The sponsorship system provides professional endorsement for the credibility 
of the issuers.  
The legal status of the stock exchanges is clarified. The stock exchanges have the 
authority to examine and accept applications for issuing and trading securities (Art.48) In 
addition, the supervisory functions of the stock exchanges over the securities companies, 
 
31 Xinrong Guan, 我国司法介入公司治理的迷惑及对策 (Confusion of and Response on Judicial Review in 
Corporate Governance of the PRC), (2009) 4 政法论坛 (Tribune of Political Science and Law), pp. 124-129. 
32 Chunying Xin, 我国证券法的发展历程及修改完善 (The Evolution and Improvement of the Securities 
Law of the PRC), (2014) 10 证券法苑 ( Zhengquan Fayuan), pp. 8-10. The author is the vice director of the 
Legislation Affairs Commission of the NPC Standing Committee. 
33 Baoshu Wang and Hui Huang, ‘China’s New Company Law and Securities Law: An Overview and 
Assessment’, (2006) 19 Australian Journal of Corporate Law, pp. 229-242.   
34 See Art.11 in the Securities Law and Chapter III Sponsors’ Responsibilities in 证券发行上市保荐业务管
理办法 (Administrative Measures on Sponsorship for Securities Issuance and Listing) by the CSRC in 2009.  
Art. 21 in the Securities Law sets out a mandatory pre-disclosure system for IPO.   
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asset evaluation agents, and accounting firms are reinforced. With regard to the trading 
system of securities, the ban on trading in other venues than the stock exchanges has been 
lifted (Art.39). Meanwhile, the conditions of listing, suspension, and termination of shares 
are further specified.  
With regard to takeovers of listed companies, a takeover can be initiated by bidding, by 
agreement or by other legitimate means (Art.85). The lock-up period of bidders is extended 
to 12 months after the completion of the takeover (Art. 98).35 Finally, the information 
disclosure system is strengthened and the accountabilities for misrepresentation and insider 
trading are clearly set forth to improve investors’ protection and maintain market order. 
Meanwhile, the state establishes a fund to pay off the damages to investors who are 
holding shares of the listed companies that end up in bankruptcy (Art. 134).  
4.2.4 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law   
The first national legislation governing enterprise bankruptcy in China was enacted in 1986, 
and it was only applicable to wholly state-owned enterprises (WSOE). For other 
enterprises, only eight provisions in the Civil Procedure Law were effective in 1991, and 
roughly addressed the issues in the liquidation procedure. The 1986 Enterprise Bankruptcy 
Law set forth the initiation and acceptance of a bankruptcy pleading, settlement of debts, 
debt priority, and liquidation procedures. The typical problems concerning the WSOEs, 
such as compensation for laid-off employees, were not addressed in this Bankruptcy Law. 
Nonetheless, bankruptcy and liquidation practice remained dormant for a long time 
because the SOEs were usually bailed out by the government, or transferred, or 
restructured.36      
  In 2006, the new Enterprise Bankruptcy Law was passed with 12 chapters and 136 
articles, and is still in effect.37 The application scope now covers all entities with legal 
person status in the vicinity of insolvency (Art.2). This statute is also one of the most 
significant pieces of legislation for the Chinese market economy, providing a legal 
 
35 Refer to 上市公司收购管理办法 (Administrative Measures on the Takeover of Listed Companies) by the 
CSRC in 2006.   
36 Yujia Jiang, ‘The Curious Case of Inactive Bankruptcy Practice in China: A Comparative Study of US and 
Chinese Bankruptcy Law’, (2014) 34 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, p. 572.   
37  The full text of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law is available at 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2008-01/02/content_1388019.htm (accessed 23/03/2019).   
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framework for the enterprise entities to exit the market and to protect their creditors’ rights 
and interests.38   
This Bankruptcy Law replaces the government-oriented liquidation model by 
authorizing the courts to designate a bankruptcy administrator, following the rules specific 
to the qualifications and appointment of an administrator (Art. 24). An administrator must 
‘investigate the status of the debtor’s assets, take charge of all the assets, seals, accounting 
books, and documents of the debtor, decide on internal management matters, daily 
expenditure, and dispose of the assets of the debtor’ (Art.25). The administrator’s 
performance is under the supervision of the creditors, which may request the court to 
appoint a new administrator under certain conditions (Art.22).   
The creditors’ committees are accorded a wider range of rights to extensively participate 
in bankruptcy procedures. The resumption or suspension of the debtor’s business, 
restructuring plans, settlement agreements, management plans for the debtor’s assets, and 
disposal and distribution plans for the bankruptcy assets should all be approved by the 
creditors’ committees. The creditors’ committees also have the authority to supervise the 
administrator’s performance and replace the administrator (Art. 61).  
More notably, the new law introduced the restructuring regime for the first time as an 
alternative to liquidation.39 The restructuring mechanism allows the insolvent enterprises 
an opportunity to turn around the failure and get back to life. The creditors may in turn, be 
likely to benefit from the restructuring, obtaining full payment of their debts. However, it 
is also possible that the restructuring plan fails and further reduces the bankruptcy assets, 
while creating more losses for creditors. The challenge is balancing the risks and interests 
among the different types of creditors and the shareholders of an insolvent company, and 
controlling the risks in the restructuring mechanism. These potential tensions require a 
more sophisticated design of substantive and procedural rules that the Bankruptcy Law 
does not achieve for the present.40  
 
38 Henry R. Zheng, ‘Bankruptcy Law of People’s Republic of China: Principles, Procedure and Practice’ 
(1986) 19 Vanderbilt Law of Transnational Law, pp. 683-738.  
39 Then drafting, voting, application and judicial approval of a restructuring plan are all regulated in Chapter 
VIII Restructuring. Art.75 suspends the execution of a secured debt. Art. 82 specifies different categories of 
creditors’ votes on the restructuring plans in different groups.   
40 To name a few, when a reorganization plan is approved, the bankrupt assets would not be executed for the 
debts through the restructure period. Art. 75 provides a remedy for secured creditors in case of possibility of 
damages to or obvious reduction in the value of collaterals. The secured creditor(s) can apply to the People’s 
Court for a resumption of the security interest. However, in practice, the secured creditors may not be able to 
discern the damages or reduction timely. Even if possible, the burden of proof makes the remedy very costly.  
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4.2.5 Summary   
Overall, the company, securities, and bankruptcy laws are nascent in China. The currently 
effective laws and regulations took shape in the early 1990s and have been modernized and 
refined through a series of revisions in the ensuing decade. Thus, the implementation and 
enforcement practice of these laws accordingly has only a very short history.  
The basic concepts and general structure of the corporate and securities legislation were 
firstly designed by emulating the model of civil law countries. With regard to the 
regulatory approach, there was a gradual relaxation of state control over corporate 
activities. In the furtherance of efficiency and economic growth, these major revisions 
imported some US legal strategies. It remains to be seen if these rules with a mixed 
western style have considered local circumstances and can effectively address the unique 
local issues.  
4.3 General Duties and Liabilities of Directors 
The Company Law devotes one complete chapter to regulating the qualifications and 
obligations of directors, supervisory board members, and senior management personnel via 
mandatory rules. These mandatory rules are broadly applicable to any directors in 
corporate entities. With regard to the election, function, and authority, term of office, and 
meeting procedures of a board of directors, the Company Law employs default rules, and 
hence, companies may have their own stipulations.  
4.3.1 The Capacity of Directors 
According to the Company Law, a company must have a board of directors and the board 
must have a chairman (Art. 45). The number of directors on a board ranges from three to 
thirteen for an LLC, five to nineteen for a CLS (Arts. 45 and 100). Nonetheless, small 
LLCs are allowed to simply have one executive director instead of holding a directorial 
board and the executive director can take a dual position as a general manager (Art. 45). 
 
Similarly, creditors who disapprove of the reorganization plan do not receive compensation for losses, if the 
court sustains the re-organization plan but the bankrupt asset shrinks eventually.   
Art. 79 and 80 articulate that the administrator and the debtor draft the organization plan. There is no room 
for shareholders of the debtor to participate and voice their interests.  
See Steven J. Arsenault, ‘The Westernization of Chinese Bankruptcy: An Examination of China’s New 
Corporate Bankruptcy Law through the Lens of the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide to Insolvency Law’, 
(2008) 27 Penn State International Law Review, pp. 45-87.  
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The basic personal information of directors is part of the required materials for the 
incorporation registration.41  
Having employee representatives as board members is mandatory for state-owned 
companies but optional for non-state companies. The employee representatives are elected 
through the employees’ general meeting; and the directors that are not employee 
representatives are elected and appointed by shareholders (general) meeting.  
Listed companies are required to institute independent directors (Art. 123). Independent 
directors are those ‘who do not hold any position in the listed company other than 
directorship and who have no relationship with the listed company engaging them or with 
its principal shareholder’. 42  They are expected to provide professional consultancy, 
objective opinions, and independent judgment in the furtherance of the company’s interest. 
In sum, directors are elected and appointed through due procedures by the authoritative 
body to take their seats on the executive board and perform the functions in accordance 
with the Company Law and the Company’s AOA. Besides, their background information 
is recorded and disclosed in a range of documents, including registration, prospectus, 
annual reports and so on. 
Some jurisdictions around the world deploy the terms ‘de facto director’ and ‘shadow 
director’ to expansively regulate how board power is actually exercised.43  A de facto 
director is one who virtually performs a director’s function despite the flaws in the 
appointment procedure or in records. 44  Shadow directors make instructions for and 
exercise influence on the nominal board of directors, and the directors defer to their 
instructions.45 Chinese legal scholars have proposed the introduction of these concepts at 
the legislation level or in the judicial interpretation by the SPC, considering that the 
governance practice is complex and not always consistent with legal provisions.46 In so 
 
41 See Art. 20 in 中华人民共和国公司登记管理条例 (Regulations of the PRC on the Administration of 
Company Registration). 
42 In 2001, the CSRC issued 上市公司建立独立董事的指导意见  (Guiding Opinions on Independent 
Directorship among Listed Companies). The 2006 Company Law formally confirms independent directorship 
in listed companies with reference to such Guiding Opinions.   
43 London School of Economics and Political Science: Study on Directors’ Duties and Liabilities in the EU 
(2013), pp. 45-54. The full text is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/board/2013-study-analysis_en.pdf (accessed 12/12/2019). 
44 Ibid.  
45 Ibid.  
46 Guo Feng, 禁止篡夺公司机会规则探究 (Studies into the Prohibitive Rule on Usurping the Company’s 
Opportunities), (2010) 1 中国法学  (China Legal Science), p. 105. The author proposed to expand the 
application scope of corporate opportunity doctrine and introduce the concept of ‘de factor’ directors.  
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doing, those who actually make major decisions or control decision-making are included 
within the purview of directors’ duties. 
4.3.2 General Duties  
The Company Law explicitly specifies directors’ duties in the combination of a general 
clause and a prohibitive list. The general clause consists of three prongs of legal duties and 
the prohibitive list fleshes out one prong of general duties.  
4.3.2.1 Abide by laws, administrative regulations, and the company’s AOA 
First and foremost, managerial conduct must be lawful. Namely, directors are required to 
abide by laws, administrative regulations, and the company’s articles of association (Art. 
147). This legality requirement is barely discussed by legal scholars, although the violation 
of this requirement is the only legal ground to bring civil actions against directors (Arts. 
149 and 152). Given that a myriad of laws and regulations delineate the boundary of 
corporate activities and concomitantly impose the compliance requirement on directors and 
officers, this branch of legal duties, in effect, strengthens external regulatory control by 
empowering the shareholders and the company to hold directors accountable for the losses 
arising from illegal corporate activities.   
The company’s AOA, in essence, is an agreement that shareholders consent to. It is 
binding on the company, shareholders, directors, and senior officers (Art. 11). The 
company’s AOA is permitted to specifically distribute decision-making power, define how 
directors and officers perform their functions, and streamline the workflow. Shareholders 
may revise the terms and conditions occasionally by voting at the general meeting. Thus, 
compliance with the company’s AOA virtually means that directors must behave within 
the expectation of shareholders.  
4.3.2.2 Duty of loyalty   
It is generally set forth that directors owe duties of loyalty and care to the company they 
serve. However, this law does not address the precise meaning of ‘duty of loyalty’ and the 
review standard. Only a list of classic breaches of duty of loyalty obliquely fleshes out its 
content.  
There have been law-making attempts to conceptualize the duty of loyalty. The 1994 
Company Law required that directors should perform their functions with loyalty and for 
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the benefit of the company that they serve.47 The 2013 Guidelines on Appointment and 
Conduct of Directors of Listed Companies, issued by the Shanghai Stock Exchange, fills in 
the conception gap.48 It clearly defines that the core of this duty is to take the company’s 
interest as the highest priority. Directors must not harm the company’s interest for the 
interests of the actual controlling party, shareholders, employees, any other third party, or 
self-interest.49 Even though these provisions are either invalid or not formally binding, the 
articulation may still be of use as a reference for interpreting or revising the general term 
‘duty of loyalty’ in the Company Law.  
(a) Asset misappropriation  
Notably, encroaching on company’s assets is flatly banned in tandem with taking bribes 
and other illegal gains in the same provision of directors’ general duties (Art. 148). This 
suggests that the primary regulatory concern is to prevent and attack asset stripping and 
corruption, which haunts companies, especially the SOEs. The first type in the list of 
classic breaches of duty of loyalty is fund misappropriation, followed by depositing the 
company’s fund into personal bank account(s) (Art. 149).  
One company, as a legal person, owns assets, funds and other intangible properties. 
Such property rights deserve legal protection, as accorded to any natural persons. 
Nonetheless, unlike natural persons, the directors and officers manage the company’s fund, 
sometimes with the assistance of personnel especially in charge of financial matters. They 
are then prone to take advantage of their positions to possess or use the company’s 
property for personal ends, which not only infringes upon the company’s property rights 
but also betrays the trust vested in their role. 
Such wrong-doing is often accompanied by fraud, concealment and conversion. Direct 
theft of company’s equipment, raw materials, and funds, making the company pay more by 
inflating the billing, expense reimbursement, or payroll schemes, and skimming the profit 
and receivables are all commonly seen in management practice, especially in companies 
with weak internal control systems. 
(b) Making loans and providing guarantees without due approval 
 
47 Art. 49 in the 1994 Company Law.  
48 The Guidelines of the Shanghai Stock Exchange on the Appointment and Conduct of Directors of Listed 
Companies issued in 2009 and revised in 2013. The Guidelines has a separate chapter on the duty of loyalty. 
49 Ibid., Articles 19 to 25.  
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The prohibitive list also includes using a company’s fund to make loans or to provide 
guarantees to other parties without the consent of the SGM or the board of directors (Art. 
149). Such abuse of the company’s funds may adversely affect the fund’s turnover and 
even cause cash-flow problems, even if the liability risk is properly assessed in advance 
and a backup plan arranged. Even worse, individual directors or officers, especially the 
legal representatives,50 may covertly enter a loan agreement or a collateral contract with a 
third party using the company’s fund but for some personal benefits. The execution of such 
contracts does not require the participation of multiple parties in the company and even the 
conclusion of the contracts may go unnoticed until serious outcomes occur.  
According to the prohibitive clause, no matter to whom and on whose behalf or in whose 
name, making loans and offering guarantees on the basis of the company’s funds cannot be 
decided by individual directors or officers. The chapter on General Provisions of Company 
Law specifies that offering guarantees for the debt of any party other than the company 
itself, should in accordance with the company’s AOA, be subject to the approval of the 
board of directors or the SGM (Art. 16). This means that due approval is a statutory pre-
requisite for a contract of providing a guarantee by a company. The company’s AOA can 
designate the approval authority to the board of directors or to the SGM.51 Moreover, these 
provisions also affect the creditors to such guarantee contracts. The creditors cannot claim 
themselves as a bona fide third party, and hence, the validity of contract would be 
sustained, when they have no reason to believe that due approval has been obtained.52   
(c) Self-dealing transactions  
As the term suggests, a self-dealing transaction is akin to making a deal with oneself.53 
When a director represents his or her company and enters into a contract with 
himself/herself, it is doubtful whether he or she can still negotiate over terms on the 
standing of the company, as he or she usually does with a third party. One way to eliminate 
the possibility that the company would be defrauded or the company’s interest would be 
 
50 According to the Company Law, every company has its legal representative, usually a director or a senior 
manager. The legal representative represents the company in the contracts and participates in litigation.  
51 Jianwei Li, 公司非关联商事担保的规范使用分析  (An Analysis into the Application of the Rules 
Regarding Corporate Non-Related-Party Commercial Securities), (2013) 3 当代法学 (Contemporary Law 
Review), p. 78.  
52 Ibid.  
53 Self-dealing, in a broad sense, refers to any form of diverting a company’s wealth by insiders to themselves. 
See, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, ‘The Law and 
Economics of Self-dealing’, (2008) 88 Journal of Financial Economics, p. 430. The term in this sub-section 
only carries a narrow sense as intended in the Art.149 (4) in the Company Law. 
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prejudiced is to strictly forbid self-dealing transactions. The 1994 Company Law did so.54 
However, the win-win possibility was excluded as well.  
The currently effective Company Law prohibits directors from ‘entering into a contract 
with the company or carrying out transactions with the company in violation of the 
company’s AOA or without the consent of the SGM’ (Art. 149). In other words, directors 
are permitted to conduct self-dealings only if the SGM approves the transaction, and the 
approval and the approved transactions are compliant with the relevant provisions in the 
company’s AOA. In essence, the SGM would make the decision for the company in place 
of the interested directors, which can help avert potential unfairness to the company arising 
from the conflict of interests. Yet, these relevant rules contain the following loopholes and 
inconsistencies.  
First, the meaning of self-dealing in law is too narrow to encompass the transactions 
between the company and another party with whom directors have a close relationship.55 
Consequently, it would be not difficult to circumvent this prohibition. A directors’ relatives 
or close friends might play the opposing party of a self-dealing transaction; however, the 
director will continue to represent the company. Such camouflaged self-dealing 
transactions are not subject to the requirement of due approval since the formality does not 
accord with the narrow-sense of ‘self-dealing’ in this prohibitive clause.  
Second, there is no detailed requirement for information disclosure. There is no 
specification for information disclosure and the extent that such disclosure is deemed 
sufficient, not to say the legal consequence of insufficient or falsified information 
disclosure. Some scholars emphasize that the existence, nature, and extent of the conflict of 
interests and its potential influence on the proposed transactions should all be disclosed to 
the authoritative body.56  
Nevertheless, the liability rule for related-party transactions broadly governs any 
transactions tainted with personal or other economic interest. Article 21 provides that the 
controlling shareholders, actual controllers, directors, supervisors, and senior managers of 
a company should not make use of their relationship or affiliation to damage the 
 
54 Art. 61 in 1994 Company Law  
55 Xiaojing Hu, 论董事自我交易的规制 (Legal Strategies Regulating Directors’ Self-dealing Transactions), 
(2010) 6 现代法学 (Contemporary Law Review), pp. 14-17. 
56 Ciyun Zhu and Lingjuan Zhu, 规制董事利益冲突交易的披露原则 (Disclosure Principle of Regulating 
Self-dealing Transactions by Directors), (2002) 2 现代法学 (Modern Law Science), pp. 59-64.    
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company’s interests, or they assume compensatory liabilities for the resultant losses to the 
company. The ‘relationship’ or ‘affiliation’ (guanlian guanxi) is explicitly defined in a 
single provision, by the standard of direct or indirect control that the parties mentioned 
above hold in other enterprises or entities (Art. 217). Moreover, a catch-all phrase ‘any 
other relationship may result in the transfer of company’s interest’ is added. Therefore, 
directors engaging in any form of self-dealing transactions or related-party transactions 
cannot be free from the liability for the losses to the company.  
However, the liability rule for related-party transactions is not identical to the liability 
for unapproved self-dealing transactions. In addition to compensatory liability, any illegal 
gains from the breach of the duty of loyalty would be confiscated, and an unapproved self-
dealing transaction is listed as one of the classic breaches of the duty of loyalty. This 
means that the magnitude of liabilities from a self-dealing transaction may vary according 
to their inclusion in the prohibitive list or is left out of the provision regarding the related-
party transactions.  
In essence, the self-dealing transactions and related-party transactions should not be 
differentiated in law, because they can all be beneficial to the company as long as the 
personal interest or the other party’s interest does not cast a shadow on the fairness of 
transactions. Furthermore, the concomitant liability should not differ between self-dealing 
transactions and related-party transactions.  
Third, it is not flexible that the Company Law only authorizes the SGM to approve self-
dealing transactions. For the large companies, especially listed companies, it would be 
costly and time-consuming to convene a provisional SGM, as individual shareholders may 
be reluctant to devote time to examining the merit of decisions. Conversely, it is more 
feasible to render the transaction to disinterested directors, when the board is not small, or 
leave the choice of the SGM and board of directors to private arrangements. Besides, it is 
reasonable to exclude the interested shareholders from voting; however, the legal provision 
does not signify so.  
Fourth, the Company Law does not particularly specify the validity of a self-dealing 
transaction. The only legal rule that can be used to determine the validity is the general 
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provision in the Contract Law.57 Under the Contract Law, any contract that involves a 
violation of the mandatory rules in national laws and administrative regulations is null and 
void. 58  Since the prohibitive list in the Company Law is mandatory, self-dealing 
transactions without due approval, or violating the company’s AOA, should be regarded as 
null and void as the Contract Law applies. However, this can be unfair to a bona fide 
director, when the approval may be revoked due to such factors as a defect of the internal 
approval procedure.59  
Finally, it is not sensible to arbitrarily consider self-dealing transactions that are in 
violation of the company’s AOA or without the approval of the SGM, to be a breach of the 
duty of loyalty, and therefore, to prohibit such conduct. The core issue with self-dealing 
transactions is how directors deal with the conflict of personal interest and the company’s 
interest. The approval procedure or internal rules intend to ensure that the directors refrain 
from conflicts of interest; however, they do not ensure or deny that the interested directors 
take the company’s interest as priority and fulfil the duty of loyalty, when the self-dealing 
transactions conclude anyway. 60  Thus, cases of interested directors who commit self-
dealing should be reviewed and decided by the courts, considering such a substantive 
standard as the entire fairness test, rather than determined merely by an ex ante procedure.      
(d) Usurping corporate opportunities  
Although business opportunities are not something like property or assets that owners take 
possession of and exercise exclusive rights over, indisputably, in the business world, 
opportunities can also be meaningful. A great opportunity may bring enormous economic 
benefit or a crucial turning point for the firm. Yet, the potential returns and risks are not 
always calculable in advance. In some instances, the opportunities may turn out to be 
nothing material. Nevertheless, this does not justify companies being deprived of the right 
to take and use the business opportunities that belong to them.  
 
57  Ansheng Dong and Baohua Zhang, 缺失的合同效力规则—论关联交易对传统民法的挑战  (The 
Absence of Validity Rules—the Challenge Posed by Related-Party Transactions to the Traditional Civil Law), 
(2007) 3 法学家 (The Jurist), pp. 59-66.  
58  Article 52, 54 in The Contract Law (1999), the translated version is available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-02/12/content_21908031.htm (accessed 
08/12/2019).  
59 Unlike other third parties outside the firm, the directors are well aware of the relevant stipulations in the 
company’s AOA. Thus, there is no need to tilt the balance towards the interested directors and sustain the 
validity of the self-dealing transactions that violate the company’s AOA, such as those without due approval.  
60 Ying Sun, 论董事自我交易的法律规制—以《公司法》第 149 条的适用与完善为核心展开 (The 
Comments on the Regulation of Directors’ Self-dealings—with a Focus on the Application and Improvement 
of Article 149 in the Company Law), (2010) 6 法学 (Legal Science), pp. 113-121.  
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Since 2006, China’s Company Law has imported the term ‘usurping corporate 
opportunities’ in the prohibitive list of classic breaches of the duty of loyalty. Namely, 
directors and senior managers are prohibited from making use of their position to take 
opportunities that rightfully belong to the company for themselves or any other party 
without the consent of the SGM (Art. 149). The tests for identifying the opportunities that 
rightfully belong to the companies and what can be construed as ‘usurping’ are unspecified.   
Chinese legal scholars attempted to fill in the legislative gap with reference to the US 
case law and mainly discussed the following factors: (1) the source of opportunities; (2) the 
relevance to the firm’s business; and (3) the duty of information disclosure.61 The first two 
factors determine whether the company should have owned the opportunities. The third 
factor justifies using corporate opportunities, in other words, ensuring that the company is 
informed of them.  
The first factor represents the inquiry into how directors obtained the opportunity. The 
perception and attitude of the third party who offers or hints about an opportunity is critical. 
Explicit expressions of making a deal with the firm would leave no doubt that the 
opportunity belongs to the firm. Without an explicit or constructive intention about who 
the third party would like to trade or co-operate with, it is necessary to consider when and 
where directors learn of the opportunity, and if they obtained relevant information in their 
directorial capacity and using corporate resources.62  
The second factor concerns the nature and substance of the opportunity by analysing the 
‘line of business’ test and the ‘interest or expectancy’ test from the common law 
tradition.63 The former test is objective, i.e., whether the opportunity is within the major 
industry and the business scope of the firm at the time. Yet, this test may fail to capture the 
opportunities in the industries that the firm has never stepped into but just conceived of an 
attempt to. The latter test is subjective but equally convincing, since the ‘expectation and 
interest’ that the firm has in an opportunity per se is what corporate opportunity doctrine 
aims to protect. 
 
61 See supra note 46 in this chapter and Shunming Cao and Hua Gao, 公司机会规则研究 (Research on 
Corporate Opportunity Doctrine), (2004) 2 政法论坛 (Tribune of Political Science and Law), pp. 16-23.  
62 Huaixia Hou, 我国禁止篡夺公司机会原则司法适用研究 (A Study into the Judicial Application of 
Prohibitive Rule of Usurping Corporate Opportunities), (2012) 4 法商研究 (fashang yanjiu), pp. 149-155. 
63 See, Yu Long, 浅析英美法中的篡夺公司机会规则及对我国《公司法》的启示 (An Analysis of the 
Corporate Opportunity Doctrine in the Common Law Systems and the Insights to the Chinese Company 
Law), (2009) 12 法制与社会 (Legal System and Society), p. 76.  
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As for the third factor, the prohibitive rule makes the consent of the SGM the only 
condition to justify the use of the corporate opportunity for other ends, but does not 
particularly set forth the duty of disclosure. Assuming that directors selectively disclose the 
information that misleads the SGM to agree to the proposals, which are harmful to the 
firm’s interests, such a scenario is not governed by the prohibitive rule nor the liability 
rules for the breach of duty of loyalty. Then the question of remedying the losses from ‘de 
facto’ usurping corporate opportunities remains undetermined in law.  
(e) Engaging in the same business 
Directors are great assets to the corporation. Any other business could distract directors 
from full devotion to the company. However, individuals do enjoy the freedom of 
conducting business activities willingly. The key policy concern underlying the rules for 
engaging in the same business as the company, is striking a balance between promoting 
economic freedom and protecting the company’s interest.64  
In the same clause, with appropriating corporate opportunities, directors and officers are 
also forbidden to engage—for himself, for herself, or for other parties—in the same type of 
business that the company runs, unless the SGM consents to it (Art.149). Setting 
restrictions on doing the same type of business is a prophylactic measure. In so doing, 
associated misconduct—usurping corporate opportunities and divulging corporate secrets 
can be forcefully alleviated. However, the SGM’s consent would be more difficult, if not 
entirely impossible, to obtain, unless any substantial benefits outweighed the potential 
competitive pressure for the company. In effect, directors can hardly make use of their own 
capacities and professional experiences in any other entities or for any other parties than 
the company they serve.  
The provision leaves some issues unregulated but intensely discussed in scholarly 
writings. First, what business can be acknowledged as ‘similar to’ or ‘the kind of’ 
company’s business is not self-evident. The preliminary step is to discern the company’s 
business. Some scholars noted that the registered business scope may be inconsistent with 
the actual operations of the company. Following this opinion, some scholars held that if the 
enterprise involves business information (not limited to corporate secrets) that directors 
 
64 Warner Fuller, ‘Restrictions Imposed by the Directorship Status on the Personal Business Activities of 
Directors’, (1941) 26 Washington University Law Quarterly, p. 189.  
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know of and the transfer or use of such information may generate competitive pressure on 
such firms, then the enterprise should be considered as ‘a similar business’.65  
Second, as regards the meaning of ‘for themselves or for other parties’, the prevailing 
opinion is to identify whether a director makes any earning from another enterprise. What 
role the director plays is not decisive.66 Such an interpretation includes the regulatory focus 
on the protection of the company’s interests, attempting to block any channel of diverting 
the company’s assets and to prevent information leakage.  
Third, many scholars argue that supervisory board members enjoy a wide range of 
statutory powers to perform the monitoring function, and therefore, may readily obtain the 
information related to financial status, business strategies, and even the development of the 
core technology. Thus, it is of great necessity to include supervisory board members also to 
protect the company’s interests better, or they may exploit the loophole to give inside 
information to the company’s competitors for their own interests.67  
Fourth, whether directors and officers are still obliged to refrain from engaging in a 
similar business after retirement or resignation is an issue that involves the overlap of 
relevant provisions in the Company Law and the Labour Contract Law.68 The Company 
Law neither holds the prohibition period to be longer than the term of office nor leaves this 
issue to the company’s AOA. On the contrary, the Labour Contract Law sets forth that one 
employee and the employer may agree on confidentiality duty and non-competition 
restriction in the labour contract upon the rescission or termination of the labour contract. 
The employer may grant the employee monthly compensation in the non-competition 
restrictive period.69  
 
65  See, e.g., Yehu Zhai, 论我国竟业禁止立法不足与完善  (Observations on the Deficiency of Rules 
Regarding Prohibiting Engaging in Competitive Business), (2011) 1 湖北社会科学 (hubei shehui kexue), pp. 
6-14.  
66  Jianfeng Jin, 公司管理层法定义务和立法完善  (Statutory Duties and Civil Liabilities Imposed on 
Corporate Management Personnel), (2008) 2 法律适用 (falv shiyong), pp. 12-18. 
67 Bo Jiang, 竟业禁止的相关问题 (Relevant Issues to Prohibition of Engaging in Competitive Business), 
(2006) 10 人民司法 (renmin sifa), pp. 71-74.  
68 Linqing Wang, 公司法下与劳动法语境下竟业禁止之比较 (Comparisons of Prohibition of Engaging in 
Competitive Business under the Company Law and Labour Contract law), (2013) 31 政法论坛 (Tribune of 
Political Science and Law), pp. 91-98.   
69 Art. 23 in the Labour Contract Law (effective in 2008 and revised in 2012) and the official translated 
version are available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2009-02/20/content_1471106.htm (accessed 
10/12/2019).  
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In essence, the non-competition restriction under the Company Law is a statutory duty 
imposed on directors and officers because they occupy crucial positions and are entrusted 
with managerial power. The non-competition restriction covenant pursuant to the Labour 
Contract Law is subject to the freedom of contract. Directors, like other employees, may 
negotiate on the relevant terms and conditions when signing the labour contract, which can 
generate a more flexible and pragmatic arrangement regarding the non-competition 
restriction after retirement or resignation.  
4.3.2.3 Duty of care 
The notion that directors ought to diligently perform their functions in the first place 
emerged in the 2002 Guidelines of Corporate Governance of Listed Companies. 70 
Afterwards, the 2006 Company Law has explicitly extended this ethical requirement into 
the duty of care universally applicable to directors and officers in all types of companies, 
imparting it with a stronger binding force. However, there remains a vacuum in the 
meaning and standard of due diligence. 
Duty of care, also called duty of diligence, is generally viewed as the transplantation of 
fiduciary duty of care from common law tradition.71 Thus, many scholars turn to the case 
laws of Delaware and other states in the US, aiming to refine the general principle of due 
care in China’s Company Law.72 Meanwhile, it is necessary to remember the difficulties of 
codifying the fiduciary doctrines that originally embody the sophisticated case laws into 
transitional civil law systems.73 Doubts are also raised about whether Chinese judges can 
 
70 The Code of Corporate Governance of Listed Companies (上市公司治理准则) was the first guidelines of 
corporate governance in China, collectively issued by the China Securities Regulatory Commission and State 
Economic and Trade Commission. In the Guidelines, Section 2 focuses on directors’ duties and Art. 33 sets 
out that directors should play their roles with loyalty, due diligence, good faith to pursue the best interests of 
the company and all shareholders. The full text of this Guidelines is available at  
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/code_en.pdf (accessed 29/11/2019).   
71 See Nicholas C. Howson, ‘The Doctrine that Dared Not Speak Its Name: Anglo-American Fiduciary 
Duties in China’s 2005 Company Law and Case Law Intimations of Prior Convergence’, Hideki Kanda, 
Kon-Sik Kim, and Cutis Milhaupt (eds.), Transforming Corporate Governance in East Asia (Oxford : 
Routledge, 2008), pp. 193-254. 
72 See, e.g., Guangdong Xu, Tianshu Zhou, Bin Zeng, and Jin Shi, ‘Directors’ Duties in China’, (2013) 14 
European Business Organization Law Review, pp. 57-95.  
Zili Ren, 公司董事的勤勉义务标准研究 (Research into the Standard of Directors’ Duty of Care), (2008) 6 
中国法学 (China Legal Science), pp. 83-92;  
Jianwen Wang and Feijian Xu, 公司高管勤勉义务判断标准的构造：外国经验与中国方案  (The 
Constitution of the Review Standard of Directors’ and Officers’ Duty of Care: Experience Abroad and 
Solutions Domestic), (2012) 9 南京社会科学 (Nanjing Social Science), pp. 110-115.  
73  See Rebecca Lee, ‘Fiduciary Duty without Equity: “Fiduciary Duty” of Directors under the Revised 
Company Law of the PRC’, (2007) 47 Virginia Journal of International Law, p. 897;   
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play a pro-active role in the interpretation and application of this general term.74 Leaving 
the observations on the application of the duty of care to the next chapter, this section 
mainly addresses the following technicalities that require further clarification.  
(a) Standard  
Setting the standard of due care is quite challenging. The subjective competence, skills, 
and experience of a director may hardly be identical to that of another. Involvement in 
business issues and the circumstances of the companies may also substantially differ. Even 
assuming one director in the same company addresses business matters in one industry, the 
proper manner of exerting power in one case may mean something quite different in 
another case. Besides, it is very difficult for other parties than the directors themselves, to 
measure the energy and efforts are actually devoted and whether there is any sloppiness, 
not to say measured ex post by judges.  
Regulatory documents and self-regulatory rules have provided comprehensive conduct 
standards to improve the corporate governance of listed companies.75 The directors should 
pursue the best interests of the company and all shareholders.76 Considering that business 
decisions are collectively made, active participation at board meetings, awareness of the 
due decision-making procedures and the scope of decision authority, prudential 
deliberation on the proposals before the meetings, and certain causes for abstention from 
voting are all emphasized as elements under the umbrella of the duty of care.77  
Besides, directors must actively ask relevant personnel to provide precise information 
and take the initiative to investigate the operations of the company. In the decision-making 
process, directors are expected to carefully calculate the risks and benefits of the proposed 
actions. 78  Primarily, they must consider a wide range of factors, including potential 
benefits and losses, the method and basis of asset pricing, feasibility and lawfulness, the 
credit of the opposing party in the transaction and of the interested parties that the 
 
Katharina Pistor and Chenggang Xu, ‘Fiduciary Duty in Transitional Civil Law Jurisdictions: Lessons from 
the Incomplete Law’, in C. J. Milhaupt, (ed.), Global Markets, Domestic Institutions: Corporate Law and 
Governance in a New Era Cross-Border Deals (New York: Columbia University Press 2003), p. 78. 
74 Ibid. Pistor and Xu (2003).  
75 Considering that the enormous number of regulatory documents and self-regulatory rules in China, to 
avoid the major omissions, one can input directors’ duty of diligence in the database of Chinese laws and 
regulations (wkinfor or chinalawinfo) to obtain an exhaustive list.  
76 Art. 33 in Code of Corporate Governance of Listed Companies.   
77 Ibid., Art. 35.  
Art.28 and 32 in the Guidelines of Shanghai Stock Exchange on Appointment and Conduct of Directors of 
Listed Companies http://www.sse.com.cn/lawandrules/sserules/listing/stock/c/c_20150912_3985863.shtml 
(accessed 12/12/2019).  
78 Ibid.  
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opposing party has a relationship with, and the long-term impact. Overall, the ‘soft’ 
substantive rules use the ‘duty of care’ as a penetrating principle to delineate the desirable 
manner in which directors play their roles.  
At first glance, the conduct standards mentioned above are quite inclusive. However, the 
expressions ‘actively’, ‘carefully’, and ‘prudential deliberation’ are still a matter of degree. 
Then the most challenging part of the due diligence doctrine emerges: what is the standard 
of care? Furthermore, failing to fulfil that standard may possibly incur a liability.  
Many Chinese legal scholars have conducted comparative studies and discussed how to 
define the standard of care. The statement most frequently referred to and advocated, 
regarding directors’ duties in the Model Business Corporation Act of the US79 , is as 
follows: ‘A director shall perform his duties as a director, ……in good faith, in a manner 
he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with such care as 
an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances’.80 A 
large number of states have similar provisions in their corporate statutes. It is also called 
the ‘reasonable care standard’. Fletcher defines the liability standard as follows: ‘directors 
and officers of a corporation must use due care and are liable for their negligence in 
conducting the affairs of the corporation’.81 This means that directors’ liabilities are not for 
any losses arising from their business decisions. It is acceptable that someone with 
competence and capability constraint makes mistakes as long as he or she exercises due 
care.  
There is a complete set of statutory rules for the duty of care and the negligence standard 
in the US, with variance among different states. In addition, relatively dynamic corporate 
litigation practice and abundant case laws contribute to the prevailing influence of the US 
fiduciary duty principle around the world. This does not necessarily mean that the 
reasonable care standard is sufficiently clear and precise. To apply this standard, the courts 
first need to examine factual situations in which the decision was made, and then identify 
 
79 See Jianwen Wang, Feijian Xu, 公司高管勤勉义务判断标准的构造：外国经验与中国方案  (The 
Device of Review Standard of Senior Managers’ Duty of Diligence: Foreign Experience and Chinese Plan), 
(2012) 9 南京社会科学 (Nanjing Social Science), pp. 110-115.  
Huihong Zhu, 董事勤勉义务比较分析 (A Comparative Analysis into Director’s Duty of Care), (2011) 2 法
商研究 (fashang yanjiu), pp. 67-68. 
Jingwei Liu, 董事勤勉义务判断标准比较研究 (A Comparative Study on the Criteria of Director’s Duty of 
Diligence), (2007) 21 当代法学 (Contemporary Law Review), pp. 5-9.  
80 Corporate Laws Committee in American Bar Association: Modern Business Corporation Act (2010).  This 
exemplary act is followed by 24 states in the US.    
81 William Meade Fletcher: Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations §1029.  
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the subjective factors, including motivation, goal, qualification, and actual efforts. Finally, 
they must determine if there is a lapse of care.  
(b) Business judgment rules (BJR)  
China’s Company Law does not adopt the BJR, which is the adjunct to the fiduciary duty 
of care in US corporate laws. The BJR is a presumption that shields directors from judicial 
scrutiny when they make business decisions in good faith, to the best interests of 
shareholders and the company, without any conflict of interest, and on an informed basis.82 
In other words, if plaintiffs cannot rebut the presumption, judges would defer to the 
directors rather than conduct any merit reviews to assess the degree of care taken. Some 
legal scholars opposed this ‘judicial retreat into the presumptive arena of the business 
judgment rule’ and doubted ‘whether there still exists a sanction for lack of care’.83 Law 
and economics scholars argue that the judicial review of the reasonableness of a business 
decision is not efficient because of expertise limitation and hindsight bias. Moreover, 
excessive personal liability would make directors avoid risky decisions that might be 
desirable to shareholders.84 Nonetheless, a common view is that the core issue as to duty of 
care is how to maintain a balance between discretion and liability.85 
The adoption of the BJR is still under scholarly debate in China. Some commentators 
asserted that the BJR should be imported to keep the Chinese version of fiduciary duty 
doctrines complete.86  It was suggested that judicial interpretation by the SPC is more 
suitable than legal rules to embrace the dynamic interaction between the BJR and business 
practice. 87  Also, some studies focused on the case law of the BJR in the takeover 
scenario, 88  revealing the complexity of the BJR, and emphasized the utility and 
 
82 Consolo v. Federal Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966), p. 144.  
83 Stuart R. Cohn, ‘Demise of the Director’s Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of Standards and Sanctions 
Through the Business Judgment Rule’, (1983) 62-4 Texas Law Review, p. 594.   
84 See supra note 45 in Chapter 2 (Easterbrook and Fischel 1991).  
85 See infra note 90 for Stephen M. Bainbidge 2002.      
86 See, e.g., Zhongli Li, 董事违反注意义务之责任追究—以美国的经营判断法则为例 (Liabilities against 
Breaches of Duty of Care by Directors—Taking the US Business Judgment Rule for Example), (2010) 3 湖
北社会科学 (Hubei Social Science), pp. 162-165.  
Jingwei Liu, 董事勤勉义务判断标准比较研究 (A Comparative Study into the Standard of Directors’ Duty 
of Care), (2007) 21-5 当代法学 (Contemporary Law Review), pp. 148-153.   
87 Qiong Fu and Li Cao, 独立董事勤勉义务边界与免责路径 (On the Boundary of Independent Directors’ 
Duty of Care and Liability Relief Approach), (2011) 12 社会科学 (Journal of Social Science), pp. 111-117.  
88 See the landmark cases: Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 493 A.2d 846 (Del. 1985), Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986),   
62A_BW EdleXun_stand.job




applicability of the BJR in China.89 However, scholarly discourse has not yet received the 
attention of policymakers.  
4.3.3 Civil Liabilities  
Legal duties only count when liabilities are stipulated as the consequences of deviation 
from legal duties. One distinguishing feature of the 2006 Company Law is the clarification 
of monetary liabilities for breaches of legal duties in comparison with its predecessor laws. 
Directors’ liabilities are just a case in point.  
The elements of a liability claim   
Pursuant to the Company Law, three elements are necessary and sufficient to establish a 
claim of directors’ liability: (1) a violation of laws, administrative regulations, or the 
company’s AOA; (2) damages to the company or to the shareholders; (3) causal link 
between the violation and damages (Art. 149 and 152).  
A perplexing issue surfaces: why is only the first part of directors’ duties set as the legal 
ground for holding directors liable. No official document can provide any clue about the 
legislative intention of the liability rules. However, most legal studies have focused on the 
standards of due care and loyalty. The slight mismatch between the contents of directors’ 
duties and the liability standard is simply ignored.  
Perhaps, one may see this question as meaningless from a pragmatic perspective. Duties 
of loyalty and care are explicitly prescribed in the Company Law; breaches of these duties 
per se constitute violations of national law, and the liability rules are applicable anyway. 
Thus, breaches of duties of loyalty and care are actually absorbed into the violation of laws 
as a count of directors’ liability.   
However, duties of loyalty and care have their independent merit and attributes. These 
duties arise from the legal relationship, which is of private law nature. In the paradigm of 
private law, breaches of duties probably result in liabilities to the other party in this legal 
relationship. Yet, the Company Law holds murky water. Despite recognizing the directors’ 
duties of loyalty and care to the companies that they serve, liabilities are sanctioned on 
account of legal violations. Such a design reflects the orientation of government regulation, 
 
89 Charlie Xiao-chuan Weng, ‘Assessing the Applicability of the Business Judgment Rule and the Defensive 
Business Judgment Rule in the Chinese Judiciary: A Perspective on Takeover Dispute Adjudication’, (2010) 
34 Fordham International Law Journal, pp. 124-147.  
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which to some extent, buries the core requirement of devotion, loyalty, professionalism, 
and prudence on the part of directors.   
4.3.4 Legal Standing to Sue Directors  
The Company Law explicitly acknowledges the litigation rights and legal standings to 
enforce directors’ liabilities. One way is to proceed as ordinary tort lawsuits. The one who 
suffers the losses is the one who sues. Shareholders have the litigation right to sue the 
directors and senior managers who violate their duties and cause them losses (Art.153), 
and so do companies to claim their losses. The other method is shareholders derivative 
action, a concept from the US, to overcome internal obstruction in the execution of a 
company’s rights.       
Shareholders derivative actions 
Shareholders initiate derivative action to recover the losses caused to the company. Its 
essence is that shareholders can execute the company’s right of litigation. On the one hand, 
a company is a legally artificial person and its board of directors or other insiders make 
decisions. In the event of a lawsuit against the directors themselves or their peers, it is 
highly possible that they will abstain from or obstruct the action. Therefore, shareholders 
are granted the legal standing to seek remedies for their company. On the other hand, 
someone might just buy the shares of a company and misuse this derivative action to attack 
the directors and the company. The news of a lawsuit concerning management conduct 
harms the reputation and reduces the market value of a company. Thus, the legal design of 
shareholders derivative actions is to screen frivolous actions and to incentivize 
shareholders to take appropriate action.90     
(a) Proper shareholder plaintiffs  
Plaintiff qualification requirements for shareholders in LLCs and CLSs are differentiated. 
LLCs usually have a close-knit group of shareholders. The shareholders’ trust in each other 
is the basis of co-operation, similar to a partnership. The shareholders’ interest is closely 
related to the LLC’s. In addition, there is a statutory limitation to the free transferability of 
LLC shares to maintain stable co-operation. 91  A stranger cannot become an LLC’s 
shareholder unexpectedly, and file a lawsuit without merit. Thus, the shareholders of an 
 
90 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporation Law and Economics (foundation press, 2002), pp. 370-386.  
91 According to Article 72 of the Company Law, one shareholder, planning to transfer their shares to a third 
party should obtain the approval of more than half of the other shareholders in the LLC. If the other 
shareholders disagree with the external transfer, they have the obligation to buy the shares. In another word, 
shareholders in the LLC have a pre-emptive right to acquire the shares of other shareholders.  
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LLC, irrespective of the duration or magnitude of their contribution to the LLC’s capital, 
are all plaintiffs qualified to initiate a derivative action (Art.152).  
Unlike an LLC, a CLS has a large group of shareholders, and these shareholders are 
readily voting with their feet through the operation of the CLS. Assuming a CLS is listed 
on the stock exchange, numerous public investors are trading its shares, the majority of 
whom are concerned about the fluctuation of share price. It is possible that a shareholder 
will misuse derivative action to make speculative deals if no qualification requirement is in 
place.92 The Company Law stipulates that one shareholder holding, or several shareholders 
jointly holding, at least 1% of the total shares for at least 180 consecutive days may file a 
derivative action (Art. 152). Indeed, 1% of the total shares of a listed company represent a 
large sum of investment. Institutional investors just fulfil the ownership requirement and 
are qualified to use derivative actions to monitor management conduct.93 
(b) Demand requirement  
Before instigating legal proceedings, qualified plaintiff shareholders ought to make written 
demands on the supervisory board or the supervisor of the LLC to pursue the claim 
regarding directors’ liabilities (Art. 152). This is a compulsory requirement that embodies 
the principle of exhaustion of intra-corporate remedies.94 If the supervisory board or the 
supervisor of the LLC rejects the demand or fails to initiate a lawsuit within 30 days after 
receiving the demand, the qualified plaintiff shareholders may file a derivative lawsuit in 
the people’s court. This demand requirement can be waived when there is an emergency 
and the failure to pursue a claim immediately will cause irreparable harm to the company 




92  Hui Huang, ‘The Statutory Derivative Action in China: Critical Analysis and Recommendations for 
Reform’, (2007) 4 Berkeley Business Law Journal, p. 237. The author also argues that minority shareholders 
in LLCs have ‘graver plight’ than do their counterparts in CLSs, and thus, deserve more access to derivative 
actions. This observation is partially true due to the statutory limitation for share transfer and the lack of 
regulatory monitoring of LLCs. However, minority shareholders in LLCs have a wide range of information 
rights and can participate in decision-making and governance issues, such as the nomination of directors. A 
general comparison of the situation of minority shareholders may not stand solid.   
93 Ibid.   
94 Daniel R. Fischel, comment: ‘The Demand and Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions’, 
(1976) 44 University of Chicago Law Review, p.168.  
Donald C. Clarke and Nicholas C. Howson, ‘Pathway to Minority Shareholder Protection: Derivative Actions 
in the People’s Republic of China’, in Dan W. Puchniak, Harold Baum, and Michael Ewing-Chow (eds.) The 
Derivative Action in Asia: A Comparative and Functional Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), pp. 243-278.   
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4.4 Information Disclosure Duty of Directors in Listed Companies  
In securities market, investors usually have serious information problems. Unlike grocery 
shopping, where buyers can readily perceive the quality of the goods and compare the 
prices of different sellers, public investors are not able to obtain full knowledge of the 
current status and development potential of one listed company. Although listed companies 
are willing to disclose information to attract investors,95 the quality and completeness of 
the information are not quite reliable, at least in the perception of investors.96  
To alleviate the information asymmetry, government regulation comes into play and a 
mandatory information disclosure system is adopted worldwide. Credible information 
disclosure facilitates the flow of capital resources to the companies that are likely to create 
more value. Thus, the information disclosure system is the cornerstone of a well-
functioning stock market.97 Besides, an information disclosure system helps in reducing 
agency problems and increases the public exposure of listed companies.  
4.4.1 Directors’ Duty of Information Disclosure  
Pursuant to general legal rules in the Company Law, directors in listed companies also owe 
duties of loyalty and diligence to the company and are expected to further shareholders’ 
interests as a whole. Shareholders are entitled to the operational information of the 
company. Directors’ information disclosure duty according to the Securities Law makes a 
difference only because the scope of beneficiaries of such duties is expanding to any 
investors in the securities market. The disclosed information amounts to public goods, and 
accordingly, is subject to government regulations. In this regard, the nature of information 
disclosure duty is hybrid.  
In China, the Securities Law and regulatory documents issued by the CSRC combine to 
establish the information disclosure system. The Securities Law employs one chapter to set 
forth general principals, contents, formality, manner, and accountability with regard to 
information disclosure. Since the securities market and the supporting institutions remain 
in the initial stage, the CSRC issued regulatory documents—Administrative Measures on 
 
95 Sanford J. Grossman and Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Market’, 
(1980) 70 The American Economic Review, pp. 393-804.   
96 With regard to the quality and uncertainty of the information disclosed in the capital market, refer to Gorge 
A. Akerlof, ‘The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism’, (1970) 84 The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 488-500.  
97 For the role of information disclosure in securities market, see, Paul M. Healy and Krishna G. Palepu, 
‘Information Asymmetry, Corporate Disclosure, and the Capital Markets: A Review of the Empirical 
Disclosure Literature’, (2001) 31 Journal of Accounting and Economics, pp. 405-440. 
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Information Disclosure by the Listed Companies to streamline the procedures of 
information disclosure, clarify the accountability of the obligators, and ultimately to 
strengthen the compliance with legal rules.98        
In principle, information disclosed by an issuer or a listed company must be ‘truthful, 
accurate and complete’ and should not consist of any false or misleading statements or 
major omissions (Art. 63). To better implement the requirements of information quality, 
directors, supervisory board members, and senior management personnel in the listed 
companies also have the duty of ‘ensuring the veracity, accuracy, and completeness’ of 
disclosed information (Art. 68).  
A series of documents that a listed company must release include the prospectus, listing 
memorandum, listing announcement, regular reports, and interim reports (Arts. 65, 66 and 
67). All of these documents must be submitted to the CSRC and the stock exchange in a 
timely manner.  
The major contents of these documents are as follows: (1) general situation of the 
company; (2) financial statement and business of the company; (3) brief introduction of the 
directors, supervisors, and senior management personnel of the company and their 
respective holdings of the company’s shares; (4) the names of the top 10 shareholders of 
the company and their respective shareholdings; (5) actual controller; (6) major lawsuits in 
which the company is involved; (7) any major event that could have substantial impact on 
the share price; (8) other matters as may be prescribed by the CSRC (Art. 65, 66, and 67).  
Directors and/or senior managers of a listed company are required to sign their written 
opinions to confirm the regular reports of the company. The board of supervisors of a listed 
company reviews these regular reports prepared by the boards of directors and provides its 
written opinions after a review (Art. 68). The regular reports include annual, half-year, and 
quarterly reports, which contain financial status, accounting report, on-going business 
projects and any other information that may significantly influence investment decisions.99   
The regulatory document (Administrative Measures) stresses that directors and officers 
should perform the information disclosure duty faithfully and diligently. Timeliness and 
 
98 Full version is available on the CSRC’s official website: 
http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/flb/flfg/bmgz/ssl/201012/t20101231_189729.html (accessed 
08/12/2019).  
99 Ibid., Art. 19.  
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impartiality are added as the information quality requirement.100 Specifically, directors are 
expected to continuously monitor and be informed of the operational and financial status of 
the company, the occurrence of major events, and their potential influence on the company. 
Directors are also expected to take the initiative to investigate and acquire the necessary 
information for decision-making.101 Such recommended practice, in essence, addresses the 
possibility that some directors may attempt to exempt themselves from the duty of 
information disclosure by claiming they do not know what is going on.  
This regulatory document pushes forward the management system for information 
disclosure matters to standardize the procedure of transmission, review, and disclosure of 
information. In this system, directors also need to monitor the preparation of information 
disclosure documents and ensure that the disclosure is timely and within the stipulated 
period. Meanwhile, the performance of information disclosure duty will be kept as a record.   
4.4.2 Liabilities for Misrepresentation  
Civil liabilities, administrative penalties, and criminal punishment are all waiting for any 
liabilities for misrepresentation. Civil liabilities are more about providing dispersed 
investors in the stock market with a channel to seek the remedies. However, civil litigation 
on this issue has been restricted for long in China, and only relaxed very recently. The 
primary method to address misrepresentation problems is public enforcement, especially 
the CSRC sanctioning administrative penalties.  
4.4.2.1 Administrative penalties 
Under the Securities Law, directors may be sanctioned with a fine ranging from 30,000 to 
300,000 CNY, when the listed company (or issuer) they serve failed to disclose 
information according to the relevant regulations, or the disclosed information has any 
false entry or misleading information. For the same reason, the listed company would also 
be ordered to rectify, or given a warning, and be fined in the range of 300,000 to 600,000 
CNY (Art. 193).  
The CSRC has the authority to investigate the recent movement of any parties in the 
securities market, including listed companies and issuers. When the CSRC notices 
irregularities, it may directly launch a formal case, determine the nature of activities, and 
announce administrative penalties. Literally, the legal ground for the administrative 
 
100 Ibid., Art. 3.  
101 Ibid., Art. 42.   
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penalties would be very inclusive, not only including the typical “cooking” of accounts but 
also for non-compliance with the regulations such as ‘Administrative Measures’.  
4.4.2.2 Civil liabilities  
When any fraudulent, misleading statements, or major omissions in a disclosed document 
cause losses to the investors, the directors, supervisors, senior managers and other directly 
accountable personnel of the listed company or the issuer are jointly and severally liable 
for investors’ losses, unless they can prove that they have no fault.102  
In the Administrative Measures, the exemption of liability has its basis in that directors 
can prove diligence in the performance of their functions. This is a very high standard. 
Misrepresentation is a tort to investors. The legal rules to the effect presume that directors 
and other obligators are at fault in misrepresentation. If they wish to evade administrative 
sanctions, directors must prove their diligence in all activities. This standard is much 
higher than that of ‘no fault’. In practice, it would be very difficult to establish exemption 
conditions.    
Moreover, this regulatory document addresses a situation in which directors, senior 
managers, and the supervisory board are not able to ensure the quality of disclosed 
information, or hold different opinions. They are required to state and disclose such 
reasons and opinions (Art. 24). Besides, the regulatory document further specifies that the 
written opinion of the supervisory board must set out whether document preparation and 
review procedures are lawful and whether the contents of the report are a true, accurate, 
and complete reflection of the status of the listed company (Art 24).  
4.5 Directors’ Liabilities to the Company’s Creditors   
Normally, a board of directors, a collegial and internal organ, does not have a direct legal 
relationship with the company’s creditors. Even in cases where individual directors 
infringe upon the rights and interests of a third party while holding office, the company is 
responsible for their behaviour, according to the Respondeat Superior principle. However, 
the party that actually exerts an impact on the creditors’ economic interest is not the 
company but the decision-makers therein. Such an impact becomes immediate and direct 
when the company is in the vicinity of insolvency. Any value reduction in the company’s 
assets means less the likelihood of debt recovery to the creditors. In light of this, the 
 
102 Under the Securities Law, intermediary agencies and other goalkeepers also assume joint and several 
liabilities as directors do, which this thesis leaves out to remain focused on the research subject.  
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Enterprise Bankruptcy Law addresses the potential threat to creditors’ interest by imposing 
liabilities on the people chiefly in charge. Quite often, these people chiefly in charge are no 
one but directors and senior managers of the company.   
Specifically, directors would be liable for creditors’ losses when their insolvent 
companies have: (1) transferred their asset for free; (2) made deals at unreasonable prices; 
(3) provided guarantees to creditors previously unsecured; (4) paid off the debt to some 
creditor(s) before the due date; (5) waived their creditor’s right; (6) concealed or 
transferred their asset to evade debt; and (7) fabricated debt or assumed unrealistic debt 
(Arts. 31, 32, and 33). Here, insolvent companies are those whose bankruptcy petitions 
have been accepted by the courts.  
Besides, the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law also generally sets forth that ‘directors are 
liable when their breaches of the duties of loyalty and care cause the company’s 
bankruptcy’ (Art. 125). However, to whom and for what losses directors are liable is barely 
comprehensible. If applying this provision anyway, it is not practically feasible to identify 
the causal link between breaches of the duties of loyalty and care, and the company’s 
collapse, except for egregious violations.  
In addition, when the company’s assets do not suffice to pay off its debt, its creditors are 
granted legal rights to go after the shareholders who have withdrawn capital already 
contributed to the company or defaulted on the payment of capital.103 These shareholders 
are liable for the company’s debt to the extent of their subscribed capital and the interest 
accruing from the subscribed capital. 104  Meanwhile, directors who have aided such 
withdrawal and evasion are jointly and severally liable with such shareholders.105  
In fact, other shareholders who have fulfilled their duties of capital contribution are 
entitled to require full payment of the capital and the interest accruing from the unpaid 
capital after the due date.106 It is argued that promoters and shareholders have consented to 
a contract or some provisions regarding capital contribution, and thus, the duty thereof, is 
of a contractual nature. 107  Shareholders that fail in performing their duties of capital 
contribution are liable for breach of the contract. Directors who assist in such breaches of 
 
103 Art. 36 and 200 in the Company Law  
104  Art.14 in 关于公司法若干问题的规定（三）  (The Provisions of Several Issues Concerning the 
Company Law of the PRC III) issued by the Supreme People’s Court in 2014. This Provisions is the judicial 
interpretation. 
105 Ibid.  
106 Ibid., Art. 15 
107 Lei Hao, 协助抽逃出资情形下董事对债权人的责任 (Directors’ Liability to the Company’s Creditors in 
the Event of Aiding in Capital Withdrawal and Capital Evasion), (2012) 5 人民司法 (renmin sifa), pp. 85-90.   
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contractual duties are jointly and severally liable for the return or completion of capital 
contribution.108  
To sum up, China’s lawmakers hold conservative and cautious attitudes towards 
directors’ liabilities to the creditors. Only when a company is under the bankruptcy 
procedure and the directors intentionally adopt schemes to reduce the company’s asset, 
directors would be held liable for the creditors’ losses. Such liabilities are commonly 
deemed as tortious liabilities, falling in the category of infringement on creditors’ rights in 
the China’s Tort Law.109  
However, Chinese law does not particularly regulate directors’ behaviour when their 
companies are financially distressed. Shareholders might prefer a high-risk project because 
of the prospect of profit without suffering losses beyond their capital contribution, while 
creditors prefer stable projects to maintain the company’s assets so that they can ultimately 
claim their loans and interests. 110  Intensive discussion is necessary to understand the 
position of directors in such circumstances and if they should have specific duties, such as 
filing a bankruptcy request on time and prioritising creditors’ interests. At present, the 
discussions are mainly focused on the technicalities and the applicability of the liability 
rules to creditors. However, fundamental issues such as the policy goal and benchmark 
remain unexplored.  
4.6 Conclusion  
China has set up a multi-layered system of substantive rules regulating directors’ 
performance in companies. The Company Law designs the most fundamental doctrines: 
directors must abide by laws, administrative regulations, and the company’s AOA; they 
owe the duties of loyalty and care to the company they serve. The classic breaches of 
loyalty duty are conditionally prohibited, including but not limited to asset 
misappropriation, self-dealing transactions, engaging in the same business as the company, 
usurping corporate opportunities, divulging corporate secrets, and accepting illegal gains 
and bribes.  
 
108 See Art. 14 (1) in Provisions of Several Issues Concerning the Company Law of the PRC III) issued by 
the Supreme People’s Court in 2014 (supra note 10).    
109 Guo Feng and Ruijuan Chai, 论董事对公司债权人的责任  (Debate on Directors’ Liabilities to the 
Company’s Creditors), (2007) 1 国家检察官学院学报 (Journal of National Prosecutors College), pp. 115-
121.   
110 Laura Lin, ‘Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors’ Duty to 
Creditors’, (1993) 46 Vanderbilt Law Review, pp. 1486-1524.  
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Directors’ liabilities can arise from damages caused by violations of laws, administrative 
regulations and the company’s AOAs. Whether merely a breach of duty of loyalty or of 
care suffices to make the cause of actions against directors, is not explicitly stated in the 
Company Law. Under the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, directors would be liable for 
corporate bankruptcy caused by breaches of duties of loyalty and care. However, 
bankruptcy law does not specify the scope and magnitude of personal liabilities in the 
event of corporate bankruptcy.  
Directors in listed companies must ensure the veracity, accuracy, and completeness of 
the disclosed information to the public. When the prospectus, regular and interim reports, 
and other disclosed documents contain any fraudulent information, misleading 
representation, or major omission, directors are jointly and severally liable for the losses 
suffered by the investors due to the inaccurate, incomplete, or fabricated information. 
Meanwhile, the CSRC may impose administrative penalties on the listed companies and 
parties who are chiefly in charge, regardless of actual losses to the investors.  
Both shareholders and the company have the legal standings to file a lawsuit to claim 
directors’ liabilities for their respective losses. Besides, derivative actions are also 
legitimately confirmed to reinforce the implementation of liability rules. 
Admittedly, the underlying theory of the legal strategy is not yet well developed; the 
technicalities of directors’ duties and liabilities need to be revised and refined. Regulatory 
documents and self-regulatory rules have continued to put flesh on the general duties. As 
the incomplete law theory argues, the dilemma of flexibility and precision confronting the 
duty and liability rules cannot be completely resolved at the law-making stage. Then how 
the adjudicators interpret and apply the legal rules is absolutely crucial to achieving the 










Chapter 6 Functional Observations, Conclusions and Recommendations  
 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter aims to answer the central research question: how, and to what extent, does 
the legal strategy1 , directors’ duties and liabilities, ameliorate the agency problems in 
China? At the core of this research question is an inquiry into the function of this legal 
strategy. Previous chapters examined the positive status of directors’ duties and liabilities, 
and revealed the uniqueness of the corporate and market context in China. It is now 
possible to take the perspective of law and economics to analyse major findings of 
previous chapters, and then to draw observations on the function that this legal strategy is 
now serving and expected to serve. For this purpose, the rest of this chapter is organized as 
follows. Section 6.2 answers the sub-questions raised in Chapter 1 by presenting a 
summary and analysis of previous studies and discussions.  Section 6.3 draws conclusions 
by providing an overall view of the usefulness of directors’ duties and liabilities and 
demonstrating the operational difficulties of directors’ duties and liabilities in China. 
Section 6.4 recommends efforts and measures to boost the utility of directors’ duties and 
liabilities. Section 6.5 lists several related issues that future studies might examine. Section 
6.6 makes the final remarks.  
6.2 Observations on the Function of Directors’ Duties and Liabilities in China  
This thesis first revisited the economic theories about the nature of the firm. These theories 
attempted to explain why firms exist or why some production takes place in firms rather 
than in markets from different perspectives. Amongst others, the agency theory, formulated 
with reference to the contractual view of the firm and the transaction cost approach, 
identifies the conflict of interests between major constituent parties in a firm, including 
shareholders and managers, controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, and 
shareholders and other stakeholders, such as creditors. These conflicts of interests may 
create a series of agency problems and incur organizational costs, also termed as ‘agency 
cost’. Amongst others, directors and officers may misuse their managerial power to further 
personal interests rather than those of the company or shareholders. Shareholders’ interests, 
 
1 See supra Section 1.2 Research Questions for the definition and usage of ‘legal strategy’ throughout this 
thesis.  
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in turn, are endangered. Shareholders need to be ensured that their investment would not be 
mismanaged and managers need to raise funds to exercise their management talents.  
The legal liability strategy addresses agency problems by bringing monetary liabilities 
as a deterrent to undesirable behaviour. To assess and examine the function of directors’ 
duties and liabilities in China, this thesis examined the characteristic features of China’s 
companies and the models of ownership and control, analysed how the legal rules are 
carved out to regulate managerial behaviour, and investigated the enforcement of legal 
liabilities and the intensity of liability deterrent. This section combines major findings from 
previous chapters and answers the research question, and sub-questions.  
6.2.1 Typical Agency Problems in China 
Chapter 3 categorized the enterprises by ownership standard, reviewed the evolution of 
each type of enterprises against a transitional backdrop, and noticed that the modern 
corporate form came to China no more than four decades ago. It revealed that the SOEs 
have sustained a politically and economically important status, and thus, have been the 
regulatory focus while undergoing a series of reforms in China. Corporate form was 
officially introduced as a major means to transform traditional SOEs, the production units 
affiliated to the government then, to independent market players. In particular, the 
operational mechanism of SOEs is no longer determined by government fiat. Private 
enterprises used to be subject to intense regulatory restrictions; however, they have gained 
development momentum, and achieved an explosive growth recently. Private enterprises 
commonly adopt corporate form mainly to restrict investment risks via the attribute of 
limited liabilities of shareholders in law.   
    Moreover, Chapter 3 examined the ownership structure, control model, and internal 
governance of China’s companies. According to these studies, most companies have a 
concentrated ownership structure. It is quite common around the world that small-and-
medium-sized companies have a small number of shareholders. In China, even companies 
listed on the stock exchanges do not have a dispersed ownership structure, even though 
numerous public investors are trading shares on a daily basis. In addition, as shown in 
Chapter 3, the extent of share concentration in listed companies is generally high, and the 
largest shareholders usually hold around one-third of all shares in their companies.2  
 
2 See supra notes 95 and 101 in Chapter 3 for the percentage of the shares that the largest shareholders on 
average hold in the listed SOEs and private companies, respectively.  
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As mandated in the Company Law, the shareholders (general) meeting holds substantial 
controlling power, including electing and removing directors, and approving major 
business plans and transactions. 3  Under the one-share-one-vote rule, the resolutions 
rendered to the shareholders (general) meetings are largely determined by the controlling 
shareholders, but minority shareholders only have a small number of votes. This means 
that one or a few controlling shareholders have the final say over personnel and operational 
matters, whereas minority shareholders’ interests are almost at the discretionary disposal of 
the controlling shareholders.  
Under the lens of agency theory, minority shareholders are the principals who make 
capital contributions but do not make decisions on investment management. Controlling 
shareholders are agents who can influence and even control decision-making but may 
pursue their own benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders. Such agency 
problems, usually termed as horizontal agency problems, arise due to the divergence of 
interests of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. A major concern in 
China’s companies is the protection of minority shareholders from expropriation by 
controlling shareholders.  
Although controlling shareholders can appoint those who represent their interests to be 
directors, and usually have fewer collective action problems in monitoring directors than 
dispersed shareholders do, vertical agency problems with delegated management cannot be 
overlooked either. As shown in the judicial decisions in Chapter 5, small-and-medium-
sized companies fall short on well-maintained internal governance. 4  As for large 
companies,  supervisory boards are only able to play a minor role, if not none at all, in 
monitoring the exercise of managerial power because of the lack of authority, information, 
and incentives.5 Independent directors in listed companies usually provide consultancy and 
various kinds of resources and connections, as many listed companies invite former 
government officials or experts in different areas.6 At the board meetings, directors might 
be more prudent in the presence of independent directors. Such influence is of course 
positive but not equivalent to a continuous and systematic supervision force. Besides, a 
frequent criticism is that the independent directors in China’s listed companies are virtually 
 
3 See supra Section 3.4.2 Internal Governance.   
4 See supra note 40 in Chapter 5.  
5 Jay Dahya, Yusuf Karbari, Jason Zezong Xiao, Mei Yang, ‘The Usefulness of the Supervisory Board 
Report in China’, (2003) 11 Corporate Governance International Review, pp. 308-321.    
6 Lihong Wang, ‘Protection or Expropriation: Politically Connected Independent Directors in China’, (2015) 
55 Journal of Banking and Finance, pp. 92-106.  
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not independent.7 In other words, in current corporate practice, internal governance cannot 
effectively check and control management regularly.  
In the SOEs, the special identity of the controlling shareholders yields thorny vertical 
agency problems. In the centrally planned era, SOEs were merely production units that did 
not enjoy management autonomy but had to stick to the fixed plan of output and price 
made by the state government. After corporatization of the SOEs in the 1990s, delegated 
management has become possible and the government has come to play a shareholding 
role. 8  At the central level, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) under the State Council, owns and controls the SOEs that occupy 
significant industries such as infrastructure construction, telecommunication, banking, 
energy, and so on. Local government agencies play an equivalent role in local SOEs.9  
Seen from a view of agency theory, there exist multi-layered agency relationships in the 
SOEs, but no real owner, or ultimate principal, is in place to monitor the agents.10  In 
particular, directors and officers are in charge of managing the SOEs and accountable to 
their principals—government shareholders. The state government, on behalf of all the 
people, owns the state-owned assets and designates the particular agency (SASAC) to be 
the owners and shareholders of the SOEs. However, people do not have enough political or 
economic power to monitor the government agency in terms of the operation of state-
owned assets in China. Unlike private companies that have equity owners, and residual 
claimants, whose single goal is to pursue the best interests of the firm, and in turn, to 
maximize their investment returns, SOEs do not have real owners with direct stakes in the 
firm, and therefore, watch the business operation closely.  
Moreover, directors and officers in the SOEs usually need to consider industrial policies 
and political goals when formulating business strategies and transaction plans because of 
government influence. The government agency plays a dual role as the shareholder of the 
SOEs and regulatory authority over the SOEs.11 As such, it is inevitable that the resolutions 
of shareholders meetings in the SOEs are mixed with regulatory goals and industrial 
 
7 See, e.g., Juan Ma and Tarun Khanna, ‘Independent Directors’ Dissent on Boards: Evidence from Listed 
Companies in China’, (2016) 37 Strategic Management Journal, pp. 1547-1557. 
8 See supra Section 3.3.1.3 Corporatization and advancing corporate governance (1993-present).   
9 See supra note 59 in Chapter 3 for detailed information about central SOEs (中央企业).   
10 See supra note 108 in Chapter 3 and the accompanying text.  
11 See supra Section 3.4.1.2 Government control and also Chenxia Shi, Political Determinants of Corporate 
Governance in China (New York: Routledge, 2012), p. 249.     
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policies, even though the government agency attempts to put up a Chinese wall to separate 
the different functions.  
The shareholding function is virtually performed by individual officials whose objective 
is to be promoted to a higher political ranking position. These government officials are 
simply bureaucratic superiors to the directors in the SOEs. Accordingly, the benchmarks 
for assessing the performance of the directors in the SOEs are not purely for the sake of the 
company’s interest, but probably include connections with those superior officials. Besides, 
multiple goals per se disturb the assessment of management performance, making it more 
difficult to identify the economic outcome attributable to the decision-makers, which 
entices them to moral hazard.12  
It is not only likely that the directors and officers in the SOEs would misuse their 
managerial power to ‘steal’ and ‘shirk’.13 They may also act in collusion with government 
officials who encroach upon state assets in various ways, which is partially due to the lack 
of real owners. Notably, directors in the SOEs and local government officials unlawfully 
gain considerable personal benefits by buying out SOEs that have been intentionally 
undervalued by fraud.14  
Similarly, ‘tunnelling’ the profit and funds of listed companies by controlling 
shareholders and directors is also notoriously common, especially in the state-owned 
company group. Before the IPO, quality assets and profitable business were concentrated 
in the company that applied for the IPO, while inferior assets and debts were arranged in 
other related companies in this group.15 When the IPO was approved and funds were raised, 
other related companies and even the parent holding companies siphon the profits and 
premium value of the shares of the listed company to pay off debts or sustain the 
operations of un-listed companies in the group. In this pattern, the interests of minority 
shareholders in listed companies can be severely harmed. Even worse, investment 
confidence is greatly undermined.   
 
12 See supra note 106 in Chapter 3 and the accompanying text.   
13 See supra note 100 in Chapter 2 and the accompanying text.  
14 In June 2004, an economist Lang, Xianping has sparked off a series of debates over the drain and loss of 
state assets in the SOEs reforms. Amongst others, extensive discussions considered whether management 
buy-out (MBO) is the proper approach to privatization of the SOEs because of the recurrence of corruption 
and scandals.  
15 Yuan Ding, Hua Zhang, Junxi Zhang, ‘Private vs. State Ownership and Earnings Management: Evidence 
from Chinese Listed Companies’, (2007) 15 Corporate Governance An International Review, pp. 223-238.  
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In addition to these problems observed in the lens of agency theory, traditional issues 
with the SOEs including ‘soft budget constraint’ and overdue policy burdens, though 
lessened through decades of reforms, still cast a shadow over the efficiency of the SOEs. In 
economic parlance, political interference incurs substantial political costs and increases 
agency costs. 16  Despite mixed ownership reform, the actual effect of this reform in 
promoting the efficiency of the SOEs remains at present unpredictable.17  
As examined in Chapter 3, in China, market mechanisms can only discipline 
management behaviour in a limited manner. Nowadays, directors and managers in private 
companies tend to run businesses diligently, to ensure that their firms survive and grow, 
because product and services markets are increasingly competitive. Profit growth, increase 
in market shares, and other similar signals from product markets are used to measure the 
quality of business decisions by directors and managers and linked to their remuneration.  
The above signals from product markets are not as significant for assessing the 
performance of directors and officers in the SOEs. Most SOEs are monopolies in their 
respective markets, and hence, are not exposed to intense competition. The remuneration 
for directors and officers in the SOEs has an upper limit to maintain a small gap with 
employees. As a result, directors in the SOEs do not need to be sensitive to the signals 
from product markets, as their counterparts in private companies usually do. 
Although by many different measures, China’s stock market has developed fast in only 
three decades, this market only presents a secondary channel for domestic firms to raise 
funds. For companies listed on the stock exchanges, their operational status is not timely 
and precisely signaled by stock prices due to the flaws in the information disclosure system, 
not to say the performance of directors and officers therein. Moreover, the market for 
corporate control is not active because potential bidders need to buy a very large fraction 
of shares to prevail as the largest shareholders in order to control the firm. This means that 
directors and officers in listed companies are not under substantial threat of replacement in 
case of a takeover.18  
In sum, China’s companies usually have a concentrated ownership structure, and 
therefore, agency problems between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders are 
prevalent. Vertical agency problems are also serious, to a varying extent, in different types 
 
16 See supra note 107 in Chapter 3 and the accompanying text.  
17 See supra note 62 in Chapter 3 and the accompanying text.  
18 See supra Section 3.5 Market Mechanisms and Incentives.   
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of companies. Directors and officers in the SOEs are not exposed to intense market 
pressure nor are they under close monitoring by shareholders. Thus, they have more 
chances to commit self-regarding actions. Government interference exacerbates such moral 
hazard, because a business decision does not intend to maximize the company’s interest 
anyway and it is confusing that the sub-optimal outcome is attributed to the decision maker 
or to other policy goals. Listed companies are required to institute a standard internal 
governance system by the securities regulations. The standard governance system partially 
mitigates management opportunism. However, listed companies are not free from vertical 
agency problems, since the external disciplining force from the stock market and the 
market for corporate control is rather weak.  
6.2.2 Design and Formulation of Directors’ Duties and Liabilities in Legislation  
Chapter 4 briefly introduced the overall legal hierarchy in China and reviewed the 
evolution of corporate, securities, and bankruptcy legislation in the transitional period. 
Business entities and market transactions did not naturally emerge in China’s centrally 
planned system. In the 1990s, the Company Law, Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, and 
Securities Law were enacted, as instruments for overall economic reforms by introducing 
the legal regimes and business models from western countries.19 To keep the economic 
reforms under government control, administrative sanctions and criminal penalties were 
adopted in these laws, as the primary regulatory approaches to rampant misuse of corporate 
form to escape debts.  
    As the overall economy has become more market-oriented, a round of major revisions 
has been made to these laws in 2005 and 2006. Amongst others, the Company Law has 
changed its regulatory notion into the promotion of private autonomy by an extensive use 
of default rules.20 In tandem, private litigation is expressly confirmed to enforce legal 
rights and remedy losses. In this way, judicial review becomes a major regulatory approach 
to wrong-doing in corporate scenarios, replacing the previous regulatory approaches that 
were primarily dependent on public enforcement.  
With regard to the regulation of managerial behaviour, before the major revision in 2005, 
the Company Law simply commanded directors and officers to maintain the company’s 
interest and strictly prohibited behaviour that could involve personal interest. It did not 
 
19 See supra Section 4.2.5 Summary.  
20 See supra note 26 in Chapter 4.  
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provide the form of liabilities, how a director can be held liable, and who has the legal 
standing to hold directors liable, which considerably weakened the effectiveness of the 
general requirement.  
Now the legal strategy, i.e., directors’ duties and liabilities have been basically instituted. 
The Company Law specifies what duties directors and officers owe to their companies, 
clarifies that directors and officers should be liable for the losses caused by breach of legal 
duties, and confirms private litigation to hold wrong-doers liable. Specifically, the 
Company Law introduces the concept of fiduciary duties from the common law tradition 
and spells out that directors and officers owe duties of loyalty and care to the companies 
they serve. In addition to their duties to companies, directors and officers must abide by 
laws, administrative regulations, and the company’s articles of association (AOA) when 
they exercise managerial power. Moreover, there is a prohibitive list of breaches of duties 
of loyalty, including asset misappropriation, usurping corporate opportunities, engaging in 
the same business as the company does, and various forms of self-dealing transactions. 
Once there are losses caused by violations of laws, administrative regulations, and 
company’s AOA, shareholders and companies can file a lawsuit before the courts to hold 
directors and officers liable for their respective losses. In addition, the shareholders 
derivative action is imported from the US, along with the fiduciary duties of loyalty and 
care, to overcome the obstacle that directors and officers are reluctant to represent their 
companies to sue their peers. Shareholders, in the name of their company, may file a 
lawsuit against the directors for the companies’ losses.  
Chapter 4 conducts a doctrinal analysis into the meaning and contents of the above legal 
rules and finds some missing pieces of the puzzle and obscurity.21 First, directors’ duties of 
loyalty and care do not have their respective standards and test for private parties to predict 
and for judges to determine whether certain behaviour breaches the general duties of 
loyalty and care.  
As the prohibitive list reads, any transaction and conduct tainted with the interest of any 
other party than the company’s interest should be approved by a shareholders meeting and 
should comply with the company’s AOA. Or else, such conduct is a breach of the duty of 
loyalty, and therefore, prohibited. The prerequisite of approval is set to filter out 
transactions that are potentially prejudicial to the company’s interest. However, there is a 
 
21 See supra Section 4.3.2 General Duties.  
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lack of mandatory requirements concerning the information disclosure by the interested 
director and the withdrawal of interested parties from the approval procedure, not to say 
the provisions regarding the legal consequences of the failure to fulfil these requirements. 
Wrong-doers can exploit these loopholes to continue transactions that benefit themselves 
but at the expense of the company, as long as they can mislead shareholders into approving 
the transactions.  
Above all, it is not sensible to strictly prohibit the transactions and conduct that have not 
undergone due approval or do not comply with the company’s AOA but are likely to 
benefit the company.22 In sum, it is not enough to deal with various forms of intentional 
infringement of the company’s interests by procedural requirements and compliance with 
the ex ante arrangements. Therefore, it is necessary to define the standard of the duty of 
loyalty and its meaning, and a judicial review should examine the merits of the specific 
transactions and conduct. 
The duty of care is almost an empty term in the Company Law, as it has no definition of 
the duty of care nor is there a list of classic types of breaches of the duty of care, such as 
the prohibitive list of breaches of the duty of loyalty. The law does not prescribe the 
requirement of the duty of care or the manner of exercising managerial powers which 
fulfils this duty. Negligent or imprudent decisions may cause great losses to the company 
and the shareholders. If the decision makers have to compensate all the economic losses, 
no one will ever want to take the risk of making decisions. Thus, it is necessary to establish 
mechanisms for risk diversification and limiting individual monetary liabilities.  
Second, it is not clear whether the breaches of the duties of loyalty and care are the 
causes of actions to hold directors liable, since the liability provision only includes 
violations of laws, administrative regulations, and the company’s AOA. Owing to such 
obscurity, the disputes rendered to the courts are screened, and the scope of judicial 
discretion is restricted.  
To be more specific, only when a dispute involves conduct that is subject to explicit 
terms, either in laws and regulations, or stipulated in an agreement, is this dispute more 
likely to be accepted and addressed by a court. To avoid controversy on their judicial 
decisions, judges abstain from interpreting and applying the general principle of the duties 
 
22 See supra 4.3.2.2 Duty of loyalty in Chapter 4.  
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of loyalty and care. This is also confirmed by the sample judicial decisions in Chapter 5.23  
Thus, at the law-making level, the usefulness of directors’ duties of loyalty and care is 
undermined.  
General duties of loyalty and care are also used to regulate particular types of 
management actions. According to the Securities Law, directors and officers in the listed 
companies are required to ensure the veracity, accuracy, and completeness of the 
information disclosed to the public. Moreover, the Administrative Measures on 
Information Disclosure by Listed Companies, a regulatory document issued by the CSRC, 
further delineates that directors and officers should perform the information disclosure 
duty faithfully and diligently and should continuously monitor and be informed of the 
operational and financial status of the company.24 How directors and officers implement 
the requirement is considered by the CSRC in dealing with misrepresentations and 
imposing administrative sanctions. However, the precise meaning and the standard of these 
requirements remain vague. Even worse, the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law states that 
directors are liable when their breaches of duties of loyalty and care cause the company’s 
bankruptcy.25 However, it does not specify to whom directors are liable and for which 
losses.  
In sum, modern corporate legislation in China has a history of merely three decades, 
taking shape in the 1990s when economic activities and corporate practices started to 
burgeon and being revised as the economic reforms deepened. In general, the concepts, 
norms, and legal instruments governing the formation and governance of a company are 
formulated by emulating the company laws in western countries. Before the 2006 revisions, 
the legislative purpose was to provide modern corporate form as a means to transform 
traditional SOEs, and accordingly the legislative approach was to give instructions by 
mandatory rules. The currently effective company law has relaxed the mandatory 
requirements which were rigid and limited to ever-changing practices, and has adopted a 
bundle of default rules to allow flexible arrangement by internal agreement. This reflects 
that the regulatory approach is shifted from administrative restrictions ex ante to judicial 
review ex post.  
 
23 See supra 5.2.2.3 Interpretation and application.  
24 See supra note 98 in Chapter 4.  
25 See supra Section 4.4 Directors’ Liabilities to the Company’s Creditors.  
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The legal norms regarding the exercise of managerial power were also revised by 
introducing the concept of the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care and explicitly granting 
shareholders and companies a private right of action to bring lawsuits against directors and 
officers. In this way, the legal duties are broadened to address both ‘stealing’ and ‘shirking’ 
on the part of directors and officers, and the legal consequences for breach of such duties 
are hardened by out-of-pocket monetary liabilities.  
However, the design and formulation of the fiduciary duties and liabilities are far from 
delicate and sophisticated. Major flaws that may greatly undermine the effectiveness of the 
duty and liability strategy in practice can be observed in the following aspects. First and 
foremost, directors’ duties are spelled out like a general principle without clear definition 
or standard. Thus, it would be quite difficult to interpret and apply such principle-like rules 
in a specific scenario, especially for China’s judges who have limited discretion to do so.  
Second, the rules regarding typical breach of the loyalty duty are specified without 
consideration of the information asymmetry between directors and shareholders. Similarly, 
no procedural rule is provided to shift the burden of proof, even though directors usually 
have the information advantage. Third, monetary liabilities for a breach of the duty of care 
are not particularly addressed in law. It is unreasonable and unfeasible to hold directors 
liable for all losses caused by their (grossly) negligent decisions. Thus, how to avoid the 
over-deterring effect on directors and to realize the coverage of compensation for 
economic losses is worth careful study and sophisticated design.       
6.2.3 Enforcement of Directors’ Duties and Liabilities  
Chapter 5 reviewed previous empirical studies, and conducted a qualitative and 
quantitative analysis into 243 judicial decisions. It reports that private enforcement against 
management wrong-doing is not as rare as previously found.  Around one-third of all cases 
of monetary liabilities for management wrong-doing are particularly against directors. 
Nevertheless, the number of lawsuits regarding directors’ liability is still small relative to 
the number of the companies all over the country.26 All of the cases deal with disputes 
arising from small and medium-sized companies. There is no lawsuit against directors in 
listed companies or in SOEs. Thus, the enforcement of directors’ liabilities remains at low 
levels, and monetary liabilities play a limited, but increasingly active role in deterring 
management wrong-doing.  
 
26 See supra note 6 in Chapter 5 and the accompanying text and supra Section 5.2.2.1 Source and data.  
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Previous studies found that the facts and issues involved in sample cases are not 
complex and are largely attributable to weak internal governance system. 27  However, 
sample cases show that the complaints become more diverse and encompass different 
aspects of business operations; some even make allegations against professional judgement 
based on industry knowledge. Some companies in the sample have been running at a loss 
for years or are even in the vicinity of insolvency, or the defendants have been dismissed 
or removed from directorial positions. 28  These companies and their shareholders are 
usually reluctant to file a lawsuit to challenge directors’ decisions unless they cannot 
obtain reconciliation with the directors, or their co-operative relationship has already 
broken down.29 Quite a few cases merely identified the responsibilities of directors for 
their wrong-doing but did not uphold the claim of monetary liabilities due to a lack of 
causal links.  
Besides, no single case expressly alleged a breach of the duty of care; however, a large 
number of cases challenged the reasonableness of directors’ conduct or decisions. This 
means that directors still need to be wary of monetary liabilities for negligent and reckless 
mistakes. Overall, the liability risk for breach of the duties of loyalty and care is not high 
for directors in small and medium-sized companies and almost non-existent in listed 
companies or state-owned companies.30  
A range of factors in the procedural rules pose obstacles to the prospective plaintiffs, 
especially to minority shareholders who initiate derivative actions. First, no particular rules 
deal with the burden of proof with regard to the cases of directors’ liabilities. Only the 
general principle—the one who makes claims bears the burden of proof for most civil 
disputes can be referred to, which means that the extensive burden of investigations and 
evidence collection rests with the plaintiffs, whereas the defendants obviously have 
information advantages.31  
    Second, the allocation of cost between the shareholder plaintiffs and the beneficiary of 
derivative actions, i.e., their companies, is far from satisfactory. According to the new 
judicial interpretation, only if and until the court upholds some or all of the claims, would 
the expenditure incurred in litigation be possibly reimbursed. In effect, only disputes 
 
27 See supra Table 5.5 Plaintiffs Claims and Win Rates and the accompanying text. 
28 Ibid.   
29 Ibid.  
30 See supra Section 5.2.2.2 Major features of sample cases and supra Table 5.1 Involved Companies.  
31 See supra discussions of Procedural hurdles in Section 5.2.3 Explanations for the Enforcement Pattern.  
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involving clear and straightforward facts and governed by well-articulated rules would be 
rendered to the courts, since risk-averse plaintiffs can estimate their win rate and the 
corresponding litigation costs on a reliable basis. In a contrast, new, complex, and 
contentious issues would be left unsettled, which would widen the gap between the law in 
books and the law in action, and the gap between legal strategy and practical needs.    
    Third, the restriction of the use of contingency fees in actions with multiple plaintiffs is 
also responsible for the dearth of actions against directors in large companies. In 
accordance with the shareholding threshold for the legal standing to file a derivative action, 
the number of shareholder plaintiffs in large companies, especially the listed ones, cannot 
be small. Without a contingency fee, it is financially burdensome for shareholders to file a 
lawsuit for the company’s sake.   
In addition to the hostile procedural rules, the courts may abstain from handling the 
claims against the directors in SOEs and listed companies, because those claims can be 
politically sensitive and may embroil the judges in tensions between different interest 
groups. 32  Moreover, the courts are susceptible to party-government intervention in 
individual cases. It is not rare that the courts follow the instructions of the local 
government or the party committees to address the disputes, for the sake of either regional 
growth or sustaining illicit political nepotism or collusion between businessmen and 
government officials. 33  Therefore, individual shareholders are not confident of being 
treated fairly and impartially and have to seek other solutions. Another concern for the 
prospective plaintiffs is whether the judges are capable of handling allegations involving 
complex business transactions.  
6.2.4 Normative Role of Directors’ Duties and Liabilities  
Chapter 2 reviewed and outlined the theoretical rationale for directors’ duties and liabilities. 
The theoretical analysis can be used to identify the function that the legal strategy is 
expected to perform in China. In general, the duty and liability strategy virtually provides 
shareholders and companies with a back-up instrument to control management wrong-
doing and a remedial channel for their losses, if any. The liability regime is indispensable 
as a remedy for the agency problems. Shareholders may stipulate the rules in the 
company’s AOA with regard to the authority, conditions, and procedures, for specific 
 
32 See supra note 94 in Chapter 4 (Donald C. Clarke and Nicholas C. Howson, 2012), pp. 254-257.  
33 Ibid.   
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types of issues and transactions. However, these rules cannot be sufficiently specific to 
designate proper behaviour for every future contingency. Nevertheless, the general duties 
of loyalty and care are always applicable. The courts, at the request of a shareholder or 
company plaintiff, examine the circumstances and determine whether directors have 
fulfilled their duties. In this way, the gaps in the incomplete internal rules are bridged. 
Directors and officers, in turn, cannot simply exploit the loopholes in the internal rules for 
self-regarding behaviour at the expense of the company. 
One-shot theft usually involves fraud and fabrications. Stock markets cannot 
automatically detect, signal, and punish such wrong-doing, because share price is formed 
mainly according to the information disclosed. Private parties, such as insiders or whistle-
blowers, may file a lawsuit to hold wrong-doers liable when they discover or obtain some 
information about one-shot theft. Moreover, a litigation procedure can facilitate 
information discovery through procedural and evidence rules. Monetary liabilities for 
breach of the duty of loyalty, usually a sum of the compensation for the losses and 
confiscation of illegal gains, are sufficient to deter one-shot theft. Thus, the liability 
strategy is undisputedly necessary to deter one-shot theft.   
    In contrast, it has long been debated whether judges should tackle the issue of whether 
directors have exercised reasonable care in making decisions. Opponents argue that judges 
have hindsight bias against risk-taking and lack the business knowledge and skills to assess 
the merit of decisions. Moreover, monetary liabilities for honest and negligent mistakes 
may cause directors to refrain from making risky decisions, which will also be undesirable 
to both investors and companies. Besides, it is strongly asserted that market mechanisms 
are more efficient in disciplining and incentivising managerial conduct than the liability 
regime.  
Following the debate, there is a clarification of the usefulness of monetary liabilities for 
a breach of duty of care by Holger Spamann, and it is argued that the usefulness of the 
liability strategy is virtually a cost-benefit matter.34 The liability incentive is based on a 
direct and independent signal of the directors’ behaviour, a judicial decision. In particular, 
judges review the factual circumstances, evaluate the appropriateness of the challenged 
actions, and determine whether directors have exercised reasonable care and whether they 
 
34 See supra note 148 in Chapter 2 (Holger Spamann, 2016).   
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are liable for the losses caused. The quality of judicial decisions is central to the benefit of 
the liability incentives.  
Liability incentives not only deter managerial slack but also complement other incentive 
schemes linked to market signals. To be specific, executive compensation has come under 
heavy criticism for inducing management short-termism. Particularly, directors and 
officers tend to pursue the increase in stock price and accounting figures in a short period 
so that they are better paid. With liability deterrent, compensation packages can be 
adjusted so that directors and officers are still incentivised to pursue their companies’ best 
interest but less sensitive to the market trend.35   
However, judicial review is costly because of the human and financial resources 
invested in the litigation procedures. When market mechanisms, especially the stock 
markets, are functioning efficiently and generating precise and informative signals, such as 
share prices, the relative benefit of the judicial decisions would become limited. Owing to 
its high cost, the liability strategy is less desirable. Thus, the usefulness of the legal 
strategy is contingent upon the market environment and judicial infrastructure.  
In China, directors’ duties and liabilities can be of great necessity and significance, since 
management opportunism is not substantially controlled either by market forces or by 
internal governance. As examined in Chapter 3, the share prices in China’s stock market 
cannot efficiently and precisely indicate the value and potential of the listed companies; the 
incentive schemes based on the share prices would accordingly deviate from the intended 
effect, i.e., aligning individual interests with the company’s interests. Notably, a great 
majority of companies are not publicly listed companies and they do not even have share 
prices in real time. As such, judicial decisions almost become the only reliable signals of 
managerial conduct, and thus, the relative benefit of the liability incentives is especially 
large, even though the cost of obtaining the liability incentive in China is not low either.  
Besides, managerial autonomy and internal governance are relatively new to ordinary 
businessmen. They are unaware of the significance of a company’s AOA. How to exercise 
managerial power is not specified in the company’s AOA ex ante. Monitoring devices are 
not well instituted or continuously maintained. Considering such governance deficiencies, 
the general duties and award of liabilities can be very useful to deter managerial wrong-
doing. 
 
35 Ibid.  
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6.3 Conclusions  
The legal strategy of directors’ duties and liabilities is currently playing a minor role in 
alleviating vertical agency problems in China. Private actions are infrequently initiated. 
Only the directors in small and medium-sized companies might be sued for breaches of 
duty of loyalty. Those in the SOEs and listed companies are virtually exempted from 
monetary liabilities for their wrong-doing. With regard to the directors in listed companies, 
the enforcement of information disclosure duties is mainly dependent on administrative 
sanctions. Yet, even the maximum fine for violations of information disclosure 
requirements does not give directors much suffering. Taken together, the under-
enforcement of directors’ liabilities is striking. Without sufficient enforcement action, 
monetary liabilities would be perceived as only existent in the statutes, and not the 
intended deterrent in managerial practices.  
Considering the context where management behaviour is not sufficiently disciplined or 
incentivised, the monetary liability strategy is expected to actively function to deter 
‘shirking’ as well as ‘stealing’. Or else, managerial conduct can be arbitrary and even 
detrimental to the company and shareholders. So far market mechanism is not developed to 
the extent that share prices and other signals can efficiently and precisely indicate business 
operation and directors’ performance. Internal governance does not institute an effective 
monitoring force. Thus, the benefit of the legal strategy would surely outweigh the cost of 
its enforcement, as analysed above.  
However, there are a series of challenges in the design, formulation, and enforcement of 
directors’ duties and liabilities in China. First, the transplantation of the fiduciary duties of 
loyalty and care to China, a transitional civil law country, poses twofold challenges. One is 
the codification of legal technicalities, embodied in the case law, into statutory rules. The 
other challenge involves the distribution of law-making power between the legislature and 
judiciary.36  
In particular, China’s legal system follows the civil law tradition and the judges 
generally interpret and apply the statutory rules to address disputes.37 It can be contentious 
 
36 See supra note 74 in Chapter 4 (Katharina Pistor and Chenggang Xu, 2003).   
37 Michael Irl Nikkel, “‘Chinese Characteristics’ in Corporate Clothing: Questions of Fiduciary Duty in 
China’s Company Law”, (1995) 80 Minnesota Law Review, p. 513.  
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that the judges innovatively interpret the legal rules beyond their literal or original 
meaning.38 However, the fiduciary duty originated from the common law tradition. The 
reason why the fiduciary duty principle can deal with any business decisions is because 
judges enjoy discretionary power to interpret and apply the general term in a particular 
scenario. As such, the authority, expertise, and experience of judges largely determine the 
application and development of the fiduciary duty law. Furthermore, it is not possible to 
develop competent courts overnight.  
Second, the function of legal strategy could be limited to small and medium-sized 
companies. Private actions can hardly fight against the directors and officers in the SOEs 
and listed companies. The judicial branch in China is susceptible to the party-government 
interference, and thus, is unable to make an impartial decision when the dispute involves 
politically and economically powerful parties. Moreover, mass incidents are sensitive in 
China, and accordingly, class actions are supressed. Although shareholders derivative 
action is imported, the procedural rules are not designed to deal with the special issues in 
such actions, such as information asymmetry between plaintiffs and defendants and the 
unreasonable proportion of benefit and cost for plaintiffs. Thus, at present, the liabilities of 
the directors in the SOEs and listed companies can hardly be enforced through private 
actions.  
Third, corporate governance in China is under-developed. Private autonomy is not made 
best use of to suit the operational conditions. It would be a challenge for ordinary 
companies to calibrate monetary liabilities for the breach of the duty of care to properly 
deter negligent decision making, which is unfavourable to the efficacy of the duty of care.   
6.4 Policy and Legal Recommendations  
 (1) To list the enhancement of directors’ duties and liabilities on the policy agenda  
The Company Law has been comprehensively revised and has been frequently given 
authoritative interpretations by the SPC since 2005.39 However, the strategy of directors’ 
 
38 See supra Section 5.2.2.3 Interpretation and application.  
39 For the revision of the Company Law, see supra Section 4.2.2.    
Judicial Interpretation I by the SPC in 2006 explains how the cases before the 2006 revision of the Company 
Law should be addressed.  
Judicial Interpretations II by the SPC in 2008 specifically clarifies the meaning of the rules regarding 
insolvency and liquidation.  
Judicial Interpretation III by the SPC in 2010 mainly involves the issues pertaining to capital contribution, 
the establishment of companies, and shareholding status.  
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duties and liabilities is not an area of focus. The Judicial Interpretations only clarify a few 
procedural issues regarding shareholders derivative actions. 40  In practice, very few 
shareholders and companies use this legal strategy to protect their interests, which 
policymakers do not yet perceive as an issue, or at least not a pressing one.  
Inactive enforcement does not mean that management practice is quite satisfactory or 
that very few disputes over business decisions take place. As illustrated and analysed in 
Chapter 5, the legal vagueness, procedural hurdles, and weak judicial institutions together 
contribute to a paucity of litigation. Shareholders and companies are reluctant to bear the 
high costs of suing for unpredictable outcomes. In this regard, to enhance the design of 
directors’ duties and liabilities and activate the enforcement calls for multiple efforts and 
even for institutional reforms in the long run.   
More notably, the liability regime is highly desirable in the current context because 
‘stealing’ and ‘shirking’ are not effectively controlled by alternative mechanisms. As 
corporate form did not spontaneously develop in Chinese enterprises but was a transplant 
from abroad only four decades ago, internal governance in practice is often inconsistent 
with the mandatory model in the Company Law. The monitors such as independent 
directors and supervisory boards are condemned as window dressing. Internal governance 
strategies to monitor managerial performances are not effective in China.   
In addition, unlike in the US and other well-developed market economies, China’s stock 
market and managerial labour market are still primitive. The stock market can hardly claim 
to play a pricing and disciplining role very well.41 The market for corporate control has not 
been fully invigorated, even though the split-share structure reform allows the circulation 
of shares that used to be non-tradable.42 Without a mature and strong market in place, 
directors and officers are less wary about the market consequences of their performances, 
and shareholders and companies may even not be able to detect managerial wrong-doings 
merely from market signals. When investors, or even prospective shareholders, have no 
assurance of accountability in the management of their investment, companies must 
assume an extra burden and cost to raise funds. Thus, it is of crucial importance to enhance 
and activate the liability regime to deter ‘slack’ as well as ‘stealing’ on the part of directors.     
 
Judicial Interpretation IV by the SPC in 2017 inclusively fills in the gaps of the rules with regard to the 
validity and revocation of the resolutions, shareholders’ information right, dividend distribution, preemptive 
rights, and reimbursement of litigation expenditure in derivative actions.     
40 See Article 1 in the Judicial Interpretation I and Article 24, 25, and 26 in the Judicial Interpretation IV.  
41 See supra note 134 in Chapter 3 and the accompanying text.  
42 See supra note 136 and note 137 in Chapter 3 and the accompanying text.  
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(2) To re-shape the design of the legal strategy  
The fundamental issue with the design and formulation of the duty rules lies in whether the 
courts have the discretion to interpret general terms and even develop sub-standards. 
Statutory rules cannot precisely specify every future contingency ex ante. The approach of 
simply relying on the statutory rules but constraining judicial discretion does not suffice to 
address the management issues arising from complex and constantly changing business 
practices. To increase the usefulness of private actions against managerial wrong-doings 
and intensify the judicial review of business decisions, it is necessary to amend the relevant 
substantive rules, procedural rules, and even rules regarding the burden of proof.    
• Explicitly include breach of duties of loyalty and care as the cause of actions 
At present, only violations of laws, administrative regulations, and the company’s AOA 
are expressly confirmed as the legal grounds for lawsuits against directors.43 This reflects 
that the regulatory approach is mainly based on fixed rules, either in law or in private 
agreement. Moreover, Chinese judges are not supposed to play an active role in 
developing rules in the overall legal system. Therefore, astute practitioners can always 
circumvent the rules with well-conceived schemes, because the ex ante stipulations would 
inevitably contain loopholes, or at least be incomplete and lack clarity. The victims may 
frequently be faced with the problems that no rules govern suspicious conduct, and hence, 
they cannot file or establish claims to seek remedies. 
    To overcome such shortcomings, it is recommended that the causes of action should be 
more inclusive and flexible, by embedding a breach of the duties of loyalty and care in the 
liability provision. In this way, prospective plaintiffs have legitimate cause to bring 
complex complaints, especially those falling in regulatory gaps, to the courts. Of course, 
it would be necessary to articulate the standards and other associated rules for the general 
duties of loyalty and care, or else a lack of predictability would make the liability strategy 
cumbersome for prospective plaintiffs.  
• Clarify the standard for the duty of loyalty 
With regard to the duty of loyalty, the Company Law provides a list of classic breaches 
thereof and a general term without clear definition. Then, there is a lack of legal basis for 
the courts to determine whether a director has fulfilled the duty of loyalty, when 
 
43 See Art. 147 in the Company Law.   
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managerial behaviour does not take a form easily categorized in that list. As shown in the 
analysis of the judicial decisions in Chapter 5, many allegations of the breach of the duty 
of loyalty do not belong to the prohibitive list.44 The courts are forced to employ the 
general principles in the property and torts law to address those allegations.45  
    As for conduct that falls within the enumerated items in the prohibitive list, the courts 
mainly examine whether the required approval has been obtained and the compliance 
with the company’s AOA is maintained.46  They do not address the substance of the 
conduct or transactions, because the legal provision does not provide a substantive 
standard. However, the SGM’s approval and compliance with the company’s AOA do not 
guarantee reasonableness and fairness of the disputed transaction to the company.47 Thus, 
not only is a clear standard for the duty of loyalty necessary, but it should also be used as 
the ultimate test for directors’ conduct in self-dealing transactions.  
    With reference to the definition in the 2013 Guidelines and the US corporate laws,48 the 
standard can be raised as ‘prioritizing the company’s interest’ in the event of a conflict of 
personal interests with the company’s interests. Moreover, directors should be encouraged 
to avoid a conflict of interests by shifting the burden of proof to the plaintiffs. In 
particular, if the deal is submitted to the disinterested decision-makers, the directors only 
need to prove that they have fully disclosed material facts to the disinterested decision-
makers to defend against the claim of breach of the loyalty duty. If the directors did not 
withdraw from decision-making, they have to prove that the deals are entirely fair to the 
company.      
• Make the rules for the approval of self-dealing transactions specific  
Due approval in tandem with compliance with the company’s AOA has been set as the 
precondition for deals involving conflict of interests, including self-dealing transactions, 
engaging in the same business as the company does, utilizing corporate opportunities, and 
so on. However, there are no particular rules for the major aspects of the approval 
procedure.  
 
44 See supra Table 5.5 Plaintiffs’ Claims and Win Rates and the accompanying analysis in Chapter 5.  
45 See supra note 36 in Chapter 5.  
46 See supra note 39 in Chapter 5.  
47 See supra note 60 in Chapter 4. 
48 The 2013 Guidelines refers to the Guidelines of Shanghai Stock Exchange on Appointment and Conduct of 
Directors of Listed Companies issued in 2009 and revised in 2013.  
See supra note 109 in Chapter 2 for the case law of duty of loyalty in the US.  
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    To ensure the independence and reasonableness of the approval resolution, it is 
necessary to impose information disclosure requirements on the interested directors. 
Further, any interested individuals should compulsorily withdraw from voting on the 
proposed deals. Specifically, interested directors should be required to disclose the 
existence of the conflict of interests fully and sufficiently, and how this conflict could 
influence the deal under discussion and negotiation.  
    The burden of proof regarding information disclosure and breach of duty of loyalty in 
self-dealing transactions can be as follows: interested directors must prove that they have 
fulfilled the information disclosure requirement. If they do so successfully, those who 
vote on the deal should be responsible for the approval. Conversely, the approval body 
claims and proves that the interested directors did not meet the disclosure requirement to 
the extent that the approval was mistakenly made. Then the interested directors need 
evidence showing they have fulfilled their duty of loyalty by demonstrating the entire 
fairness of this transaction to the company.   
• Establish the rules for the duty of care   
The currently effective company law only attaches the tag of ‘duty of care’ to the general 
duty provision. The empty term ‘duty of care’ seems to simply endorse and foster a 
trustworthy management culture. This legislation gap partially leads to confusion and 
inconsistency in judicial practices. 
To deter management slack via the liability regime effectively, it is of a great necessity 
to set forth a series of workable and well-balanced rules. They can be for: (1) the standard 
of due care; (2) allocation of the burden of proof between the opposing parties; (3) 
confirmation of the corporate autonomy of limiting the liabilities for breach of duty of 
care; (4) and liability insurance to diversify risk.   
    Apart from the due care standard, another important element is how to limit personal 
monetary liability within a reasonable range. Holding directors liable for all the losses 
arising from their negligent mistakes could bankrupt them, and thus, no individual would 
take up directorial positions. At the other extreme, granting them complete immunity 
from monetary liabilities would eliminate any deterrence to imprudence and negligence. 
Thus, it is also necessary to grant private authority to limit the range of monetary 
liabilities personally assumed and to develop insurance to control legal risks and 
indemnify actual losses.   
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• To clear the procedural hurdles in private litigation 
Law enforcement is critical to the efficacy of the legal rules. If directors are rarely sued or 
held liable for a breach of duties, they would not take their legal duties seriously. As 
reported in Chapter 5, very few actions have been initiated against directors in large 
companies limited by shares (CLS) and no cases involved listed companies or SOEs. To 
stimulate private actions to enforce directors’ liabilities, it is important to clear the hurdles 
in the procedural rules and allocate the cost and risk of litigation among the plaintiffs, 
defendants, and beneficiaries.  
    First, the shareholding threshold for derivative actions in CLSs is too high, and it is 
time consuming and costly to gather the holders of adequate shares to sue. Quite often, 
minority shareholders need to employ derivative actions to protect their interests, whereas 
controlling shareholders simply replace the directors they do not like. A large CLS or a 
listed company usually has numerous minority shareholders who each hold only a tiny 
fraction of the company’s shares. As such, the collective shareholding by only a few 
minority shareholders does not suffice. Thus, lowering the shareholding threshold would 
be favourable for minority shareholders who need to sue and reduce the cost arising from 
collective actions problems. The proper extent to which the shareholding threshold should 
be lowered has to be carefully considered, since frivolous and opportunistic litigation is 
also not desired.       
    Second, procedural rules need to further reduce the litigation costs that shareholder 
plaintiffs have to assume. It is irrational to let the plaintiffs pay the litigation fee, lawyers 
fee, and devote their own time and energy to file a lawsuit that would not benefit 
themselves proportionally, especially in case of a large company. The new Judicial 
Interpretation approves the reimbursement of reasonable litigation expenditures by the 
company to shareholder plaintiffs only when the claims are all or partially upheld.49 With 
this new rule, shareholder plaintiffs may have the chance of bearing almost no litigation 
expenditure. However, it is quite difficult for minority shareholders to predict the win rate, 
as directors have information advantages over them, and they still need to be prepared to 
pay for all the litigation expenditure anyway. Thus, the financial concern remains a 
discouragement to minority shareholders.  
 
49 Judicial Interpretation IV for the Company Law by the SPC in 2017.  
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The following methods are proposed as options to further ease the economic burden of 
shareholder plaintiffs. The filing fee and litigation fee, charged by the courts, might be set 
as a flat fee no matter what amount of monetary liability is claimed. This would be 
especially beneficial to minority shareholders in a large company. Their liability claims 
usually involve large sums of money. A proportion of the amount claimed can be much 
higher than the flat fee.  
With regard to the lawyers’ fee, the contingency fee arrangement is obviously more 
preferential to minority shareholders. Another way is to render the assumption of all the 
litigation cost to the court as a claim in the derivative action. Based on the substance of 
the fact, the court may decide whether the claims are material to the company’s interest 
and decide on the allocation of cost. Yet, this method presents a challenge to the courts.  
    Third, the contingency fee arrangement motivates lawyers to play a pro-active role in 
shareholders derivative actions. It is advisable to officially permit and advocate such an 
arrangement in all the shareholders derivative actions, no matter how many shareholders 
sue and participate in the litigation procedure. A contingency fee per se means almost no 
or very little cost of legal services to shareholder plaintiffs. Moreover, an entrepreneurial 
lawyer can handle the collective action problems that numerous plaintiffs inevitably 
have.50     
(3) To build an independent and competent judicial branch 
An independent and competent judicial branch is integral to the rule of law in general and 
decisive to the effectiveness of directors’ duties and liabilities in particular. From the 
perspective of law and economics, the benefit of the liability strategy is largely dependent 
on the quality of judicial decisions. The legal strategy is more desirable when judicial 
decisions can precisely signal management. Conversely, judicial errors, judicial hindsight, 
lack of competence, and ineffective information discoveries in the courtroom would all 
impair the precision and truthfulness of the judicial decisions. 
To increase the usefulness of the legal strategy, judges need to be able to analyse 
complex commercial issues, properly assess the merit of managerial conduct and 
transactions, and innovatively interpret the meaning and standard of law in various 
 
50 Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey R. Miller, ‘The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative 
Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform’, (1991) 58 The University of Chicago Law 
Review, p. 116.  
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business scenarios. Whenever the disputes involve multiple plaintiffs or large companies 
with government backgrounds, the courts can retain an independent and impartial status to 
address such disputes. For all of these purposes, a series of measures is proposed to 
counteract the impact of judicial deficiency for the present, and institutional reforms are 
called for as well.  
First, it is imperative to grant the judges greater discretionary power and raise the level 
of judicial competence in tandem. Particularly, judges need to develop expertise in 
corporate governance and company law matters. Judicial discretion is a prerequisite for the 
viability of the strategy of directors’ duties and liabilities. Only sticking to the fixed rules is 
not enough to handle the disputes arising from complicated and changeable business 
practices, no matter how well the rules are written in advance. However, directly 
empowering the judges to make law is not realistic in China’s legal system. Thus, an initial 
step for advocating judicial discretion is refining terms that are too general and obscure to 
be applicable. With more lawsuits on directors’ liabilities, it is necessary to expand judicial 
discretion. Besides, the SPC issuing guiding cases and authoritative interpretations may 
promote the exercise of judicial discretion in the judicial system and maintain a relatively 
unified interpretation and application of the law nationwide.  
China’s judicial competence has sufficiently improved over recent years, an important 
goal pursued by judicial reforms. The systems for recruitment, selection, training, and 
promotion of judges are established, standardized, and fully implemented. Today, the 
majority of judges in the intermediary and higher-level courts have a university education 
background and have passed the national judicial examination. Very recently, the quota 
system for judges has been experimented in pilot areas, which means that only a proportion 
of court personnel who have extensive trial experience and professional expertise, can be 
selected as judges.51 Those who are not competent enough would assume the role of trial 
support and administrative functions.  
    Nevertheless, rapid economic growth and structural transition continuously bring about 
complicated disputes entangled with competing concerns. In addition to the institutional 
reforms, the courts can improve the capabilities of judges by means of well-organized 
training and seminars. In these meetings, judges may have considerable discussions on 
 
51 For more information about the quota system for judges, see the White Paper issued by the SPC ‘Judicial 
Reform of Chinese Courts’, available at http://english.court.gov.cn/2016-03/03/content_23724636_10.htm 
(accessed 23/03/2019).  
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recent controversies and share their experiences from judicial practices. Moreover, it 
would be meaningful to keep effective channels, formal and informal, for communications 
with business practitioners, industry experts, academic scholars, and even other 
enforcement agents. In doing so, the experience, knowledge, and skills of the judges can be 
sufficiently strengthened and adapted better to the economic and societal changes.  
    Second, judicial independence is critical to the protection of investors and the 
enforcement of liabilities of those directors in economically and politically powerful 
companies. However, China’s courts are usually under undue interference, which is 
ingrained in the fundamental political system.52 Obtaining judicial independence would be 
an arduous and multi-faceted task.  
    The Party leadership is firmly asserted no matter what measures and efforts are 
undertaken in the judicial reforms. The party committees have significant influence in the 
selection and appointment of judges. The only expectation, for the present, is that the Party 
may adopt proper standards and due procedures to assess the qualification of the 
candidates.   
The local government controls the budget level of the court at the corresponding level, 
and accordingly, may pressure the court in particular cases. As local governments in China 
consider regional economic growth as the top priority on policy agenda, it is no surprise 
that they may instruct courts to refrain from rendering decisions which may adversely 
affect the local economy. Therefore, procedural rules should allow plaintiffs to choose a 
court in other localities than the defendant’s domicile. In this way, the plaintiff’s interests 
would not be prejudiced.   
    In addition to undue party-government interference, the people’s congresses and the 
procuratorates may also intervene in individual cases. For the courts to remain independent, 
it is necessary to clarify the line between supervision and undue intervention. The 
procuracy supervision should be limited to ethical or corruption issues of judges. People’s 
congresses must avoid interfering with the outcome of individual cases and the suitability 
of judicial decisions. 
    Third, China’s courts should have stronger political power to resist interference and gain 
more authority in dealing with complex and sensitive disputes. State revenue, rather than 
local revenue, should fund the courts and the welfare of judges. Jurisdictions across the 
 
52 See supra Section 5.2.3 Explanations for the Enforcement Pattern: judicial deficiency.  
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country can be re-divided in a manner that a local court may have jurisdiction over several 
parts of different administrative areas. Local protectionism can, therefore, be greatly 
undermined. Yet, any measure intended to elevate the role and power of the judicial branch 
in the overall political system might be resisted by the government, legislature, 
procuratorate organs, or other state organs, as it would tilt the previous balance of power 
allocation.    
(4) To reinforce administrative enforcement against and increase the penalties for 
misrepresentations   
The information disclosure system underpins the stock market and ameliorates the agency 
problems between the investors and inside controllers of the listed companies. China’s 
regulatory authorities used to keep a very low level of enforcement intensity, which is 
insufficient to maintain the pricing and disciplining functions or promote the development 
of the stock market.53 In 2016, when the new chairman of the CSRC took office, a wave of 
regulatory and enforcement campaigns have been launched. The number of cases under 
investigation and those already decided increased exponentially in one year, which reflects 
the regulatory agency’s determination to tackle violations of the Securities Law. However, 
it is not clear whether there remains to be an increasing trend of enforcement actions.  
    In the furtherance of the information disclosure system, it is necessary to maintain the 
momentum of vigorous enforcement campaigns, or business practitioners might adopt an 
opportunistic compliance strategy. Namely, companies might fulfil the information 
disclosure requirements when an enforcement campaign targets misrepresentations, but do 
otherwise upon the closure of the campaign. As such, the ups and downs of enforcement 
intensity can also be a disturbing factor to the market order.    
It is necessary to alleviate the under-enforcement and selective enforcement problems to 
level the playing field for all listed companies. The state-owned companies, especially 
those related to the central government, should not be given immunity from administrative 
sanctions. The number of state-owned companies is decreasing; however, the aggregate 
market capitalization of these companies still prevails over others. Thus, it is not possible 
to ignore the detrimental effect arising from selective enforcement. Capital resources 
 
53 Chunxin Jia, Shujun Ding, Yuanshun Li, and Zhengyu Wu, ‘Fraud, Enforcement Action, and the Role of 
Corporate Governance: Evidence from China’, (2009) 90 Journal of Business Ethics, pp. 561-576.  
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would be misled to flow to those listed companies that are actually not as profitable as 
publicly disclosed.  
The regulatory authorities, including the regional offices of the CSRC, need to employ 
more high-tech tools to analyse the disclosed data and information and expedite the 
regulatory responses to suspect cases. In addition to repeated and severe violations of 
information disclosure requirements, the regulatory authorities should also pay attention to 
minor infractions, accounting irregularities, and inadequate reports. Such an enforcement 
approach will send a message that listed companies should not overlook minor issues nor 
risk committing serious violations.  
Besides, an increase in the maximum penalty is strongly called for. The present upper 
limit of the administrative sanctions is disproportionately low. Companies and involved 
directors and officers do not suffer significant monetary liabilities, which greatly limits the 
usefulness of administrative enforcement against misrepresentations.  
Last but not least, the staffing and budget level of the CSRC and its regional offices 
need to be raised to better deal with the increasing caseload and the investigation of 
complex business issues. The staff’s expertise, technological capabilities of the authorities 
and cooperation within and between different divisions and offices are all conducive to 
forceful enforcement actions, and therefore, continuous and all-round efforts should be 
made to improve these aspects and factors.  
6.5 Future Research  
A series of interesting topics related to directors’ duties and liabilities are worth follow-up 
discussions. For instance, whether the duties of loyalty and care should have different 
standards and tests for independent directors, supervisory board members, and senior 
managers, since they perform different functions from what executive directors usually do 
in the operation of a company, but the currently effective rules do not address such 
differentiation. How to distribute monetary liabilities among directors and other involved 
officers is unclear in law. In addition, in different types of transactions, the standard of due 
care can vary greatly and more specific and sophisticated rules are necessary. Legal 
scholars can focus on one type of transactions, such as merger transactions, to discuss a 
proper test to determine the fulfilment of the duties of loyalty and care. Furthermore, how 
to formulate and develop the duty of care in corporate statutes remains a challenging task. 
More general and fundamental questions such as how the statutory rules can grow to 
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accommodate the emerging issues in business practice must trigger a widespread and 
theoretically meaningful debate. 
In addition to private litigation and administrative sanctions, how criminal penalties play 
a role in deterring the misappropriation of a company’s assets and other intentional 
infringement of the rights and interests of companies and shareholders is also an attractive 
question. In particular, China has a tradition of employing criminal penalties as the major 
tool of social control and the criminal law imposes criminal liabilities on directors and 
officers of listed companies to punish asset misappropriation and other types of wrong-
doing. Considering that the investigation and prosecution of a crime is more costly than 
private enforcement and such problems as corruption of enforcement agents, it is necessary 
to investigate the effectiveness and efficiency of criminal liabilities. Besides, the 
comparison between private litigation, administrative sanctions, and criminal penalties in 
combating management wrong-doing can also greatly enrich the understanding of the 
general proposition—law matters to corporate governance, and provides a basis for 
optimizing the overall regulatory approach.  
Future studies can employ the methodology of interviews and questionnaires to obtain 
first-hand information about the black box (board of directors) and reveal how directors 
and officers respond to liability risks and the extent to which the legal rules may influence 
their decision-making and managerial behaviour. Case studies would also be useful in 
illustrating how informal institutions and extra-legal instruments, if any, play a role in 
disciplining directors and officers in listed companies and SOEs where it seems that the 
liability strategy is almost dormant. Moreover, it is not advisable to overlook how cultural 
and traditional factors affect the resolution of disputes pertaining to management wrong-
doing.  
6.6 Final Remarks  
Managerial performance would be best incentivised by the synergy between market 
mechanisms, legal strategies, governance devices, and incentive schemes. Directors’ duties 
and liabilities are like a sword hanging over directors. Whether this sword really falls or is 
only window dressing and whether it is sufficiently sharp to deter managerial wrong-doing 
can considerably influence management practice.  
    The usefulness of the liability strategy depends on multiple factors, including the quality 
of legislation, enforcement intensity, the competence of the judges and regulatory agencies, 
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and even cultural values and traditional reasons. Thus, the enhancement of this legal 
strategy cannot simply boil down to efforts in a single aspect like law-making; and broadly 
speaking, the improvement in corporate governance requires a multi-pronged approach.  
For either task above, it is important to understand that legal scholars, and even 
lawmakers, judges, and regulatory authorities need to step out of their professional zones. 
They should look from different perspectives and other disciplines, into how boards of 
directors are making business decisions and how they react to market trends. With a 
comprehensive understanding of managerial behaviour and commercial practice, 
lawmakers, judges, and regulatory authorities will perform their respective functions in a 
more pragmatic and suitable manner. The legal strategy can be better designed and more 
effectively enforced to deter managerial wrong-doing. Eventually, this will facilitate 


























Appendix A: Judicial Decisions Involving Breach of Directors’ Duties 
 
No Parties Court  Claims of 
Plaintiff(s) 
1.  Anhui Jintun property 
development company v. Yao 
Jixin, Hu Yueming and Anhui 
gold lion mining company 
Anhui Province Suzhou City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2013) no. 00071  
Failure to obtain the 
bank loan for the 
company due to the 
breach of duties of 
loyalty and care  
2.  Zhou Zenan v. Shenzhen city 
taiyang decoration engineering 
company  
Guangdong Province Shenzhen 
City Intermediary People’s Court 
(2013) no. 2046 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund  
3.  Guangzhou Bester software 
company v. Luo Yanhui 
Guangdong Province Guangzhou 
City Tianhe District People’s 
Court (2013) no. 960 
Violation of the 
company’s internal 
financial rules with 
fabricated invoices  
4.  Li Tong v. Liu Zhenhai  Tianjin City First Intermediary 
People’s Court (2013) no. 111 
Entering into a 
contract that 
assigned corporate 
revenue to a third 
party   
5.  Tianjin Jingtian trade company v. 
Ren Xinqiang  
Tianjin City First Intermediary 
People’s Court (2012) no. 612 
Arbitrary transfer of 
the company’s asset 
at low price  
6.  Longhui company v. Shu Hunan Province Chenxi County 
People’s Court (2013) no. 51 
Providing guarantee 
for personal debt 
with the company’s 
asset  
7.  Xindaoxin amusement park 
design and consultancy 
(Shanghai) company v. Wang Li 
and Zhuhai decoration project 
company 
Shanghai City Jing’an District 
People’s Court (2013) no. 510 
Misappropriation of 




8.  Wang Kai v. Liu Peirong  Beijing City Xicheng District 




Beijing City Second Intermediary 
People’s Court (2014) no. 03218 
9.  Ningbo Peihe farming machinery 
company v. Wu Xinxing and Shi 
Jianming 
Zhejing Province Ningbo City 
Jiangdong District People’s Court 
(2012) no. 2187-1 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund by 
receiving payment to 
the company via 
personal account  
10.  Wang Xudong v. Sichuan 
Luzhou bridge and road company 
Sichuan Province Luzhou City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2012) no. 687 
Making payment on 
behalf of the 
company to the party 
that has not been 
duly authorized in 
the transaction  
11.  Liu Gangliang v. Ren Yonghu Shanxi Province Shenmu County 
People’s Court (2013) no. 02231 
Mismanagement 








12.  Henan Yaohuachun wine 
company v. Luo Erren  
Henan Province Xuchang City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2013) no. 218 
Failure to properly 
keep original 
receipts and the 
account record, 
causing the 
receivables not paid  
13.  Zhuang Wulong v. Chen 
Donghang 
Hainan Province Higher People’s 
Court (2013) no. 4 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund  
 
14.  A company v. Wu B and Huang 
C 
Shanghai City First Intermediary 
People’s Court (2013) no. 737 
Usurping customer 
resource  
15.  Chen Jia v. Huang Xiaogang  Zhejiang Province Shaoxing City 
Keqiao District People’s Court 
(2013) no. 278 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund   
16.  Yang v. Qian Shanghai City Yangpu District 
People’s Court (2013) no. 407  
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund by 
means of personal 
account   Shanghai City Second 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2013) no. 890  
17.  Shenzhen Zhontailai investment 
companies v. Ma Huilai and Ma 
Ningshen 
Guangdong Province Higher 
People’s Court (2013) no. 28 
Providing loans in 
violation of 
regulations  
18.  Chen v. Xu and Yu Sichuang Province Puzhou City 
People’s Court (2013) no. 668 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund  
19.  Yu Fengbing v. Shenzhen 
Simaidi technology development 
company  
Guangdong Province Shenzhen 
City Intermediary People’s Court 
(2013) no. 385 
Opening up a 
personal account to 
save corporate fund 
20.  Shanghai A company v. Ma, Xu, 
Qian and Shanghai B company 
Shanghai City Minxing District 
People’s Court (2013) no. 21 
Engaging in the 
same business as the 
company runs  
21.  Li, Gu v. Shanghai Kailing metal 
product company 
Shanghai City Second 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2012) no. 1205 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund  
22.  Tong Wen, Mo Haijun v. Hu 
Haibo and Li Hong  
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous 
Region Guilin City Intermediary 
People’s Court (2013) no. 183 
Causing losses to 
shareholders  
23.  Xinyang shengda trading 
company v. Zhao Xinjian  
Henan Province Xinyang City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2012) no. 69 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund and 
purchase of non-
performing debts 
24.  Xiamen Zhangyitong industrial 
trading company v. Wang 
Baiyuan and Dai Zhiqiang  
Fujian Province Xiamen City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2013) no. 516 
Breach of the duties 
of loyalty and care  
25.  Ningbo Jinhe magnet company v. 
Zhang Weize  
Zhejiang Province Ningbo City 
Yinzhou District People’s Court 
(2013) no. 68 
Selling the products 
in storage at low 
price and breach of 
the duty of care  
26.  Zhang Lai v. Lin Fengjiao and 
Zhejiang Tai’an security 
technology company 
Zhejiang Province Hangzhou 
City Intermediary People’s Court 
(2013) no. 554 
Engaging in the 
same business as the 
company runs 
27.  Li Guohua and Cao Yong v. 
Shenzhen Yongchaotai industrial 
company and Shenzhen Shanwei 
marketing company  
Guangdong Province Higher 
People’s Court (2013) no. 209 
Making investment 
in another firm 






28.  Zhongwang company v. Chi fei 
and Xu Xiqing  
Shandong Province Zibo City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2014) no. 2 
Returning corporate 
seals, licence and 
documents 
29.  Qin Zhidong and Hou Xuefeng v. 
Xu Xianguo and Xu Xianjun 
Neimenggu Autonomous Region 
Huhehot City Intermediary 
People’s Court (2014) no. 1127 
Failure to obtain 
government approval 
for the project, 




30.  Beijing Faboyang international 
technology development 
company v. Chen Xilian 
Beijing City First Intermediary 
People’s Court (2013) no. 13957 
Engaging in the 
same business as the 
company runs  
31.  Ma Lijuan v. Sun Jianqiang  Zhejiang Province Changxing 
County People’s Court (2014) no. 
647 
Providing guarantee 
without due approval 
of shareholders 
meeting  
32.  Sichuan Huineng nonferrous 
metal company v. Li Shiquan   
Sichuan Province Higher 
People’s Court (2014) no. 667 
Arbitrary disposal of 
corporate assets 
33.  Zhang Yichao, Yuan Che v. 
Huang Xiuran and Bai Jingyu 
Chongqing City the Fifth 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2014) no. 05636 
Violation of tax 
laws, causing the 
company sanctioned.  
34.  Zhu Jiongming v. Pan Peicong, 
Pan Peifang, Tingyu group 
company and Shanghai Daoyu 
Logistic Company 
Shanghai City Pudong New 
District People’s Court (2014) 
no. 3602 
Self-dealing 
transaction for the 
transfer of equity 
interest Shanghai City First Intermediary 
People’s Court (2015) no. 565 
35.  Deng Huifang v. Wang Kai and 
Shenzhen Boerte Investment 
Company 
Guangdong Province Shenzhen 
City Intermediary People’s Court 
(2014) no. 2528 
Breach of the duties 
of loyalty and care 
36.  Wei Yueping v. Li Jingsheng Beijing City First Intermediary 
People’s Court (2014) no. 2528 
Failure to pay the 
debt to the company  
37.  Wang Qiang v. Tan lv, Ren 
Jicheng, Fang Zhou  
Hunan Province Changsha City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2014) no. 04169 
Engaging in the 
same business as the 
company runs  
38.  Ningbo gangzhonglv 
international logistic company v. 
Hong Bin 
Shanghai City Pudong District 
People’s Court (2013) no. 3820 
Transferring the 
company’s business 
in related party 
transaction at 
extremely low price  
Shang City First Intermediary 
People’s Court (2015) no. 107 
39.  Loudi auction company v. Yanga 
Yani 
Hunan Province Loudi City 
Louxing District People’s Court 
(2012) no. 889 
Engaging in the 
same business as the 
company runs  
40.  Zhengmin v. Guangzhou 
Xiangfengsheng trading 
company and Chen Shaohui  
Guangdong Province Guangzhou 
City Intermediary People’s Court 
(2014) no. 430  
Breach of the duty of 
care  
41.  Hangzhou Ruili real estate 
company v. Hangzhou Xinsheng 
real estate development company 
and Ye Chaosheng  
Zhejiang Province Hangzhou 
City Bijiang District People’s 
Court (2014) no. 640  
Causing losses to the 




personnel with the 
related company  
 
Zhejiang Province Hangzhou 
City Intermediary People’s Court 






42.  Hangzhou Baikang medical 
technology v. Zhang Yijun 
Zhejiang Province Suzhou City 
Xihu District People’s Court 
(2014) no. 485 
Holding back the 
seals of the company 
after being dismissed  
43.  Tian Guisheng, Wei Chi and 
Zhou Tianrun v. Diao Jian  
Sichuan Province Jianyang City 
People’s Court (2014) no. 1190  
Payment of the 
company’s debt with 
company’s facilities 
without due approval  
44.  Shanghai Ruolai internet 
technology company v. Shanghai 
Chengguan internet technology 
company and Yang Minjie 
Shanghai City Changniu District 





45.  Anqiu Wenrui Filtering 
Machinery Company v. Wang 
Xinjian and Sun Zehai  
Shandong Province Anqiu City 
People’s Court (2014) no. 132 
Tax frauds, causing 
the company 
sanctioned.   
46.  Hou Yuquan v. Zhang Ximing 
and the liquidation team of 
Panshi Material Company  
Jilin Province Panshi City 




47.  Jiangsu Jinshida biotechnology 
company v. Lou Xiaoying 
Jiangsu Province Nanjing City 
Qixia District People’s Court 
(2014) no. 235 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund  
48.  Shanghai Bohua gene chip 
technology company v. Mao 
Yumin, Louyi, Shanghai Bohu 
investment consultancy company 
  
Shanghai City Pudong New 
District People’s Court (2013) 
no. S3191 
Transferring the 
company’s asset via 
related party 
transaction, causing 
losses to the 
company   
49.  Changzhou Sanli equipment and 
engineering of environment 
protection company v. Zou Yan 
and Dai Xiaoping  
Jiangsu Province Higher People’s 
Court (2012) no. 0050  
Self-dealing 
transactions and 
engaging in the same 
business as the 
company runs 
50.  Sanming Huaneng hydraulic 
pump valve company v. Yan 
Qunli 
Fujian Province Sha County 
People’s Court (2014) no. 1317  
Mismanagement 
causing product 
defect and return of 
the products.  
51.  Li Ming v. Ling Hongyue, Ling 
Jiyue, Zhuhai Maiteer metal 
surface processing technology 
company 
Guangdong Province Zhuhai City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2014) no. 209 
Making use of 
related party 
transaction to 
conceal the payment 
to family members  
52.  Beijing Lianhe light technology 
company v. Lv Min  
Beijing City Second Intermediary 
People’s Court (2014) no. 07002  
Occupying the 
company’s facilities  
53.  Wang Min v. Gu Nianhua and 
Guweiqi company  
Jiangsu Province Wuxi City 
Chong’an District People’s Court 
(2013) no. 1550  
Holding the 
company’s licence 
and occupying the 
company’s property  
54.  Siyang Xiantahui textile 
company v. Yu Jianfen  
Jiangsu Province Suqian City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2013) no. 0140  
Breach of the duty of 
care  
55.  Chen Gangqiang v. Li Jianhua Beijing City First Intermediary 
People’s Court (2014) no. 04526 
Tunnelling the 
company’s profit to 
personal account and 






56.  Li Bin v. Sun Jianguo and 
Suzhou Weisiman biological 
medicine company  
Tianjin City Higher People’s 





57.  Zhong Zhifeng v. Zhang Yangzhi  Hubei Province Xiaogan City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2013) no. 0044 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund  
58.  Changchun assembly company v. 
Zhang Qing  
Jilin Province NongAn County 
People’s Court (2014) no. 2 
Causing losses to the 
company  
59.  Shanghai Shizhen information 
technology company v. Li 
Wangdong, Hu Juan, and 
Shanghai Haochen information 
technology company  
Shanghai City Minhang District 




engaging in the same 
business as the 
company does, and 
arbitrarily 
transferring the 
company’s inventory  
60.  Zhangye Bowen human resource 
development company v. Liu 
Chuanwen  
Gansu Province Zhangye City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2014) no. 226  
Engaging in the 
same business as the 
company runs  
61.  Guangdong Zhongxing hydraulic 
power company v. Li Yanfang  
Guangdong Province Guangzhou 
City Intermediary People’s Court 
(2014) no. 270 
Engaging in the 
same business as the 




62.  Lv Zhengfan v. Bao Guowu, 
Chen Haoran, and Zhuhai city 
Haoda trading company 
Guangdong Province Higher 
People’s Court (2013) no. 68 
Transfer of the 
company’s shares at 
low price  
63.  Pinghu machinery company v. 
Wen Yu  
Shanghai City Second 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2014) no. 103 
Misappropriation of 
the company’s fund  
64.  Yang Guizhi v. Gao Gengren Hebei Province Shijiazhuang 
City Intermediary People’s Court 
(2014) no. 00107 
Misappropriation of 
the company’s fund 
and failure to go 




Hebei Province Shijiazhuang 
City Intermediary People’s Court 
(2015) no. 00174 
65.  Lin Honghai v. Yao Huixian  Shanghai City Second 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2013) no. 1302 
Transfer of the 
company’s asset at 
low price and 
misappropriation of 
the payment  
66.  Haian Wanhe company v. Guo 
Wenshan  
Jiangsu Province Higher People’s 
Court (2013) no. 0895 
Purchase of 
automobiles at high 
price 
67.  Jiangsu Yashen logistic company 
v. Kong Dejun and Wang 
Yanrong  
Jiangsu Province Suzhou City 
Wujiang District People’s Court 
(2013) no. 0895 
Purchasing 
transportation 
vehicles at high price  
68.  Shanghai Tianen insulating 
material company v. Zhang 
Xianming  
Shanghai City Second 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2013) no. 1414  
Engaging in the 
same business as the 






69.  Ji Guoqiang v. Chen Baoliang  Shanghai City First Intermediary 
People’s Court (2014) no. 818  
Causing losses to 
shareholders’ 
interests  
70.  Chen Zhixiong v. Chen Zhiwen  Jiangxi Province Higher People’s 
Court (2014) no. 13 
Improperly dealing 




payment of rent to 
the company  
Jiangxi Province Higher People’s 
Court (2014) no. 80 
71.  Li Wanfu and Li Fuzhen v. Zhu 
Guohua and Zhu Zhiping 
Inner Mongolia Autonomous 
Region Hulun Buir Cith 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2014) no. 5  
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund  
72.  Zhongwang company v. Chen 
Xukui  
Shandong Province Higher 
People’s Court (2014) no. 244 
Holding back the 
company’s licence, 
seals, and account 
books without due 
capacity  
73.  Zhigao exploration group 
company v. Tang Jinrong and 
Jianou food company  
Fujian Province Nanping City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2013) no. 128 
Holding back the 
company’s licence, 
seals, and account 
books without due 
capacity  
74.  Gaohong overseas company v. 
Xu Feng and Zhao Min  
Fujian Province Sanming City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2013) no. 167 
Holding back the 
company’s licence, 
seals, and account 
books 
75.  Jiangsu Sunan special equipment 
group company v. Zhao Haihua  
Jiangsu Province Suzhou City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2014) no. 0164 
Failure to ensure the 
company to perform 
the contract, causing 
losses to the 
company 
76.  Zhejiang Sanshi group company 
v. Fang Hao  
Anhui Province Suzhou City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2013) no. 00094 
Breach of the duty of 
loyalty and care  
77.  Shen Ping v. Chen Zhangwei  Zhejiang Province Jiaxing City 
Nanhu District People’s Court 
(2014) no. 453 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund  
78.  Lu Guohua and Bao Yimin v. Gu 
Jun and Ai Xi  
Chongqing City Higher People’s 
Court (2015) no. 02809 
Payment of personal 
expenses from the 
company’s fund  
Chongqing City Higher People’s 
Court (2015) no. 00166 
79.  GuoZhigang v. Fang Xinhui  Ningxia Autonomous Region 
Longde County People’s Court 
(2015) no. 89 
Entering into a 
cooperation contract 
in violation of the 
articles of 
association 
80.  Tengzhou Zhengyu real estate 
development company v. Gong 
Youmen  
Shandong Province Higher 
People’s Court (2015) no. 96  
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund  
81.  Qingtao Harmoni international 
trading agency company v. Li 
Mingshan and An Shanji  
Shandong Province Qingdao City 
Laoshan District People’s Court 
(2014) no. 506 
Misappropriation of 





82.  Huang Zhongqing v. Qu Jinglu Beijing City Dongcheng District 
People’s Court (2014) no. 09581 
Engaging in the 
same business as the 
company runs  
83.  Guangdong Nanxiu E-commerce 
trading company v. Feng Qiruo 
and Shenzhen Yuanzheng culture 
development company  
Guangodng Province Guangzhou 
City Tianhe District People’s 
Court (2012) no. 4393 
Usurpation of 
exclusionary right of 
publishing a 
magazine   
84.  Ma Lijuan v. Sun Jianqiang  Zhejiang Province Huzhou City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2015) no. 125  
Providing guarantee 
to a third party 
without due approval 
of shareholders 
meeting  
85.  Shenyang Yaoshun property 
management company v. Wang 
Yali  
Liaoning Province Shenyang City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2015) no. 00410  
Forming another 
company to engage 
in the same business 
as the company runs 
and usurpation of 
corporate 
opportunities  
86.  Nanjing Hebote laundry 
company v. Liang Wen  
Jiangsu Province Nanjing City 
Intermediary People’s Court 





financial system  
 
87.  Xu Chuande v. Wang Qisheng 
and Qingyang county culture 
development company  
Anhui Province Chizhou City 
Guichi District People’s Court 
(2015) no. 00072 
Engaging in the 
same business as the 
company runs  
 
88.  Jiaozuo municipal construction 
group company v. Li Suting  
Henan Province Jiaozuo 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2015) no. 00050  
Making loans to a 
third party, causing 
losses to the 
company  
89.  Shanghai Wencheng energy 
management company v. Yu 
Chaolong  
Shanghai City Chongming 
District People’s Court (2014) 
no. 255  
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund  
90.  Liu Wenjie v. Cai Yonghua  Jiangsu Province Nantong City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2014) no. 0423 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund  
91.  Zhongshan Changhzou group 
company v. Huang Zhihong, 
Huang Peihai and Huang 
Rongcan  
Guangdong Province Zhongshan 
City First People’s Court (2014) 
no. 2260 
Reduction of the 
borrower’s payment 
and interest  
92.  Xu Gan, Wang Wenjin, Zhao 
Yuefeng and Yang Yijie v. Sun 
Huazhong  
Hunan Province Zhuzhou City 
Lusong District People’s Court 
(2014) no. 224 
Breach of the duty of 
loyalty  
93.  Xiangguo International electric 
technology company v. Robert 
Walter Roche 
Shanghai City Qingpu District 
People’s Court (2014) S1636 
Recruiting counsel 
without due approval  
94.  Ninde Longwei real estate 
development company v. Ruan 
Chongliu  
Fujian Province Ningde City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2015) no. 1246 
Holding back the 
company’s licence 
and seals without 







95.  Baosheng group company v. 
Luigi Migliorini  
Jiangsu Province Higher People’s 
Court (2015) no. 00016  




96.  Beijing Jinglu technology 
development company v. Wei 
Yueping  
Beijing City Haidian District 
People’s Court (2015) no. 05812 
Holding back the 
company’s seals and 
licence without due 
capacity  
97.  Tang Xiangsheng, Yang Daping, 
Zuo Fuhe, Gao Min, Li Guihua v. 
Peng Jisheng  
Chongqing City Fifth People’s 
Court (2015) no. 02809 





98.  Jinan Dongfang company v. Li 
Jiabin and Jinan Dongfang 
Weitai machinery company  
Shandong Province Higher 
People’s Court (2015) no. 532 
Engaging in the 
same business as the 
company runs  Shandong Province Jinan City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2015) no. 38 
99.  Li Jianjun v. Xia Min  Beijing City Daxing District 
People’s Court (2014) no. 13220  
Holding back the 
company’s licence 
and seals after being 
dismissed  
100.  Shanghai Changrun real estate 
company v. Liang Chengjia  
Shanghai City Minhang District 
People’s Court (2014) no. 934 
Making payment in 
violation of the 
company’s finance 
workflow, causing 
losses to the 
company  
Shanghai City Minhang District 
People’s Court (2014) no. 948 
101.  Ruian Hailan trading company v. 
Gao Wenxiang, Ruan Min 
Zhejiang Province Ruian City 
People’s Court (2015) no. 319  
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund  
 
102.  Shen Chunhai v. Liu Zhen Beijing City First Intermediary 
People’s Court (2015) no. 7729 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund  
 
103.  Fu Weiyong v. Hu Xiaojian Jiangxi Province Xiyu 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2015) no. 126  
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund 
104.  Liu Fang v. Lu Shengping, Wang 
Guangjun and Shenyang 
Zhongtian automobile cast part 
company  
Liaoning Province Shenyang City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2015) no. 01467 
Arbitrarily rendering 
the company’s office 
to a third party for 
business operation  
105.  Defan construction consultancy 
company v. Zhang Qiao and 
Zhou Shimiao  
Shanghai City Huangpu District 
People’s Court (2014) no. 980 
Engaging in the 
same business as the 




106.  Wang Weihua v. Hu 
Guangsheng, Lu Ping, Lu Lisha 
and Shenzhen Juhe composite 
material company  
Guangdong Province Shenzhen 
City Nanshan District People’s 
Court (2014) no. 437  
Engaging in the 
same business as the 
company runs and 
arbitrarily 
transferring the IP 






107.  Beijing Beiderui bio-technology 
company v. Lv Shen  
Beijing Second Intermediary 
People’s Court (2015) no. 12246 
Holding back the 
company’s licence 
and seals without 
due capacity 
108.  Wang Lu v. Zhao Jianzhong  Beijing City Xicheng District 
People’s Court (2015) no. 00631 
Breach of the duty of 
care and arbitrarily 
submitting the 
government 
approval, causing the 
company suspended   
109.  Zeng Wensheng v. Luo Gengxin  Guangdong Province Shenzhen 
City Intermediary People’s Court 
(2015) no. 531 
Misappropriation of 
the corporate fund 
and arbitrarily 
paying more 
construction fee than 
the due amount  
110.  Yunan Ruilijiang trading 
company v. Sun Peng  
Yunan Province Kunming City 
Wuhua District People’s Court 
(2015) no. 1143  
Entering a contract 
at unreasonably low 
price, causing losses 
to the company  
111.  Hubei Enshi logistic and trading 
company v. Zhang Jie and Du 
Rongzhong  
Hubei Province Enshi Tujia and 
Miao Autonomous Prefecture 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2015) no. 00457 
Arbitrarily lowering 
the quality of 
products in the 
contract, causing 
losses to the 
company  
112.  Shenyang Fuyun Carriage 
company v. Tong Yu, Hu 
Zhiyuan  
Liaoning Province Shenyang City 
Heping District People’s Court 
(2014) no. 00016  
Self-dealing 
transaction  
113.  Shenyang Yuanwang technology 
company v. Feng Shuying  
Liaoning Province Shenyang City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2015) no. 886 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund  
114.  Puyang international trading 
company v. Zhang Guohui  
Henan Province Higher People’s 
Court (2015) no. 01077 
Engaging in the 
same business as the 
company runs  
115.  Zhou Jielin v. Liu Zhibiao  Hunan Province Hengdong 




116.  Kuang Wensheng, Liang Wenge, 
Zhang Chifen v. Huang Mingjie, 
Zhang Zhaofeng  
Guangdong Province Guangzhou 
City Intermediary People’s Court 
(2015) no. 886 
Tax frauds under the 
cover of perks and 
other compensation, 
causing the company 
sanctioned by the tax 
authority  
117.  Shanghai ** entertainment 
company v. Tang ** 
Shanghai City Baoshan District 
People’s Court (2014) no. 1629  
Breach of the duties 
of loyalty and care  
118.  Chengdu Hengfeng packaging 
company v. Zhou Jiuning and Lv 
Ziqing  
Sichuan Province Chengdu City 
Longquanyi District People’s 
Court (2015) no. 2216  
Improper dealing 
with the dispute 
against the company 
  
119.  Situ Zhi v. Huang Suling, 
Shenzhen Runtong magnesium 
materials company  
Guangdong Province Shenzhen 
City Intermediary People’s Court 
(2014) no. 1733 
Engaging in the 
same business as the 







120.  Ningbo Kaiyuan company v. 
Kong Weiliang and Ningbo 
Kaiyuan real estate company  
Zhejiang Province Ningbo City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2014) no. 4 
Inflation of the 





121.  Xiamen Haiyang southern plastic 
container company v. Deng 
Huifang, Wang Kai, and 
Shenzhen Boteer investment 
company 
Guangdong Province Shenzhen 
City Nanshan District People’s 
Court (2014) no. 598 
Engaging in the 
same business as the 




122.  Liang An v. Cai Shuzhong and 
Yu Jiehua  
Shanghai City Second 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2015) no. 576 
Breach of the duties 
of loyalty and care 
and engaging in the 
same business as the 
company runs  
123.  Cai Yuxiang v. Wang Jinfeng  Shanghai City Songjing District 
of People’s Court (2015) no. 702 
Collusion with 
another company to 




124.  Li Jian v. Hao Guidong and 
Tonghua mining group company  
Jilin Province Higher People’s 
Court (2015) no. 22 
Selling fine coal at 
low price 
125.  Beifang technology (Asia) 
company v. Meng Tao  
Tianjin City Higher People’s 
Court (2016) no. 274  
Breach of the duties 
of loyalty and care 
126.  Chengdu online trading company 
v. Yang Feixiang  
Sichuan Province Chengdu City 
High-tech Industry Development 




127.  Weifu (Hangzhou) precision 
machinery company v. Ma 
Guosheng and Hangzhou Weifu 
smart technology company  
Zhejiang Province Hangzhou 
City Intermediary People’s Court 
(2016) no. 5972  




of corporate fund 
128.  Xiangyang Xunda transportation 
company v. Zhang Jun and Yu 
Xiaobo  
Hubei Province Xiangyang City 
Xiangyang District People’s 
Court (2016) no. 1583 
Starting a new firm 
to engage in the 
same business as the 
company runs Hubei Province Xiangyang City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2017) no. 469 
129.  Guangzhou Daimengfei 
cosmetics company v. Chen Yan 
Guangdong Province Guangzhou 
City Intermediary People’s Court 
(2016) no. 6787 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund and 
breach of the duty of 
care   
130.  Hangzhou leilong internet 
technology company v. Guo Jian 
Zhejiang Province Hangzhou 
City Binjiang District People’s 
Court (2016) no. 2061 
Breach of duty of 
care, infringing upon 
other’s IP right 
131.  Jiuzhou securities companies 
limited by shares v. He Nian  
Supreme People’s Court (2016) 
no. 265 
Misappropriation of 
clients’ fund in 
violation of the 






132.  Nanjing nanhua information 
technology company v. Xin 
Yingmei and Wang Xiaogang  
Jiangsu Province Higher People’s 
Court (2015) no. 00680 
Engaging in the 
same business as the 
company runs  
133.  Huang Xunzhang v. Wen Anmin  Beijing City Chaoyang District 
People’s Court (2013) no. 35146 
Giving the page of 
newspaper taken by 
the company for 
advertisement to a 
third party for free  
134.  Li Ming v. Ling Hongyue, Ling 
Jiyue  
Guangdong Province Zhuhai City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2016) no. 615 
Paying for a third 
party’s pension and 
insurance  
135.  Qi Hualin v. Li Fei Shanxi Province Hanzhong City 
Intermediary People’s Court 




136.  Shenzhen Dadi property 
management company v. Xie 
Yuntian  
Guangdong Province Shenzhen 
City Intermediary People’s Court 
(2016) no. 2755 
Offering the 
company’s real state 
for sale at low price  
137.  Shijiazhuang Mancang medical 
equipment company v. Ma 
Zhiqiang, Feng Junxian  
Shijiazhuang City Luquan 
District People’s Court (2016) 
no. 15  
Buying and selling 
counterfeit drugs, 
causing the company 
punished  
138.  Baoji Huifeng construction 
company v. Liu Jinhu, Liu 
Liqiang, Li Xinya  
Shaanxi Province Baoji City 
Weibin District People’s Court 
(2016) no. 1098 
Breach of the duties 
of loyalty and care  
139.  Li Jianjun v. Xia Min  Beijing Second Intermediary 
People’s Court (2016) no. 2831 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund  
140.  Beijing Xinlei real estate 
management company v. Zhang 
Guiqi 
Beijing City Haidian District 
People’s Court (2015) no. 10893 
Resigning without 
due procedure  
141.  Zhang Yonglin, Zhang Chaofen 
v. Shi Changquan, Li Huaquan, 
Chen Yunwang  
Chongqing City Yubei District 




engaging in the same 
business as the 
company runs 
142.  Shanghai international tourism 
company v. Ni Jiali 
Shanghai City Jingan District 




engaging in the same 
business as the 
company runs 
 
143.  Dalian Zhongjia trading company 
v. Fan Heli  
Liaoning Province Dalian City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2016) no. 1455 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund for 
purchase of personal 
real property  
 
144.  Foshan City Bihui high purity 
coating company v. Lan 
Hongming  
Guangdong Province Foshan City 
Nanhai District People’s Court 
(2016) no. 3911 
Purchase of facilities 











145.  Du Jiake, Luo Sheng v. 
Huizhong and Xi’an Guangmao 
property management company  
Shaanxi Province Higher 
People’s Court (2016) no. 270 
Failure to obtain all 
the government 
approval for the 
project, causing 
delayed performance 
and more payment  
146.  Huai An Henglong real estate 
development company v. Wang 
Shuilin and Huai An property 
management company  
Jiangsu Province Huai An 
Economic and Technology 
Development District People’s 
Court (2015) no. 247  
Starting a new 
company with a third 
party and usurpation 
of corporate 
opportunities  
147.  Zhong Bo v. Zhong Shouwen 
and Kashgar Huaxin investment 
company  
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous 
Region Kashgar Prefecture 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2016) no. 385 
Making payment of 
land transfer   ultra 
vires  
148.  Wang Zhiyao v. Chen Chao, 
Dengjia  
ZhejiangProvince Ningbo City 
Jiangdong District People’s Court 
(2015) no. 2921 
Breach of duties of 
loyalty and care 
149.  Liu Jianhao v. Liu Jianwei  Shanghai City Jinshan District 




from the company’s 
clients  
150.  Haili welfware group company v. 
Fang Weiwen  
Shandong Province Tai’an City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2014) no. 2 
Abuse of power to 
settle the dispute  
151.  Wu Xiaoping v. Li Ziqiang, Liu 
Yuemei  
Guangdong Province Zhongshan 
City First Intermediary People’s 
Court (2015) no. 3297 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund  
152.  Zanpeila amusement equipment 
(Suzhou) company v. Fei Renzu 
Jiangsu Province Suzhou City 
Huqiu District People’s Court 
(2015) no. 00003 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund 
153.  Hangzhou sea food company v. 
Wen Xianming  
Zhejiang Province Hangzhou 
City Gongshu District People’s 
Court (2014) no. 1132 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund 
154.  Xiao Tinghua v. Zhang Nengtian  Hubei Province Wuhan City 
Donghu New Technology 
Development District People’s 
Court (2015) no. 00891 
Breach of the duty of 
loyalty and paying 
the workers in 
violation of internal 
rules  
155.  Zhai Yuqi v. Ma Jinlong  Hebei Province Tangshan City 
Fengtan District People’s Court 
(2015) no. 2 
Related party 
transaction  
156.  Zhang Chenwei, Shen Shiguan, 
Shen Weizhong v. Wang 
Xiaobing  
Shanghai City Jinshan District 




personal account  
157.  Shanghai Huace materials 
technology company v. Shen Li 
and Li Ruifeng  
Shanghai City Minhang District 




158.  Chen Jing v. Jin Wuguang and 
Dai Cangjie  
Zhejiang Province Yongjia 
County People’s Court (2015) no. 
628 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund and 






159.  Zhongxin Guoan electricity 
power company v. Qi Lu 
Liaoning Province Shenyang City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2015) no. 1550 
Arbitrarily moving 
facilities to the 
subsidiary company  
160.  Guangzhou Huayi International 
auction company v. Gu Shu’an  
Guangdong Province Guangzhou 
City Intermediary People’s Court 
(2015) no. 1229  
Knowingly 
accepting the fake 
product for auction  
161.  Jiang Xiaofeng v. Mao Ziming  Guangxi Autonomous Region 
Hezhou City Intermediary 
People’s Court (2016) no. 1040 
Privately entering 
contract with a third 
party to rent the 
company’s building  
162.  Xu Junjie, Wu Yun v. Fang Peng, 
Xu Jianyi 
Zhejiang Province Hangzhou 
City Intermediary People’s Court 
(2016) no. 1427  
Settling the dispute 
with the employee 
with unreasonable 
compensation  
163.  Wang Qingsheng v. Wang 
Fengcheng  
Shandong Province Weihai City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2016) no. 690  
Mismanagement 
leading to the 
company insolvent 
and misappropriation 
of corporate fund 
164.  Sichuan Yinshan photoelectricity 
technology company v. Zhou 
Yong 
Sichan Province Chengdu City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2016) no. 1 
Holding back the 
company’s seals and 
accounting books  
165.  Jiangsu Shuntian international 
group company v. Wang Junmin 
Jiangsu Province Nanjing City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2016) no. 574 
Economic crimes 
and embezzlement, 
causing losses to the 
company  
166.  Liu Yang v. Su Qihao  Chongqing City First 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2017) no. 4831 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund 
(return of loans and 
retainer fee) 
167.  Suzhou media and advertismenet 
company v. Chang Junjun 
Jiangsu Province Suzhou City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2016) no. 8629  
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund  
168.  Shanghai Jilong automation 
technology company v. Wang 
Qingsheng  
Shanxi Province Taiyuan City 
Xiahualing District People’s 
Court (2017) no. 3227 
Engaging in the 
same business as the 
company runs  
169.  Rizhao Xinmei real estate 
development company v. Zhang 
Songlin 
Shandong Province Rizhao City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2017) no. 2074 
Defrauding in 
obtaing loans in 
violation of laws  
170.  Lejiao information technology 
company v. Sun Dawei and Li 
Meng  
Jiangsu Province Suzhou City 
Xiancheng District People’s 
Court (2016) no. 5286 
Starting a new firm 
which engages in the 
same business  
171.  Beijing Shenzhou information 
technology company v. Yang 
Lichun and Lu Rongjie  
Beijing City First Intermediary 
People’s Court (2017) no. 9059 
Transfer of the 
company’s IP right 
for free to another 
firm 
172.  Chengdu Yuju technology 
company v. Zhu Wenqi and 
Chengdu Binde technology 
company  
Sichuan Province Dujiangyan 
City People’s Court (2016) no. 
371 
Take a similar 
position in another 
firm which engages 
in the same business 
as the company runs  
173.  Wuwei village investment 
company v. Wu Daosen  
Gansu Province Wuwei City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2017) no. 981 
Renting warehouse 






174.  Shanghai Qingma publishing 
company v. Rao Xueman, Gu 
Aishan  
Beijing City Dongcheng District 
People’s Court (2015) no. 11571 
Engaging in the 
same business as the 
company runs 
175.  Qinghai Jinsanjiao flour 
company v. Liu Lifeng and Bai 
Mingjie  
Qianghai Province Xining City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2017) no. 146 
Self-dealing 
transaction  
176.  Hangzhou Daqi kids’ clothing 
company v. Xu Wei  
Zhejiang Province Hangzhou 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2017) no. 4793 
Engaging in the 
same business as the 
company does  
Zhejiang Province Hangzhou 
Yuhang District People’s Court 
(2016) no. 6226 
177.  Guangzhou Hongxin real 
property management company 
v. Gao Fengling  
Guangdong Province Guangzhou 
City Intermediary People’s Court 
(2017) no. 17746 
Taking a dual role in 
another company  
178.  Qidong Kailai real estate 
development company v. Wang 
Wei and Zhao Peng  
Jiangsu Province Nantong City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2017) no. 1813 
Improper disposal of 
the company’s debts 
179.  Yiwu small product information 
technology company v. Wang 
Peichang  
Henan Province Puyang City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2017) no. 2540 
Breach of the duties 
of loyalty and care  
180.  Li Jicheng v. Gan Shan  Zhejiang Province Higher 
People’s Court (2017) no. 622 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund  
181.  Shanghai Fumi culture company 
v. Zuo Chunju  
Shanghai First Intermediary 
People’s Court (2017) no. 10301 
Breach of duty of 
care and delay in 
payment  
182.  Gaomi Kaidi investment and 
management company v. Qian 
Xianchen 
Shandong Province Gaomi City 
People’s Court (2017) no. 4891 
Arbitrarily providing 
guarantee for 
personal debt and 
selling the 
company’s asset 
183.  Wu Youhong v. Zhang Zhong  Jiangsu Province Zhejiang City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2017) no. 2601 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund to 
pay personal debt  
184.  Guanlin company v. Huang 
Qifen  
Fujian Province Higher People’s 
Court (2017) no. 43 
Arbitrarily hiring 
recruiting counsel to 
seek CEO candidate  
185.  Shanghai Guangwan construction 
design consultancy firm v. Wan 
Gujian  
Shanghai City Pudong New 





engaging in the same 
business as the 
company does  
186.  Siping Hongji real property 
limited company v. Wang Yabin  
Jilin Province Siping Tixi District 
People’s Court (2017) no. 571 
Arbitrarily disposing 
of the company’s 
asset at unreasonable 
low price  
 
187.  Tang Congmiao, Zhang Xiaoying 
v. Yang Ali  
Guangdong Province Shenzhen 
City Futian District People’s 
Court (2017) no. 16526  
Receiving 
commission paid to 








188.  Tan Jianer v. Zheng Dan  Shanghai City Songjiang District 






and client resources  
189.  Li Yiwei v. Wang Dong and Su 
Wei  
Hubei Province Zaoyang City 
People’s Court (2016) no. 1698 
Engaging in the 
same business as the 
company runs  
190.  Guangxi Liujiang hengze real 
estate development company v. 
Liang Yijian  
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous 
Region Liujiang County People’s 
Court (2017) no. 2304 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund  
191.  Yunxi Binhewan hotel company 
v. Wang Chuandi  
Hubei Province Yunxi County 
People’s Court (2016) 1259 
Over-pricing the cost 
of a project  
192.  Shanghai Zhaolin gymnastic 
company v. Ge Yijiong 
Shanghai City Pudong New 
District People’s Court (2017) 
no. 42948 
Engaging in the 
same business as the 
company runs and 
withholding student 
resources  
193.  Huayuan renting company v. 
Jiang Wenhui  
Beijing City Chaoyang District 
People’s Court (2017) no. 13538 
Buying cars for 
himself from 
corporate fund 
194.  Li Haining v. Yang Lichun and 
Lu Rongjie  
Beijing City Haidian District 
People’s Court (2015) no. 24997 
Engaging in the 
same business and 
transferring the 
company’s IP right 
195.  Tuo Xizhong v. Tuo Dapeng and 
Tuo Xiquan  
Hebei Province Higher People’s 
Court (2017) no. 504 
Making loans to a 
third party to obtain 
the land parcel  
196.  Fugeshen machinery construction 
(Shanghai) company v. Hu 
Jianwei  
Shanghai City Second 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2017) no. 7018 
Arbitrarily paying 
the bonus to himself 
197.  Fengshun Yifeng transportation 
company v. Tian Sheng 
Guangdong Province Meizhou 
City Intermediary People’s Court 
(2017) no. 675 
Providing welfare to 
people who are not 
employees  
198.  Liu Yikui v. Liu Chengping and 
Sichuan Degang group company  
Sichuan Province Deyang City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2017) no. 550 
Signing acceptance 
bills without 
contractual basis  
199.  Simante micro-display 
(Shenzhen) company v. Hu 
Qiusheng  
Guangdong Province Higher 
People’s Court (2016) no. 70 
Responsibilities of 
capital contribution 
were not fulfilled  
200.  Shiyan zhongbai culture product 
company v. Ma Like  
Hubei Province Shiyan City 
Maojian District People’s Court 
(2016) no. 2792 
Breach of duties of 
loyalty and care  
201.  Li Jinqiu v. Li Qi  Beijing City Daxing District 
People’s Court (2017) no. 6448 
Transfer of the 
company’s asset at 
low price  
 
202.  Guilin Liudianban food company 
v. Hu Haibo  
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous 
Region Guilin City Intermediary 
People’s Court (2017) no. 1675 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund and 
holding back the 
company’s materials 







203.  Zhang Xiaochuan, Yang Guifang 
v. Tu Jianghong  
Chongqing City Nanchuan 





204.  Zibo Qiyuan construction design 
company v. Ma Zhiqiang  
Shandong Province Zibo City 
High-tech Industry Development 




205.  Chen Genxi, Jiang Binghui v. Cai 
Maoquan  
Shanghai City Pudong New 





206.  Hangzhou aquaculture company 
v. Wen Xianming, Xu Tong  
Zhejiang Province Hangzhou 
City Xiacheng District People’s 
Court (2016) no. 8362 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund  
207.  Tianxiang investment 
consultancy company v. Ji 
Songqiao  
Beijing City Haidian District 
People’s Court (2015) no. 02739  
Making loans 
without due approval 
and failure to make 
payment in 
compliance with the 
contract  
208.  Jiang Jun, Li Quan v. Zhang 
Jinfeng, Shanghai Miheng 
Medical Equipment Sales Center  
Shanghai City Higher People’s 
Court (2017) no. 22 
Arbitrarily 
transferring the 
company’s fund to 
another company’s 
fund  
209.  Jiangxi Yichun Zhonggong group 
company v. Ruan Dongrong and 
Jiangxi Pugang company  
Jiangxi Province Higher People’s 





210.  Chongqing Zhongqi xinan 
automobile group company v. 
Xie Yong  
Chongqing City Yubei District 
People’s Court (2017) no. 8337 
Engaging in the 
same business as the 
company runs  
211.  Suzhou Hengting electronic 
company v. Li Liang and Zhou 
Wei  
Jiangsu Province Suzhou City 
Huqiu District People’s Court 
(2016) no. 3054 
Holding the 
company’s seals and 
licence after being 
dismissed, abuse of 
power to pay wages 
212.  Wuxi Zhongou education 
consultancy company v. Guo 
Yun and Wuxi Yuguo media 
company  
Jiangsu Province Higher People’s 
Court (2017) no. 1197 
Causing losses to the 
company by related 
party transactions 
213.  Shanghai Jinting cultural 
communication company v. Song 
Haitao  
Guangdong Province Foshan City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2017) no. 758  
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund  
214.  Shanghai Zhongqiao education 
development company v. Xu Li  
Shanghai City First Intermediary 
People’s Court (2017) no. 5255 
Transfer of the 
company’s asset, 
causing losses to the 
company  
215.  Zhejiang Bokai meter company 
v. Ye Dafu  
Zhejiang Province Hanghzou 
City Intermediary People’s Court 
(2017) no. 2043 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund under 
the cover of unclear 
entry of expenditure   
216.  Guangdong Purun environment 
protection technology company 
v. Zhou Cong Zhang  
Guangdong Province Jiangmen 
City Intermediary People’s Court 
(2017) no. 881 
Engaging in the 
same business as the 





217.  Xiamen Shengyuan rubber and 
plastic company v. Lv Fangzong  
Fujian Province Higher People’s 
Court (2017) no. 44 
Breach of duties of 
loyalty and care and 
arbitrarily confirm 
price increase of the 
project  
218.  Wu Youhong v. Zhang Zhong  Jiangsu Province Zhenjiang City 
Jingkou District People’s Court 
(2017) no. 762 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund  
219.  Guizhou Xianggui investment 
company v. She Meilin  
Guizhou Province Guiyang City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2017) no. 374 
Entering into a 
contract without due 
approval of 
shareholders meeting  
220.  Aili Wensen (Beijing) material 
company v. Yang Wenshuang  
Beijing City Dongcheng District 
People’s Court (2017) no. 8157 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund and 
starting a new 
company  
221.  Suqian Ruiyou renewable energy 
company v. Wang Jianfang  
Jiangsu Province Suqian City 
People’s Court (2017) no. 353 
Breach of the duty of 
care, causing 
corporate licence 
improperly used  
222.  Su Qihao v. Liu Yang  Chongqing City Yubei District 
People‘s Court (2016) no. 16004 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund  
223.  Tianjin Xunshan internet 
technology company v. Li 
Hongtao  
Tianjin City Nankai District 
People’s Court (2017) no. 3757 
Self-dealing 
transactions  
224.  Shenzhen Baiheng electronic 
company and Zeng Zhixiong v. 
Chen Xi  
Guangdong Province Shenzhen 
City Intermediary People’s Court 
(2017) no. 103  
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund  
225.  Shangguan Yiwu v. Ma Xuewen  Shandong Province Yancheng 
County People’s Court (2015) no. 
820 
Improperly dealing 
with the disputes 
with a third party  
226.  Xianggang Xujun company v. 
Zou * 
Shenzhen City Qianhai District 
People’s Court (2016) no. 238 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund  
227.  Liao Minxia v. He Boning  Guangdong Province Foshan City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2017) no. 2268 
Vexatious arbitration  
228.  Guangdong Ailehuo company v. 
Li Gaosheng, He Liping 
Guangdong Province Foshan City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2017) no. 2094 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund 
229.  Shanghai Jinglian information 
technology company v. Zhang 
Danyu  
Beijing City Xicheng District 




230.  Nanjing guotai fire extinguishing 
company v. Wang Changcai  
Jiangsu Province Nanjing City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2016) no. 10564 
Starting a new firm 
which engages in 
similar business to 
the company runs  
231.  Shanghai Lemeng information 
technology company v. Wu 
Minchun  
Shanghai City Second 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2016) no. 1156 
Inflating expenditure 
and refusing to 
return corporate fund  
232.  Hebei Ruihe glass fiber company 
v. Zhang Litai  
Hebei Province Higher People’s 
Court (2017) no. 99 
Failure to ensure the 
company to pay tax, 








233.  Li Hao v. Zhang Youwei and 
Guangdong Tianma tourist 
agency company  
Guangdong Province Guangzhou 
City Intermediary People’s Court 
(2016) no. 18843 
Entries to record 
with fabricated 
invoices 
234.  Chongqing Changshou 
transportation renting company 
v. Li Xuefeng  
Chongqing City Changshou 




without resolution of 
shareholders meeting  
235.  Chengdu Shuyunyuan culture 
development company v. Chen 
Xiaodong  
Sichuan Province Chengdu City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2016) no. 11401 
Engaging in the 




236.  Guangzhou Miaoyizhai bio-
technology company v. Huo 
Guangsen and Deng Meixian  
Guangdong Province Guangzhou 
City Intermediary People’s Court 
（2016） no. 17726 
Misappropriation of 
corporate fund  
237.  Yuan Min, Pan Hui, Peng Ling, 
Jiang Yuxia v. Huang Qiren, 
Huang Wei, Shu Tao, Xu 
Youming  
Sichuan Province Higher 
People’s Court (2016) no. 950 





238.  Tongdali company v. Xin 
Fengqin  
Liaoning Province Higher 
People’s Court (2016) no. 832 
Transfer of 
company’s real 
property without due 
approval of 
shareholders meeting  
239.  Wu Jie v. Shu Jie  Jiangsu Province Suzhou City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2017) no. 9744 
Failure to fulfill the 
duty in liquidation 
procedure  
240.  Yang Ziyuan v. Chen Jing  Guangdong Province Foshan City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
(2017) no. 881 
Failure to obtain all 
the government 
approval  
241.  Kunming Yunan wining 
company v. Wu Hongliang  
Fujian Province Higher People’s 
Court (2016) no. 1521 
Self-dealing 
transactions  
242.  Sichuan Dawo renovation 
company v. Tong Xu  
Sichuan Province Tongjiang 




and seals  
243.  Zhao Yuwun v. Zhao Haiyang  Hubei Province Wuhan City 
Intermediary People’s Court 
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Management behaviour is undisputedly pivotal to a company’s operation and performance. 
How to incentivize and discipline management behaviour is a common concern in practice, 
and a fundamental problem of corporate governance. In law, there is worldwide 
convergence of the rules regarding directors’ duties and liabilities. Various jurisdictions 
have introduced the fiduciary duties of loyalty and care from the US corporate law systems 
to strengthen directors’ obligations, but the practical effect varies across countries. This 
thesis focuses exclusively on directors’ duties and liabilities in China, examines how 
fiduciary duty is incorporated into corporate legislation, and analyses how such duties and 
liabilities function and ameliorate the agency problems in this particular context.   
   The functional inquiry is based on the theoretical discussions from a law and economics 
perspective. Agency theory identifies the conflict of interests in a corporate scenario, 
explains why managers or controlling shareholders might misuse controlling power, and 
generally assesses the utility, limitation, and cost of internal monitoring forces, incentive 
schemes, and external market mechanisms in disciplining management opportunism. 
Following the roadmap of the agency theory, this thesis examines the ownership structure 
and internal governance of China’s companies and observes that concentrated ownership is 
commonplace and internal governance mechanisms might not sufficiently monitor and 
control management behaviour as corporate practices have developed relatively recently.  
Moreover, a historical review of enterprise development shows that state control and 
family control remain in many companies and might exacerbate the expropriation of 
minority shareholders’ interests by managers and controlling shareholders. Meanwhile, 
share prices and other signals in the markets are not informative about a company’s 
profitability, since the stock market has not achieved fully-fledged development and the 
market for corporate control has just emerged. Thus, an alternative mechanism is needed to 
curb management opportunism in China.  
To better understand the necessity, rationale, and working mechanism of directors’ 
duties and liabilities, this thesis reviews previous discussions, including the analysis of the 
fiduciary duty from the view of incomplete contract theory, the LLSV empirical studies, 
and cost-benefit analysis of the monetary liability for breach of the duty of care. In essence, 
general duties are adopted to fill in incomplete management contracts to regulate business 
decision-making in varying circumstances. Monetary liabilities can generate a deterrent 
effect. When the relative benefit of monetary liabilities outweighs the cost of enforcement, 
the enforcement of liabilities is highly desirable. Nevertheless, the relative benefit of 
monetary liabilities is contingent on the efficient and informative nature of the share price 
and other signals. In line with such cost-benefit analysis, this thesis observes that the 
relative benefit of monetary liabilities is considerable in China, since share prices and other 
market signals are not as efficient and informative as their counterparts in developed 
markets.   
This thesis examines the design and formulation of directors’ duties and liabilities and 






and apply a general term. Meanwhile, an analysis of judicial decisions from 2013 to 2017 
presents a general picture of the enforcement practice. Private actions against directors’ 
wrong-doing are relatively inactive but not completely dormant in small and medium-sized 
companies. However, directors in the SOEs and listed companies are rarely sued and are 
almost free from monetary liabilities. Besides, a literature review of the administrative 
sanctions imposed on listed companies shows that directors in listed companies are under 
increasingly intense pressure to fulfill the information disclosure duty, even though the 
amount of the fine is too small. Overall, directors’ duties and liabilities play a limited role 
in deterring management opportunism in China.   
To bridge the gap between normative role and current state of directors’ duties and 
liabilities, this thesis identifies the reasons for the underenforcement of directors’ liabilities, 
including procedural hurdles, unreasonable cost burden, and perceived deficiencies in the 
judiciary. Finally, a series of measures are proposed to enhance the applicability of the 
relevant legal rules and to encourage private actions against management wrongdoing.  





















Managementgedrag is in hoge mate bepalend voor het functioneren en de prestaties van 
een bedrijf – daarover bestaat weinig discussie. In de praktijk worstelt men echter vaak met 
de vraag, hoe 'goed' managementgedrag gestimuleerd kan worden en welke maatregelen 
bij ongewenst gedrag kunnen worden genomen. In het kader van corporate governance is 
dit een fundamenteel probleem. De wetgeving met betrekking tot de plichten en 
aansprakelijkheid van bestuurders ontwikkelt zich wereldwijd in dezelfde richting. In 
diverse rechtsgebieden zijn, om de plichten van bestuurders sterker in de wet te verankeren, 
de fiduciaire plichten loyaliteit en zorg uit het Amerikaanse stelsel van ondernemingsrecht 
overgenomen, maar het effect daarvan in de praktijk verschilt van land tot land. In deze 
thesis, die uitsluitend ingaat op de plichten en aansprakelijkheden van bestuurders in China, 
wordt onderzocht op welke wijze fiduciaire plichten in het ondernemingsrecht zijn 
opgenomen. Daarbij wordt geanalyseerd welk effect dergelijke plichten en 
aansprakelijkheden hebben en hoe ze in deze specifieke omgeving het principaal-
agentprobleem verkleinen.   
   De centrale vraag is gebaseerd op theoretische discussies vanuit de vakgebieden rechten 
en economie. De principaal-agenttheorie maakt duidelijk dat er in bedrijfsomgevingen 
belangenconflicten bestaan, hetgeen verklaart waarom controlerende aandeelhouders hun 
macht kunnen misbruiken en geeft een algemene analyse van het nut, de beperkingen en de 
kosten van interne controle, stimuleringsregelingen en externe marktmechanismen als 
disciplinaire maatregelen tegen opportunistisch gedrag van managers. In dit proefschrift 
wordt, met de principaal-agenttheorie als routekaart, de eigendomsstructuur en de interne 
aansturing in Chinese bedrijven onderzocht. Daarbij wordt geconstateerd dat 
geconcentreerd eigendom gebruikelijk is en de interne controlemechanismen mogelijk 
onvoldoende zijn om toezicht uit te oefenen en te sturen op managementgedrag.  
Daarnaast wordt de ontwikkeling van bedrijven vanuit historisch perspectief besproken, 
waarbij wordt aangegeven dat veel bedrijven nog steeds door de staat en families worden 
aangestuurd en dat dit de mogelijkheden voor managers en controlerende aandeelhouders 
om tegen de belangen van minderheidsaandeelhouders in te gaan, verder vergroot. Daar 
komt bij dat aandelenprijzen en andere marktsignalen geen informatie over de 
winstgevendheid van een bedrijf geven, omdat de aandelenmarkt nog niet volledig is 
ontwikkeld en de markt voor bedrijfscontrole nog maar kort geleden is ontstaan. Er zijn in 
China dus andere mechanismen nodig om opportunistisch gedrag van managers tegen te 
gaan.  
In deze scriptie wordt, om meer inzicht te krijgen in de noodzaak, logica en werking van 
plichten en aansprakelijkheden voor bestuurders, bestaand materiaal besproken, waaronder 
de fiduciaire plicht vanuit de theorie over onvolledige contracten, de empirische studies 
van LLSV en een kosten-batenanalyse van financiële aansprakelijkheid bij schending van 
de zorgplicht. In wezen worden algemene plichten toegepast om tekortkomingen in 
onvolledige managementovereenkomsten op te vangen en zo in uiteenlopende situaties de 
zakelijke besluitvorming te regelen. Aansprakelijkheid kan een afschrikkende werking 






oplevert, is het zeer wenselijk dat het aansprakelijkheidsrecht wordt ingezet. Hierbij geldt 
wel dat de relatieve voordelen van aansprakelijkheid afhankelijk zijn van de efficiëntie 
waarmee aandelenprijzen en andere signalen tot stand komen en van de informatieve 
waarde van deze signalen. Op basis van zo'n kosten-batenanalyse wordt in dit proefschrift 
vastgesteld dat het relatieve voordeel van aansprakelijkheid in China aanzienlijk is, omdat 
aandelenprijzen en andere marktsignalen niet zo efficiënt tot stand komen en niet zo 
informatief zijn als in andere grote landen, in ontwikkelde markten.   
In dit proefschrift worden de opbouw en de formulering van plichten en 
aansprakelijkheid van bestuurders onderzocht en wordt ingegaan op de problemen waar 
Chinese rechters, die niet bevoegd zijn om algemene plichten te interpreteren en op te 
leggen, mee te maken hebben. Aan de hand van een analyse van rechterlijke uitspraken in 
de periode 2013-2017 wordt een algemeen beeld gegeven van de handhaving in de praktijk. 
Privaatrechtelijke maatregelen tegen bestuurders die zich misdragen komen in het midden- 
en kleinbedrijf niet vaak voor, maar er zijn wel gevallen te noemen. Toch worden 
bestuurders van staatsbedrijven en beursgenoteerde bedrijven bijna nooit vervolgd of 
financieel aansprakelijk gesteld. Verder is literatuuronderzoek uitgevoerd naar de 
bestuurlijke sancties die aan beursgenoteerde bedrijven zijn opgelegd. Daarbij is gebleken 
dat bestuurders van beursgenoteerde bedrijven steeds sterker onder druk staan om aan hun 
informatieplicht te voldoen, ondanks het feit dat de boetes voor schending van deze plicht 
te laag zijn. In het algemeen spelen de verplichtingen en de aansprakelijkheid van 
bestuurders in China slechts een beperkte rol als het gaat om het voorkomen van 
opportunistisch gedrag van managers.   
In dit proefschrift wordt beoogd de kloof te overbruggen tussen de normatieve rol die 
plichten en aansprakelijkheden van bestuurders zouden moeten spelen en de huidige status 
ervan, door vast te stellen om welke redenen er te weinig op de plichten van bestuurders 
wordt gehandhaafd. Dit zijn onder andere procedurele hindernissen, onredelijk hoge kosten 
en vermeende tekortkomingen van het rechtsstelsel. Tot slot worden maatregelen 
voorgesteld die de toepasbaarheid van de betreffende rechtsnormen zouden verbeteren en 
het nemen van privaatrechtelijke maatregelen tegen misdragingen van bestuurders zouden 
aanmoedigen.  
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